The Ghost Train

Phase 1

7:30 a.m.
Michel Petit, the assistant train station manager, and an active member of the M.N.B. (Mouvement National Belge) resistance group, notes that SS soldiers take up positions along tracks 14 and 15. He estimates there are between 150 and 175 SS-men on the platforms. A civilian has already informed him around 6 a.m. that the prison of Saint-Gilles is in the process of being evacuated. Michel Petit gives covert instructions to sabotage the locomotive requested for this action. He immediately sends out a message to the Laeken resistance group, asking them to pass on the warning to all other resistance groups covering the Brussels-Antwerp railway route. Informed that a German hospital train is being diverted via Denderleeuw to Bruxelles Midi/Brussel Zuid station, Michel Petit, assisted by another staff member, leaves his office to go and fix a dynamite charge onto rail switch no. 67.

7:40 a.m.
The station manager, Léon Petit, passes on the same information as his namesake Michel. A short time later a resistance man shows up in Léon’s office, promising the station manager that he will use all means at his disposal to keep the train from leaving, pending a possible positive answer from General Jungclaus. Petit assures the man that there will be no problem, but requests him to go and find the train depot manager, Technical Inspector Piette, and ask him to slow down the delivery of the requested locomotive. No sooner is he informed than Piette passes on the instruction to engine driver Roelants. Without informing the Germans, all the locomotives spread around the marshalling yard are called to the railway depot.
Léon Petit’s office is earmarked as the central headquarters for the whole operation. From here a well-conceived priority sabotage plan will be executed in the course of the day. The actors will be primarily the railroad personnel and staff, aided by resistance people. Soon many resistance members, including the personal representative of Général De Gaulle, are coming and going. A violent intervention is considered, but dropped as it is realised that any such action will inevitably entail carnage. The word is spread that the Germans are to be constantly and deliberately misinformed on the total number of locomotives available.

As soon as the Fahrtnummer (convoy number) 1.682.508 for the prison train is given to Léon Petit, he secretly passes it on to the railway depot workshop. Now the sabotage can be pinpointed onto particular locomotives and plans laid down in detail. Spare parts will get broken, drivers can make themselves scarce or disappear altogether or they can get hurt or ill and (unnecessary) additional controls can be inserted in the day’s schedule to slow down the whole process. Locomotives can show up at the wrong places and unfortunate misinterpretations will certainly cause problems all over the marshalling yard. Imagination will be their only limit.

9.15 a.m.
A locomotive is requested from the depot. The depot reports that the specific Type 33 locomotive has broken down. In fact the lubrication piping has been sabotaged on Locomotive 3302. Locomotive 1202 is now assigned, but it turns out to be suffering from a broken Westinghouse pump. The driver Georges reports sick and is replaced by Vanderveken. It becomes obvious to the Germans that the Belgians are deliberately slowing down the repair jobs. They order German mechanics to take over and the engine is soon fixed. However, as the locomotive leaves the depot it is sent off in the wrong direction and ends up in a totally different place somewhere on the marshalling yard. At noon it will be reported as still there …

12:00 noon
A locomotive towing a German goods train pulls in at Bruxelles Midi/Brussel Zuid. It is reassigned to the prisoner’s train. However, the locomotive is inadvertently diverted to the Schaerbeek marshalling yard on the other side of Brussels. Apparently there has been some misunderstanding at the turntable where trains can be sent off in different directions on different tracks …

2:00 p.m.
Driver Roelants requests to be replaced, as his shift has been completed. He is replaced by Delorme, who claims he still has to go and collect his wages (it is Saturday). He disappears from the depot and as it turns out stays away for two hours.

2:15 p.m.
Georges’ replacement, Vanderveken, drags his feet as long as possible. Seeing that this act cannot be kept up indefinitely, he falls from a locomotive and fakes being injured so well that the Germans carry him off to hospital.

