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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION
APO 558

EE-S-4

373.2

1 April 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Missions 21 March 1945 - Field Orders 634 and 635.

TO : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.

F. O. 634

BATTLE ORDER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	A/C DISPATCHED	A/C OVER TARGET
20th CBW	Alhorn (Vis.)	Osnabruck (H2X)	104	101
" "	Hesepe "	" "		
96th CBW	" "	" "	101	99
14th CBW	" "	" "	99	97
" "	Achmer "	" "		
2nd CBW	" "	" "	114	112
		24D	418	409

F. O. 635

BATTLE ORDER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	A/C DISPATCHED	A/C OVER TARGET
96th CBW	Essen A/F (Vis.)	None	18	17
2nd CBW	" "	" "	20	20
20th CBW	" "	" "	22	22
14th CBW	" "	" "	32	31
			92	90

F. O. 6341. Takeoff, Assembly, and D.L.

a. Takeoffs were normal with units experiencing no weather difficulties. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were from fair to good with some units reporting slow assemblies. The Division assembly was effected with the 96th Combat Wing being two minutes late and being third in the Division column instead of second. An attempt was made by the 96th Combat Wing to secure proper position in the Division column at Control Point 1, but due to the large force, this was not effected and units remained in the order (20th - 14th - 96th - 2nd) at entry to the D.L. It should be noted that once a unit is in improper position on the D.L. it should remain in that position and not attempt to regain its briefed position unless the success of the mission (uncovery of IP etc) will be jeopardized by so doing.

Combat Wing	First Actual Takeoff	Assembly Altitudes	Briefed Time For CP 1	Assembly Time
20th	0621	14,000	0823	2:02
96th	0631	14,000	0826	1:55
14th	0615	14,000	0829	2:14
2nd	0615	14,000	0832	2:17

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. Landfall at enemy coast was very good - all units being within four miles of the briefed point. Visibility was very good. Division column here was eleven minutes in length.

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b. Route in to the IP was unobscured by clouds and visibility was good, aiding navigators to stay within six miles of course.

c. Maneuver at IP was normal; some units were two to four miles south due to conflict among Squadron formations while uncovering.

d. Bomb runs were made visually - navigation check points were good.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. Six Squadrons from the 20th Wing (448th and 446th - 3 each) were able to attack the airfield at Alhorn visually with excellent results. Hesepe was attacked by four Squadrons of the 93rd Group, eleven Squadrons from the 96th Wing and three Squadrons of the 392nd Group. The choice of fragmentation bombs, ordered by Eighth Air Force for this target, was an error. Units assigned to this target did excellent bombing - with the correct bomb loads a return trip to this airfield would not have been necessary. The remaining force of the 14th Wing (7 Squadrons) and all of the 2nd Combat Wing dealt Achmer a blow that will keep it unserviceable for some time. Results of the mission were excellent.

b. The excellent job done is an example of perfect coordination. This is again proof that performances of this caliber can be expected when there is careful coordination from planning through execution.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were normal for three Wings; the 96th Combat Wing experienced difficulty in rallying because of interference from B-17's, and came out seven miles south of the rally point.

b. The route out to landfall showed excellent navigation, and all units adhered closely to course.

c. Landfall out was very good. All units were on course. The Division column was eighteen minutes in length.

5. Fighter Support

a. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force assigned the following Fighter Groups as close support: the 4th and 353rd. These Groups gave escort on penetration and in the target area. At "bombs away" they strafed the target A/D's.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy reaction to this effort. The Groups strafing the A/D's were covered by four Fighter Groups from other forces. The 353rd Group claims 12-0-4 jets, 9-0-15 s/e, and 5-0-1 t/e on ground at Achmer/Bramsche A/D, for loss of 5 MYR. 4th Group attempted to strafe Hesepe A/D but the flak was too heavy - the Group then adjourned to Achmer and helped 353rd Group for claims of 1-0-0 t/j, 4-0-4 t/e, and 4-0-4 s/e - the losses were 5 MYR.

b. Flak at the targets was meager, inaccurate.

7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - Both route and target forces were planned for this mission. Some weather difficulties were expected enroute from low middle cloud. The target force was to report weather thirty-five minutes before target time because the primaries were to be attacked visually only. In event the primaries were not visual, decision had to be made prior to the IP to go to the secondary target.

