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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION  
APO 558

EE-S-4

373.2

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 14 March 1945 - F. O. 627

TO : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.

BATTLE ORDER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	A/C DISPATCHED	A/C OVER TARGET
2nd CBW	Arnsberg (Vis. or GH)	Giessen (Vis. or H2X)	0	0
20th CBW	Gutersloh " " "	" " " "	90	89
" "	Holzwickede " " "	" " " "		
96th CBW	" " " "	" " " "	78	77
14th CBW	Gutersloh " " "	" " " "	90	88
		2AD	258	254

1. Takeoff, Assembly and DAL

a. Takeoffs were normal except for the 458th Group which had one A/C catch fire on the hardstand. Several bombs exploded and the perimeter was obstructed. As a result of this, one Squadron was unable to take off.

Combat Wing	First Actual Takeoff	Assembly Altitude	Briefed Time For CP 1	Assembly Time
14th CBW	1046	16,000	1311	2:25
20th CBW	1050	16,000	1314	2:24
96th CBW	1038	16,000	1317	2:39

b. Assemblies were slow due to haze in the assembly area.

c. Division assembly was completed on time and all units left the coast on time and in the proper order.

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. All units made landfall in good order and were well closed up at this point.

b. Upon the recommendation of the weather scout, the column flew south of the briefed course until crossing the front lines.

c. At the IP's some crowding occurred because of poor visibility. However, the maneuvers at the IP's were well executed.

d. The units attacking Gutersloh did so directly without trouble. Those attacking Holzwickede were, with two exceptions, forced to turn to the secondary, after discovering that the GH tracking station was inoperative. Of the units attacking the primary, one was a Squadron of the 446th Group which utilized a pilotage assist through considerable haze and killed rate by GH. The 458th Group, rallying on the run by doing a dogleg, closed in on this Squadron and dropped.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. All units of the 14th Combat Wing and the 448th Group of the 20th Wing bombed their assigned primary target, Gutersloh M/Y, with good to excellent results. The HR Squadron of the 392nd Group released 15,000 feet short of the IP.

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Tactical Analysis of Mission 14 March 1945

The lead bombardier accidentally moved the high-low speed clutch on the disc speed drum into the high position. In a situation such as this, the change in rate of synchronization should be noticed and the bombsight rechecked immediately. Some difficulty was encountered with haze in the target area and bomb smoke obscuring the MPI for the last Squadrons over the target.

b. The 93rd and 446th Groups did not bomb the primary due to the GH tracking station being out. Both Groups attacked the secondary target, Giessen M/Y, on H2X equipment with slight visual assistance. Bombing results were poor.

c. Units of the 96th Combat Wing bombed the assigned primary, Holzwickede, and the secondary, Giessen. The GH tracking station was lost by the 3rd Squadron of the 466th Group one-third the distance down the bomb run. This Squadron continued the run using pilotage check points through breaks in the cloud to hold course and dropped on GH rate. It is not advisable to continue a GH run in this manner due to the nature of the curved course line and the decision should have been made to attack the secondary when it was seen that visual conditions did not exist at the primary target. Three Squadrons of the 458th Group could not pick up the GH tracking station and elected to drop on the smoke markers of the 466th Group, 3rd Squadron. The Lead and 2nd Squadrons of the 466th Group and three Squadrons of the 467th Group bombed the secondary target, Giessen M/Y, on H2X equipment with some visual assistance after GH tracking station could not be picked up. Results at Holzwickede were unobserved and at Giessen fair.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were good in spite of the change of plan in the air.

b. From rally points to landfall, the route was again generally south of course for three reasons: weather, poor visibility, and close contact between Wings. All Wings were in visual contact.

c. At landfall the 44th Group and entire 96th Wing were forced to give way to the south due to close contact with other units. The 446th Group was the first unit to leave the coast. The Division column (446th Group excepted) extended six minutes in length at landfall out.

5. Fighter Support

a. There were four Fighter Groups assigned as close escort and one Group on free lance to support 2nd Air Division Bombers. The 355th A and B Groups covered the 2nd Combat Wing, the 479th A Group covered the 14th Combat Wing, the 479th B and 56th A and B Groups covered the 20th Combat Wing (which was to split into two forces) and the 4th Fighter Group covered the 96th Combat Wing. The 353rd Fighter Group supplied area support.