3:15 p.m.
The Germans are completely at a loss and send an armed guard to the locomotive depot and start looking for Delorme. Eventually Louis Verheggen and Léon Pochet are ordered to drive the engine. Three SS guards move into the driver’s cab and take up positions behind the two engineers, their weapons trained at their backs. They will remain there until 10:15 a.m. the following morning, an 18-hour constant vigil on the slightest movements of the drivers. Despite the guards, Verheggen and Pochet manage to continue sabotaging the progress of the train for the whole journey.

3:30 p.m.
Locomotive 1202 leaves the depot.

4:15 p.m.
Locomotive 1202 is attached to the row of 32 wagons. The train is guarded by several German officers and between 150 and 175 SS soldiers. A section of machine-guns has been mounted onto the anti-aircraft (flak) wagon. They are installed in such manner as to be able to direct their fire along both flanks of the train. Verheggen demands a brake test to be executed, in spite of the German workshop leader assuring him that this has already been done. Verheggen informs assistant manager Deweiger that he will do anything in his power to keep the train from passing the border. Deweiger runs along the train shouting the message to the prisoners as he passes each wagon. In the meantime he picks up all little pieces of paper thrown out of the trucks (via the ventilation slots) by the prisoners. These scraps of paper contain messages to their families and relatives. Deweiger takes a great risk as the patrolling guards would normally shoot him for doing this, but somehow it doesn’t happen. Assistant-chief Decoster approaches Verheggen to sign a work form but in reality he passes on a message that the Resistance is counting on him and trusts him.

Departure of the train is now set at 4:50 p.m.
Leaving the station, Verheggen notices that the signaller has set the all-clear sign for slow traffic to Ruisbroek. Profiting from the ignorance of the three guards he enters the marshalling yard on this wrong track. The local assistant station manager stops him and after some discussion he is redirected to Forest/Vorst. At Forest-Midi/Vorst-Zuid railway station, Vanderstricht, the assistant station manager, has been informed of the oncoming prisoner train, which is supposed to pass through his yard at 4:55 p.m. He has put his signals in such way as to force a 72-wagon German goods train coming from Halle and on its way to Bruxelles Midi/Brussel Zuid via Forest/Vorst onto the main track, thus blocking Verheggen’s locomotive. Logically Vanderstricht directs the Ghost Train locomotive onto a dead-end sidetrack. Vanderstricht now starts concentrating on the 72-wagon train on the main track. In order to move it away the locomotive needs to be brought from the head to the back of the row of wagons. Vanderstricht eventually splits up the train into two parts. Discussions with the Germans leads to the decision to send the locomotive back on the reverse track. In the process an anti-aircraft (flak) wagon is attached to the train at Forest/Vorst. Verheggen takes the opportunity to replenish his water supply.

Phase 2

5:45 p.m.
The Ghost Train arrives at the Schaerbeek railway marshalling yard. In spite of the signal being in the “safe” position, Verheggen brakes to a stop and intends to leave the engine’s cabin pretending to go and fetch a yard pilot. He is forced back inside the cabin and ordered to leave immediately. One of the guards assures him: “Maschine kaput, du kaput!” (Locomotive dead, you dead!).

At Vilvoorde the signals are in “stop” position. Verheggen secretly congratulates the clever signaller. It allows him to halt his train for a long period of time. The guards however soon get impatient and suspicious and order him to drive on in spite of the signals.

Driving into the Mechelen/Malines marshalling yard via Eppegem at around 11 p.m. the signals are again in the “stop” position. This is normal though, as the signal installation is out of order following the latest Allied bombing raid on Mechelen/Malines. The engineer needs to get down and phone to find out whether he can actually pass the signs. The guards again make a lot of fuss but realizing Verheggen is in the right, he is given permission to get down from the engine and is escorted by two guards to the nearest telephone. One guard stays with Pochet. Permission to pass the signs is obtained and the journey continues.