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b. Execution - No weather difficulties were encountered and all targets were attacked visually. The scouting forces functioned normally.

9. Screening Force

a. As none of our targets was heavily defended, no Screening Force was planned.

10. Radar

a. H2X Analysis

Group	<u>A/C</u> <u>Dispatched</u>	<u>A/C Over</u> <u>Target</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Navigation</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	2	2	1	1	1 equipment malfunction
445th	4	3	2	2	1 equipment malfunction
453rd	6	6	6	5	1 equipment malfunction
44th	6	6	6	6	
392nd	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
491st	3	3	3	3	
93rd	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
446th	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
448th	3	3	2	2	1 equipment malfunction
458th	6	6	6	5	1 equipment malfunction
466th	3	3	3	3	
467th	5	5	5	5	
	50	49	43	41	

(1) Radar performance on this mission is considered unsatisfactory. Malfunctions were of such a nature that they could not be fixed by the operator in the air.

b. GEE performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. There was some jamming but in most instances operation was unrestricted.

(1) Of 484 GEE A/C dispatched for the two missions of this date, only nine failures occurred.

c. GH Analysis

Group	<u>A/C</u> <u>Dispatched</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	2	2	Bombed visually - signals good.
445th	1	1	Bombed visually - signals fair.
453rd	3	2	A/C in LL did not turn equipment on. Signals fair - all visual bombing.
44th	4	3	Lead, 44th - no signals - others, signals fair - all visual bombing.
392nd	3	3	GH good - all bombing visual.
93rd	3	Unknown	GH equipment not utilized.
458th	1	1	Signals good - visual bombing.
466th	2	Unknown	GH equipment not utilized.
467th	2	Unknown	GH equipment not utilized.

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Tactical Analysis of Missions 21 March 1945

F. O. 635

1. Takeoff, Assembly, and D/L

a. Takeoffs were normal. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were from good to very good. On the D/L, all units were in proper order with some units being a little late; however, no difficulties ensued.

Combat Wing	First Actual Takeoff	Assembly Altitudes	Briefed Time For CP 1	Assembly Time
2nd	1545	12,000	1649	1:04
14th	1531	12,000	1631	1:20
96th	1500	13,000	1648	1:48
20th	1526	12,000	1650	1:24

NOTE: Due to the small number of A/C involved, the time allowed for assembly seems excessive. One hour and ten minutes should have been sufficient time for assembly.

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. Landfall in at enemy coast was made good. Visibility was good and cloud coverage almost nil. The Division column was four minutes long at the point of entry.

b. The route in to IP was flown within five miles of the briefed route by all units except the 20th Wing which approached its IP ten miles left of course due to faulty navigation. Visibility was good and cloud coverage was nil.

c. The maneuver at the IP was normal - all units uncovered in good order.

d. Bomb runs were good by all units in spite of slight haze and flak.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. The Essen A/F mission was a follow up of the attack on the airfields earlier in the day. Most units bombed with excellent results.

b. The 44th Group's lead A/C suffered battle damage which severed the electrical cables to the C-1 auto-pilot and bomb sight. The lead A/C was unable to relinquish its lead in the time remaining before bombs away. Bombs fell over and left. Two A/C of the same Squadron dropped early because of enemy action.

c. The lead A/C of the 446th Group had difficulty finding the MPI due to bomb smoke and haze - bombs fell upon roads and a barracks area - with very good damage results.

d. Excellent bombing was performed by the lead 389th, lead 466th, 448th and the LL 392nd.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were normal with all units leaving the target in good order.

b. Route out to landfall was flown generally five to six miles south of course by the 96th, 2nd, and 20th Wings, due to navigation. Good visibility afforded check points, but the 20th Wing was the only one to correct its course to the briefed landfall out. The 14th Wing cut its route short, going thirteen miles north of course.

c. Landfall out was very good by the 14th and 20th Wings; 96th and 2nd Wings were nine miles south of course, having failed to correct their heading when they came off course after the rally point. The Division column was four minutes long.

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Tactical Analysis of Missions 21 March 1945

5. Fighter Support

a. Two Fighter Groups supported 2.D Bombers on their second mission when they attacked Essen (Mulheim) Airfield in the Ruhr. The 359th Group covered the first two Boxes with the 355th on the last two Boxes. This was a reduced effort not necessitating a large number of Fighters.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy aircraft reaction.

b. Moderate to intense accurate tracking flak was experienced at the target.