(1) Due to the 2nd Combat Wing being scrubbed, the 355th Group was given an area to sweep in lieu of their close escort assignment.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. No attacks were directed toward 2AD Bombers; however, two of our escorting Fighter Groups had combat. The 56th Group spotted six Jets in Frankfurt area, destroying two for no loss. Another claim by the 56th Group was received via radio before the pilot making this claim landed on the Continent. No other reports have been received on this encounter. The 353rd Group sent one Squadron into the Magdeburg area where it bounced fifteen Me109's forming up at 10,000 feet for claims of 11-0-0 with no loss. One plane and pilot of the 56th Group was lost when the pilot bailed out over the Channel due to engine failure - his chute failed to open.

b. Flak at Holzwickede was light inaccurate; at Gutersloh light, inaccurate; at Giessen light to moderate, inaccurate to accurate.

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Tactical Analysis of Mission 14 March 1945

(1) Heavy haze, a smoke screen (at Giessen) and bomb smoke were present at the targets.

7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning

(1) The Scouting Force was to report route weather thirty minutes ahead of the Bombers. Target weather at Holzwickede was to be reported twenty minutes before TOT, and target weather at Gutersloh thirty-five minutes before TOT. This was done to allow enough time for Bombers to let down to a minimum altitude of 10,000 if by doing so they would have a better chance of visual bombing.

b. Execution

(1) Scouting Forces gave accurate reports on penetration and target weather. Heavy haze made instrument bombing advisable. Communications were normal and all Combat Wings report that the Scouting Force was a big help.

(2) One Me262 was destroyed (Lt. Rodebaugh.) in the Koblenz area at 1600 hours.

9. Screening Force

a. Planning

(1) It was planned to use the Mosquito Screening Force from Watton and screen Holzwickede for the 20th "B" Combat Wing.

b. Execution.

(1) The Screening Force started the screening maneuver as planned; however, units were unable to bomb this target because of GH station failure and went to the secondary at Giessen. The Screening Force rejoined the 20th "B" Combat Wing and flew with it to the secondary. It then flew ahead and dropped chaff on the bomb run to the secondary.

(2) This is a good example of what capable Air Commanders, proper use of communication channels, and good judgment can accomplish. The Screening Force will be commended for the excellent manner in which it performed its mission.

10. Radar

a. H2X Analysis

Group	A/C Dispatched	A/C Over Target	OK For Navigation	OK For Bombing	Remarks
44th	7	7	5	5	2 equipment malfunctions
392nd	4	4	4	3	1 equipment malfunction
491st	1	1	1	1	
93rd	4	4	4	4	
446th	4	4	4	3	1 flak damage
448th	4	4	4	4	
458th	8	6	5	5	1 equipment malfunction
466th	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
467th	4	4	4	4	
	40	38	34	32	

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Tactical Analysis of Mission 14 March 1945

(1) Radar performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. All failures were due to malfunctions which the operator could not correct.

b. GEE operation on this mission is considered satisfactory. There was light jamming on the Rheims and Ruhr chain but operation was unrestricted.

c. GH - The tracking station was inoperative between 1508 and 1625. The RAF reported to Eighth Air Force that the ground station was having difficulty. The release station was very satisfactory. All bombing was visual or by H2X.

11. Comments

a. All Wing and Group Commanding Officers should endeavor to cut the length of time to effect assembly. The 96th Combat Wing took almost two and three-fourths hours which only means that when we assemble above 15,000 feet, even on shallow penetrations, the gas load is so increased that our bomb load is reduced out of all proportion to the length of operation.

By command of Major General KEEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*Robert H. Terrill*  
ROBERT H. TERRILL  
Colonel GSC  
Dep C of S for Operations

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Weather Summary


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Tactical Analysis of Mission 14 March 1945C O N F I D E N T I A LWeather Summary

a. Forecast - Light non-persistent contrails in medium cloud level with light non-persistent occasional moderate semi-persistent above 20,000 feet. Target winds: at 20,000 - 330/20, at 25,000 - 330/25.

b. Actual - Few light to moderate non-persistent contrails 20 - 21,000 feet over the Continent. Haze gradually thinned upward from surface becoming nil by 16,000 feet - but no definite top. Winds and temperatures were as forecast.

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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION  
Office of Director of Intelligence  
APO 558

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20 March 1945

SUBJECT: AA Report, 2d Air Division, No. FLO/2AD/512.

TO : Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, AAF 101, APO 634,  
Attention: AA Officer.