Belgian railways used a similar type of upper quadrant semaphore signals as the British, with the default (horizontal) position, and accompanying red light, meaning stop. (www.signalbox.org)

The engineers Verheggen and Pochet keep the vapour release valve activated the whole time, even when the engine is not moving. This absolutely unnecessary manoeuvre, unobserved by the three SS guards, causes extreme loss of water. Verheggen and Pochet only raise the question of water replenishment as they come into Mechelen/Malines, where they know the water can not be replenished due to damage caused to the water supplies during the recent allied bombing of the Mechelen train yard. This results in the train being diverted to the nearest available water tanks, at the overcrowded Muizen station.

Meanwhile, the fate of the prisoners aboard what was now being called the “Ghost Train” was being urgently discussed by Red Cross representatives with SS General Jungclaus. Also putting pressure on Jungclaus to order the prisoners’ release was General Werner Wachsmuth, German commander of the Brussels Military Hospital and of all sick and wounded in Brussels. With the Allies drawing nearer he had been ordered to evacuate the city and to leave all non-walking wounded behind, but this he was not prepared to do. In the prevailing circumstances Jungclaus agreed to give the order for the train to return to Brussels for the release of all political prisoners into custody of the Belgian authorities. (RAF Evaders)

11:40 p.m.
The Ghost Train pulls in at Muizen station. The train is not given permission to leave. Shots are heard around 0:15 a.m. The German train controller eventually shows up around 5.30 a.m. and orders the train to return to Mechelen/Malines.

Sunday 3 September 1944
05:30 a.m.
The Ghost Train leaves Muizen but on approaching Mechelen/Malines the wheels of the locomotive start slipping as the train takes a curve due to malfunctioning sand distributors. Verheggen goes to the nearest telephone and requests a locomotive be sent to pull his convoy away. A Type I locomotive is available and will be sent ASAP. Its driver is Gerardy. Verheggen makes certain that Gerardy knows exactly what his train contains and what its intended destination is.

Returning to his engine Verheggen gets into a discussion with the SS soldiers manning the anti-aircraft gun wagon, which has been shifted at Forest/Vorst from being at the back of the train, to right behind the locomotive. They demand their flak wagon be repositioned at the back of the train and away from the engine, the first target of any marauding Allied fighter planes. Verheggen plans to leave them behind and has told Pochet of his intention. Once he has disconnected the flak wagon, he will not hook it on again and will leave for Brussels without it. That is why the flak wagon was missing when the train pulled in at La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland.

10:15 a.m.
The Ghost Train arrives at La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland station. The Germans and the collaborators immediately commandeer Gerardy and his locomotive. In the face of the advance of the Allies towards Brussels, all Germans and collaborators have now reached the point of sheer panic and their only aim is to grab any available transport to make sure they can escape to Germany. Gerardy’s engine is hooked up to a German train and he himself is forced to drive the train out. Later on he and his stoker will manage to escape from the engine in the Mechelen/Malines area.
Now that Verheggen’s locomotive has been detached from the train, the driver decides to make his own escape. He climbs down and starts inspecting the locomotive, walking around it. One guard stays behind holding a rifle to Pochet’s back. The two other guards have left. As soon as Verheggen is out of the German’s sight he makes a dash for it and gets away from the marshalling yard unscathed. Pochet decides to let the fire die out in the engine and starts taking actions to that effect.

Phase 3

09:10 a.m
Although the Bruxelles Midi/Brussel Zuid personnel have decided to follow the example of the other railway stations and abandon them, leaving the Germans with their own problems, they return to their posts as soon as they are informed by telephone from Bruxelles-Ouest/Brussel-West that a prisoner train is approaching La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland.

The German train commander, unaware of Jungclaus’ decision to release the prisoners, demands another locomotive to be hooked up to his train. A troop train commander has already confiscated locomotive 109. For the other engine, locomotive 1202, there is no driver available, Verheggen having made a run for it. Also by this time stoker Pochet has managed to kill the fire in the boiler. One locomotive is reserved for a Red Cross train. All of sudden it seems that several locomotives have been sent off to Schaerbeek without wagons. With all the signals being held on “safe”, approaching trains just pass the La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland station without stopping. The La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland railway people have made it impossible for the prisoner train to leave the station again.

