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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION  
APO 558.

EE-S-4

373.2

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission, 20 March 1945 - F. O. 633.

TO : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.

BATTLE ORDER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	A/C DISPATCHED	A/C OVER TARGET
2nd CBW	Hemmingstedt (Vis.)	Heligoland (Vis. or H2X)	33	32
20th CBW	"	"	33	32
96th CBW	"	"	29	29
14th CBW	"	"	34	32
		2AD	129	125
		1AD	151	149
		3AD	158	152

1. Takeoff and Assembly

## a. Takeoff - Times

Combat Wings	First Actual Takeoff	Assembly Altitude	Briefed Time For CP 1	Assembly Time
2nd	1315	10,000	1444	1:29
20th	1329	10,000	1445	1:16
96th	1330	10,300	1446	1:16
14th	1330	10,000	1447	1:17

(1) Takeoffs were accomplished without difficulty.

b. Assemblies - Normal - units departed at the briefed altitude, being one minute early and in good order.

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. The route across the North Sea was flown as briefed to 06°E. The 14th Combat Wing flew slightly south of course at this point but corrected back to the briefed route on approaching the IP.

b. The IP was made good by all Groups but the 392nd and 491st Groups - both of these Groups over-ran the IP while uncovering. No difficulty was reported on bomb runs. Clouds prevented the 445th Group from bombing the primary so it went on to attack Heligoland, the briefed secondary.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. All units attacked the primary target with the exception of one Squadron of the 445th Group, the Division lead. This unit could not attack the primary due to cloud cover. It attempted to go to the secondary but jettisoned prior to the release point because of battle damage. All bombing on the primary target was done visually with fair to excellent results. There was interference on the bomb run among units of the 20th Combat Wing allowing only short synchronized runs. One unit reported a forty second run. This interference was caused by lagging of Squadrons of the 2nd Combat Wing. The 467th Group had a gross error. 5/10 cloud and bomb smoke contributed to poor synchronization. The 44th Group also had a gross error. The bombardier attempted to synchronize on a point

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short of the target and displace the crosshairs into the bomb smoke. The error here can be attributed to either a poor initial synchronization or a miscalculation in displacement of the crosshairs. Such procedure is definitely subject to human error but under the circumstance, 2 - 3/10 cloud and heavy bomb smoke, the correct one. Such procedure should be included in the camera bombing program.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. The 2nd Combat Wing made good the rally point. The 445th Bomb Group used this point as an IP and made a run on Heligoland - altitude on the bomb run, 20,000 feet. The 20th Combat Wing made its rally without difficulty. The 96th Combat Wing cut short the rally point so as to close interval between itself and preceding Wings. The 14th Combat Wing made a 180° turn off the target in order to close up on the 96th Combat Wing.

b. The route from the rally point back to English coast was well flown. All Groups but the 445th Group stayed within a few miles of the briefed route. The 445th Group which left the Division column to bomb the secondary remained south of course in order to cut down distance and thereby overtake the Division column - the column was eight minutes long upon crossing the English coast in.

c. Remarks - The DR navigation on this mission was very good. The flight was almost entirely over water with no Mickey or visual check points as aids. GEE reception was poor and 96th Combat Wing's Navigator VHF frequency 5155 was ineffective. Almost all the navigation over water was DR based on the Metro winds.

5. Fighter Support

a. Two Fighter Groups were assigned as close escort to 2d Air Division Bombers. The 55th Fighter Group covered the 2nd and 20th Combat Wings and the 357th Group covered the 96th and 14th Wings.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy aircraft reaction to 2d Bombers.

b. Flak at Hemmingstedt was from nil to light, inaccurate - at Heligoland, intense and accurate.

7. Losses

a. One aircraft, 445th Group - Aircraft was hit by flak over Heligoland and went down three miles east of Heligoland - one chute observed.

8. Scouting Force

a. Plan - Nine aircraft were delegated to report target weather at TOT minus twenty-five minutes. No weather difficulties were anticipated.

## b. Execution

(1) 2nd Combat Wing received information that the target was clear at TOT minus 45, but was informed, while on the bomb run, that the target was covered with 5 - 7/10 cloud. The 2nd Combat Wing should have had more warning of this condition if possible. The only unit affected by weather conditions (drifting clouds at the primary) was the 445th Group which went on to bomb Heligoland, the secondary. Other succeeding units were able to make visual sightings on the primary.

(2) All other Combat Wings reported receipt of good information.

(3) Scouting Force leader's readability was poor but the necessary information was transmitted and received.

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9. Screening Force

a. Because the primary target was lightly defended, no screening was deemed necessary.