1. GENERAL: TARGET

: (a) Gutersloh (b) Holzwickede  
(c) Giessen (Secondary)

DATE

: 14 March 1945

CONDITIONS

: (a) 5-7/10 Haze (b) 10/10 Haze  
(c) 5/10 Haze

ROUTE ORDERED

: 50°23'N, 06°30'E - 50°17'N, 07°00'E -  
50°08'N, 07°45'E - 50°32'N, 07°55'E -  
(a) 50°43'N, 08°33'E - 51°30'N, 08°55'E  
Gutersloh - 51°47'N, 08°12'E - 51°34'N,  
08°32'E - 50°43'N, 08°33'E - 50°32'N,  
07°55'E - 50°08'N, 07°45'E -  
(b) 50°59'N, 08°15'E - Holzwickede -  
51°30'N, 07°54'E - 50°59'N, 08°15'E -  
50°32'N, 07°55'E - 50°08'N, 07°45'E.

ALTITUDE ORDERED

: (a) 18,000 ft. (b) 22,500 ft.

AXIS OF ATTACK ORDERED

: (a) 320° (b) 320°

FORECAST WIND

: 25 m.p.h. from 330°

2. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS: Gutersloh was bombed visually by squadrons. Holzwickede was bombed by means of GH equipment. Giessen was bombed by squadrons by means of H2X equipment with visual assistance. Owing to failure of the GH equipment, the majority of the force dispatched to attack Holzwickede bombed Giessen as a secondary target. A chaff Screening Force consisting of 4 Mosquitoes flew over Holzwickede 12 minutes before the bombers.

3. FLAK: En route, meagre inaccurate flak was encountered at Koblenz (A), Limburg (A) and Marburg (B).

No flak was encountered at Gutersloh.

Meagre to moderate and generally inaccurate predictor control fire was encountered at Holzwickede, and also from Hamm and Soest during withdrawal from this target. It is difficult to tell whether this was "seen" or "unseen" fire on account of the haze.

Meagre to moderate fairly accurate predictor control "seen" fire was

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encountered at Giessen.

4. PHENOMENA: A single very large smoke burst was seen north of Koblenz. This burst did not appear to be near any aircraft, but the smoke persisted in the sky for a considerable time.

SORTIES : 272

A/C LOST TO FLAK : NIL

A/C DAMAGED BY FLAK: 6 (2.2%)

*A. S. King*  
LT. COLONEL, R.A.

cc: D of I, 1st and 3rd Air Divisions,  
ATTN: AA Officers  
M.I. 15, War Office, Whitehall, London

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TARGET: GUTERSLOH

EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF GUNS: NIL

CW	GROUP	SORTIES	DAMAGED		A/C LOST				Axis Attack	Axis With- Drawal	T.O.T.	Altitude
			Sli.	Ser.	Flak	E/A	Acc	Unkr				
14	392nd	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	300°-350°	220°	1531- 1532	18,000-19,500
14	44th	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	315°-320°	215°	1531- 1539	18,500-19,000
14	491st	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	310°-315°	225°	1533- 1534	19,000-20,500
20	448th	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	315°	220°	1537- 1539	18,500-19,500
TOTALS:		128	-	-	-	-	-	-	300°-350°	215°- 225°	1531- 1539	18,000-20,500
PERCENTAGES:												

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TARGET: HOLZWICKEDE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF GUNS: 80

CW	GROUP	SORTIES	DAMAGED		A/C LOST				Axis Attack	Axis With- Drawal	T.O.T.	Altitude
			Sli.	Ser.	Flak	E/A	Acc	Unkr				
96	466th	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	325°	-	1530	21,500 ft.
96	458th	24	2	-	-	-	-	-	315°-330°	85°	1533- 1534	23,500-24,500
TOTALS:			34	2	-	-	-	-	315°-330°	85°	1530- 1534	21,500-24,500
PERCENTAGES:			5.9%									

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TARGET: GIESSEN EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF GUNS: 28

CW	GROUP	SORTIES	DAMAGED		A/C LOST				Axis Attack	Axis With- Drawal	T.O.T.	Altitude
			Sli.	Ser.	Flak	E/A	Acc	Unkr				
20	446th	32	1	-	-	-	-	-	145°-155°	255°	1543- 1545	23,500-25,000
20	93rd	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	165°-280°	260°	1543- 1556	22,000-23,000
96	466th	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	120°-160°	240°	1554- 1555	20,000-22,000
96	467th	28	3	-	-	-	-	-	150°-155°	245°	1555- 1556	21,500-23,500
TOTALS:		110	4	-	-	-	-	-	120°-280°	240°- 260°	1543- 1556	20,000-25,000
PERCENTAGES:			3.6%									