7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - One force was to report target weather twenty minutes before target time.

b. Execution - Target force functioned normally.

9. Screening Force

a. This target was very heavily flak defended; however, no screening force was planned because the target was to be definitely visual.

10. Radar

a. H2X Analysis

Group	<u>A/C</u> <u>Dispatched</u>	<u>A/C Over</u> <u>Target</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Navigation</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	4	4	4	4	
445th	5	5	5	5	
453rd	1	1	1	1	
44th	3	3	2	2	1 equipment malfunction
392nd	1	1	1	1	
491st	1	1	1	1	
466th	4	4	4	3	1 interference
446th	2	2	2	2	
448th	2	2	2	2	
	<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>21</u>	

(1) H2X performance on this mission is considered satisfactory; there were two failures - the cables on one aircraft were cut by flak, and in the other A/C the H2X scope received too much interference - it could not be used for bombing.

b. GEE performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. There was some jamming on the Ruhr chain but operation was unrestricted.

c. GH Analysis

Group	<u>A/C</u> <u>Dispatched</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	1	1	Visual run - excellent signals
44th	2	2	" " " "

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392nd	1	1	Visual run - excellent signals
448th	1	1	" " "
446th	2	2	Visual run - good signals
466th	2	Unknown	GH equipment not utilized

(1) General remarks - Equipment worked very well.

11. Comments

a. In general these two missions were executed in a superior manner. Navigation on the early mission was particularly commendable and no more need be said about the bombing.

b. There was too much sloppy navigation on the mission to Essen A/F. The excellent visual conditions as well as the many navigational aids available should bring much better navigation than we had.

c. Runs on the Essen A/F mission were set up as GH runs. The 466th Group did not utilize GH equipment. The following up of visual runs with blind bombing instruments should be standard procedure (a) so that a change over to instrument bombing can be immediately effected when necessary, (b) so that equipment can be properly checked and (c) so that the operator will get the benefit of practice.

By command of Major General KEENE:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD
Brigadier General USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Robert H. Terrill
ROBERT H. TERRILL
Colonel GSC
Dep C of S for Operations

2 Incls:

Incl 1 - Weather Summary F. O. 634
Incl 2 - Weather Summary F. O. 635

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
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Tactical Analysis of Mission 21 March 1945 - F. O. 634

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Weather Summary



a. Forecast - Light non-persistent contrails above 23,000 feet becoming moderate to dense persistent, 1,000 feet below the cirrus. Target wind: at 20,000 feet - 280/45.

b. Actual - Contrails - light, non-persistent 18 - 22,000 feet and moderate persistent above 22,000 feet over the Continent. Winds and temperatures aloft as forecast.


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Tactical Analysis of Mission 21 March 1945 - F. O. 635

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Weather Summary

a. Forecast - Light, persistent contrails at 18 - 20,000 feet, becoming moderate, persistent above 22,000 feet. Target wind: at 23,000 feet - 280/38.

b. Actual - No contrails - winds and temperatures aloft as forecast.

Group 458th Bomb Gp (H)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

(Part 1)

Primary: Hosepe A/TOrdered Targets: Secondary: (1) Any A/T assigned to any other
(2) Osnabruck M/T unitDate of Operation 21 Mar ch 1945Division Field Order No. 694

Squadron	Sorties		Credit Sorties	Effective Sorties	Non Effective Sorties	No. A/C Bombing	Type of Tgt	Name of Target	Number and Type of Bombs on Targets	Aircraft Lost						Time of Take off	Total Time of Mis'n	Comments
	Total	Less Unused Spares								Total	Flak	Flak & E/A	E/A	Acc	U N K			
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	18	19	25	27	40
14	9	9	8	8	1	8	PT	Hosepe A/T	332 100# M30							0640	172	01 A/C - long delay fuzing
2	9	9	9	9	-	9	PT	Hosepe A/T	960 100# M30									
3	9	9	8	8	1	8	PT	Hosepe A/T	332 100# M30 2 M47									
4	9	9	9	9	-	9	PT	Hosepe A/T	424 120# M41									
TOTALS	36	36	34	34	2	34	PT	Hosepe A/T	1024 100# M30 424 120# M41 2 M47	-	-	-	-	-	-	0640	172	

NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE SUMMARY (Part 3)

Total Non Eff Sorties	Causes of Non-Effectives					Incidents of Mechanical and Equipment Failures															Comments
	Weather	Personne	Enemy Action	Other Non Mech.	Mech. & Equip.	Total	Engine	Oil System	Fuel System	Super-charger	Propeller & Governor	Communication System	Guns & Turrets	Bomb Release	Bomb Bay Doors	Electrical System	Instruments	Oxygen System	Bomb-sights	A/C in general	
46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
2					2	2				1						1					
Footnote 1 M41 Footnote 2 M41 Footnote 3																					

41-29305

42-50504

458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	ALLEN, R	209	3			42-50578	578	F	Z5	48	SKY ROOM	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	BECK	209	3			42-51199	199	A	Z5	39	UNKNOWN 023	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	BURMAN	209	19			41-29352	352	K	7V	84	WOLVE'S LAIR	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	CLUTTER	209	ABT			42-50504	504	L	7V	--	UNKNOWN 019	ABORT - #4 TURBO OUT
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	DANIEL	209	4			42-100366	366	H	Z5	71	MIZPAH	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	DYER	209	24	PHILLIP	L1	44-49902	902	M	J3	4	UNKNOWN 043	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	EIDELBERG	209	25			41-28980	980	V	J4	26	UNKNOWN 009	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	EVERETT	209	23			42-95183	183	U	Z5	92	BRINEY MARLIN	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	GRICE	209	35			42-51110	110	M	7V	93	TOP O' THE MARK	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HADDEN	209	28			44-40277	277	P	J4	51	MISS USED	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HATHORN	209	27		L3	44-49261	261	A	J3	14	UNKNOWN 042	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HERDTI	209	17			42-95018	018	J	Z5	93	OLD DOC'S YACHT	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HOEY	209	31			42-50912	912	D	J4	25	THE TRAVLIN' BAG	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HOFFMAN	209	15		L4	42-51939	939	G	J3	27	UNKNOWN 028	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	HOLMGREN	209	5			44-40126	126	L	Z5	70	SPITTEN KITTEN / SKY TRAMP	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	JACKSON, WL	209	16			44-10487	487	R	7V	46	Girl on surfboard (no name)	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	JOHNSON, C	209	13			42-51743	743	F	J3	24	UNKNOWN 006	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	LANQUIST	209	9			42-95557	557	H	J3	38	LADY PEACE	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	MARTIN, W	209	2			44-10618	618	T	J3	10	UNKNOWN 038	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	MATEER	209	4			42-50640	640	O	Z5	35	BUGS BUNNY	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	McCOY	209	13			42-50768	768	Y	J4	40	ARISE MY LOVE AND COME WITH ME	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	MINSKER	209	4	GARDNER	D1	44-48837	837	L	J3	18	UNKNOWN 041	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	NUTTER	209	7			42-95108	108	B	Z5	69	ENVY OF 'EM ALL II	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	O'REGAN	209	16			41-29340	340	N	7V	72	YANKEE BUZZ BOMB	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	PELTON	209	ABT			41-29305	305	N	Z5	--	I'LL BE BACK/HYPOCHONDRIAC	ABORT - #4 SUPER CHG
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	PERRY	209	33			42-100425	425	O	7V	70	THE BIRD	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	RHOADES	209	23			42-51179	179	P	Z5	80	DUSTY'S DOUBLE TROUBLE	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	ROBINSON	209	3			42-110163	163	M	J4	73	TIME'S A WASTIN	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	SANDERS	209	4			42-50456	456	D	Z5	50	DOROTHY KAY SPECIAL	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	SEALY	209	32			42-110059	059	T	Z5	72	UNKNOWN 056	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	SIMPSON	209	30			42-51270	270	A	7V	28	MY BUNNIE II	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	SMITH, WB	209	1			44-50766	766	J	7V	1	YOU'VE HAD IT	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	THOMAS	209	5			42-95120	120	M	Z5	83	HOOKEM COW / BETTY	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	WALLIS	209	8			44-40298	298	E	Z5	44	THE SHACK	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	WILLIAMS, DG	209	23			44-50539	539	B	J4	3	UNKNOWN 045	
21-Mar-45	HESEPE	WILLIAMS, DK	209	15		L2	42-51936	936	I	J3	22	UNKNOWN 027	