10:30 a.m.
Baron Kruuse af Verchou, the Swedish consul to Belgium, Mr Miney, the Swiss consul, Robert baron de Foy (head of the Sécurité d’Etat belge) and his Chef de Cabinet, Victor Liekendael are called to the office of the German Ambassador Mayr-Falkenberg who informs them officially of Jungclaus’ orders to release the prisoners and that the prisoner train is on its way back. The delegation immediately departs for the La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland station.

10:45 a.m.
Dr Van Dooren, whose wife is one of the prisoners in the train, begins negotiations with the German railway commander at La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland. The doctor arrives with Mr. Roberte of the Red Cross. Roberte had been informed at 6 a.m. by the German ambassador that the train had been ordered back and that all prisoners are to be returned to their cells at Saint-Gilles prison. Roberte is determined to not let the prisoners return to Saint-Gilles and asks Van Dooren to begin talks with the German commandant.

12:30 p.m.
The commandant, himself being in the dark concerning any specific orders, lets himself be convinced and orders the prisoners to be released from the train.

Shortly after the liberation of the political prisoners at La Petite Ile/Klein-Eiland station, news arrived confirming Jungclaus’ orders to free the prisoners.
SS General Richard Jungclaus was dismissed from his post on 16 September …

Despite the release of political prisoners from the Ghost Train, the POWs (who seem to have been overlooked) were still in their carriage when the train was taken over by German troops being returned to Germany.

When we came back into the station all political prisoners were released. An effort was made to turn the PWs over to the Red Cross but they refused to take the responsibility of accepting us. We were [now] on a Red Cross troop train with three engines. Nobody seemed to know what was happening and the political prisoners were looting the cars. We were told that the Maquis (sic) had given their word that one Red Cross train could go through the lines in return for the release of all political prisoners. We started out of the station again but soon stopped. There was the noise of explosions and tanks, then we backed into the yard at Strombeek (sic). At Strombeek two of the cars were derailed so the cars behind them were abandoned. The Germans in these cars all piled into the first few cars and they went off. We PWs were left there and everything was quiet. The Canadian F/Lt (Thurmeier MB/1114 – query) whom we had elected as our leader because he spoke German insisted that we all lay on the car floors until morning. He was afraid of booby-traps and snipers. The navigator named Ted (Kleinman #2101) and another American went out to look things over. When they came back, they said it would be best to stay where we were until dawn. (Bomar account #1593)

We remained on the train, which left Brussels at 14.00 hrs. As the train was starting, three PWs (names unknown) were able to get out of the carriage. The train arrived at Mechelin at 20.00 hrs and then returned to Shaerbeek on the outskirts of Brussels, where it was derailed at 01.00 hrs on 4 Sept. The German guards then disappeared. At 04.00 hrs F/O Elliott (MB/1317) and I left the train and walked into Brussels. (Muir account 2885)

That afternoon (3 September) we set off for Germany again but owing to partisan activity we could not get through. We could see our own army advancing. The carriage with all the Allied men was derailed, and the Germans all left us and went to the front of the train. About 16.30 hrs (sic) F/O Cunningham (2621) Sgt Murphy (2622) Sgt Mason (2623) and I left the train … (Brown account 2286)

About dark the train started moving off from Skarbeeck (sic). There were general disturbances outside. The train stopped, backed off, and the baggage car came off. The Germans went wild and scattered. The men remained in the car to see what happened. About daybreak it was agreed that any man who wanted to leave could. (Ryckman account #1591)

The train reached Schaarbeek where we saw a Red Cross train go by with wounded and soldiers. Also noticed that one SS officer with us had changed his uniform to Wehrmacht. Much shunting to and fro, and our particular car was switched off, derailed, and left there. We layed low until morning fearing a trap (39 of us) and then escaped in small groups during early hours of morning. (Terzian account #1789)

My particular thanks to John Howes, Oliver Clutton-Brock, Edouard Reniere, Bruce Bolinger and of course to Walter Verstraeten — Keith Janes

List of the airmen POWs believed to have been on board the Ghost Train

Men from 458th are highlighted below.