10. Radar

## a. H2X Analysis

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Dispatched</u>	<u>A/C Over Target</u>	<u>OK For Navigation</u>	<u>OK For Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	1	1	1	1	
453rd	1	1	1	1	
445th	2	2	1	1	1 A/C MLA
44th	1	1	0	0	1 equipment failure
392nd	1	1	1	1	
491st	2	2	2	2	
93rd	2	2	2	2	
446th	2	2	2	2	
448th	2	2	2	2	
458th	2	2	2	2	
466th	1	1	1	1	
467th	1	1	1	1	
	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	

(1) H2X performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. There was only one failure which could not be remedied in the air.

b. GEE performance on this mission was very weak. There was jamming on the Ruhr and Reims chains. Operation was unsatisfactory east of 0630E.

11. Comments

a. This is still too much time for assembly. Not more than fifteen minutes should be allowed for assembly of this small force. One hour should have been maximum.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD  
Brigadier General USA  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*Robert H. Terrill*  
ROBERT H. TERRILL  
Colonel GSC  
Dep C of S for Operations

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Weather Summary

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
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Tactical Analysis of Mission 20 March 1945C O N F I D E N T I A LWeather Summary

a. Forecast - Moderate, semi-persistent contrails above 22,000 feet. Target wind: at 20,000 feet - 270/65.

b. Actual - Temperatures as forecast - winds 10 - 20 degrees more northerly than forecast and slightly stronger. Light to moderate semi-persistent to persistent contrails 18 - 21,000 feet over the Continent. 10/10 medium cloud was observed to the east of the target area with tops 17 - 18,000 feet and cumulus tops to 13 - 14,000 feet were observed to the south of the withdrawal route.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Group 458th Bomb Gp

## STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

(Part 1)

Primary: Hammstedt Oil Refinery

Ordered Targets: Secondary: ~~Heligoland~~

Date of Operation 20 March 1945

Division Field Order No. 633

Squad- ron	Sorties		Credit Sort- ies	Effect ive Sort- ies	Non Effect ive Sort- ies	No. A/C Bomb- ing	Type of Tgt	Name of Target	Number and Type of Bombs on Targets	Aircraft Lost						Time of Take off	Total Time of Mis'n	Comments
	Total	Less Unused Spares								Total	Flak	Flak & E/A	E/A	Acc	U N K			
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	18	19	25	27	40
Ld	10	10	10	10	-	10	PT	Hemmingstedt Oil Refinery	103 500# RDX 3 500# GP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1350	50	
TOTAL	10	10	10	10	-	10	PT	Heminstedt Refinery	3 500# GP 103 500# RDX	-	-	-	-	-	-	1350	50	

## NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE SUMMARY (Part 3)

[illegible]

20 March 1945

Dane-Breeding

J3 : 936I

(Scope)

Moran-Betzold

J3 : 628K

K-20

8AF

Ferrill

7V : 352K

K-21

Perry

7V : 4250

K-22

RCM-8AFJackson, W.E.

7V : 270A

K-21 8AF Cont.

Brown

7V : 567G

2AD Cent.

Laird

7V : 340N

8AF

Sievertson

7V : 487R

8AF

Denard

7V : 504L

RCM-2AD

Martin

7V : 110M

SPARES

J3-743F (PFF)

7V-502E

DISP.

41

27

ORDER OF TAKE OFFR/N 23

WEST				EAST
DISP.	A/C	NO.	A/C	DISP.
22	936I	1		
		2	628K	25
30	4250	3		
34	340N	4		
32	352K	5		
33	270A	6		
27	504L	7		
		8	487R	Hgr. 1
29	567G	9		
31	110M	10		

458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	BROWN, C	208	4			42-50502	502	E	7V	51	LARRUPIN' LINDA	REPLACED 567
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	DANE	208	29	BREEDING	L1	42-51936	936	I	J3	21	UNKNOWN 027	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	DENARD	208	2			42-50504	504	L	7V	30	UNKNOWN 019	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	FERRIELL	208	20			41-29352	352	K	7V	83	WOLVE'S LAIR	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	JACKSON, WE	208	14			42-51270	270	A	7V	27	MY BUNNIE II	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	LAIRD	208	13			41-29340	340	N	7V	71	YANKEE BUZZ BOMB	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	MARTIN, W	208	1			42-51110	110	M	7V	92	TOP O' THE MARK	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	MORAN	208	23	BETZOLD	D1	42-51743	743	F	J3	23	UNKNOWN 006	REPLACED 628 - GAS LEAK
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	PERRY	208	32			42-100425	425	O	7V	69	THE BIRD	
20-Mar-45	HEMINGSTEDT	SIEVERTSON	208	30			44-10487	487	R	7V	45	Girl on surfboard (no name)	