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Auth: Dir of Int.  
Date 16/3/45  
Initials RK

Personal Report by Lt. Col. R.F. King, R.A. Attached to 2d Air Division,  
USAAF on Operation to Helzigkede on 14 March 1945

ROUTE: 52°55'N, 02°20'E - 51°42'N, 03°42'E - 50°40'N, 05°10'E - 52°23'N, 06°30'E -  
50°17'N, 07°00'E - 50°08'N, 07°45'E - 50°32'N, 07°55'E - 50°59'N, 08°15'E -  
Target - 51°30'N, 07°54'E - 50°59'N, 08°15'E - 50°32'N, 07°55'E - 50°08'N,  
07°45'E - 50°40'N, 05°10'E - 51°42'N, 03°42'E - Yarmouth

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Clear on route. 10/10th haze from 20 miles south of target  
to target.

TIME OF ATTACK: 1534 hours

HEIGHT OF ATTACK: 24,000 ft.

AIRCRAFT: Liberator (B-24)

GENERAL: Fourteen squadrons were dispatched to attack this target, but owing to  
failure of the PFF equipment eleven of these squadrons attacked the  
secondary target at Giessen and only three squadrons attempted to attack  
the primary. I flew in the lead aircraft of the last squadron to attack  
the primary, but photographs reveal that owing to faulty PFF equipment  
the bombs actually fell in the vicinity of Kamen.

NARRATIVE: 1. Approximately an hour before take off, a Liberator on the airfield  
from which I was flying caught fire and blew up. The explosion damaged  
a number of other aircraft with the result that one squadron was unable  
to take off. However the rest of the force took off at approximately  
1100 hours without further incident, although some difficulty was  
experienced in assembling due to haze which extended up to 16000 ft.  
We crossed the Dutch Coast in the vicinity of Walcheren I, the island  
presenting a tragic picture as it is almost completely flooded and only  
houses and trees can be seen standing out of the water.

2. No flak was encountered either in the battle area south of the Moselle  
or at the Rhine although visibility was perfect. On the east side of the  
Rhine numerous formations of medium and fighter bombers could be seen  
attacking various targets, and almost every German town worthy of the  
name appeared to be on fire. However in spite of all this activity I  
could see no flak. Shortly after turning at the IP thick haze began  
to obscure the ground and it was found that our PFF equipment was not  
working, so it was decided to bomb on the smoke markers of another  
squadron. About 12 bursts of flak appeared just below and ahead of our  
aircraft a few seconds before bombs were released. After bombing we  
made a 180° turn to the right, and we were engaged by approximately  
10-12 guns throughout the whole of this turn. About eight of these  
guns were firing predictor control, but although they were accurate  
for height they were firing consistently 50-100 yards outside the turn.  
Bursts from a four gun battery were following us on the inside of the  
turn, but they were 200 to 300 ft. too low. All this fire was almost  
certainly coming from south of Hamm. Shortly after this flak stopped

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we were engaged briefly by a number of guns, probably from Soest, but all the bursts were 2000 to 3000 ft. beneath us.

2. After leaving the target we flew south to Giessen as most of the other squadrons in the Wing were attacking this target. Visibility here was excellent, and by keeping just out of range of the defenses ourselves we had a good view of the flak engaging the other squadrons. I should estimate that 12-18 guns were in action at Giessen and they were firing a perfect example of predictor control fire which from a distance appeared to be fairly accurate, although out of 118 aircraft which attacked this target only 11 were damaged.

4. After leaving Giessen the squadron ahead of us were off course and crossed the Rhine at Koblenz, but we turned south and crossed at Obr Lehnstein. No flak came from either of these towns. However a few miles to the north of Koblenz a solitary "scarecrow" appeared consisting of a plume of smoke many times larger than a flak burst. This smoke persisted in the sky for several minutes, but I could see no aircraft anywhere near it and it appeared to be completely pointless.

5. No flak was encountered again in the battle area, but this may have been due to ground activity of which there was obviously plenty judging from the numerous fires. With the aid of binoculars it was possible to get an excellent view of allied fighters attacking a long convoy of enemy vehicles and setting them on fire from end to end.

6. No further incident of interest occurred and we landed at base at 1820 hours.

7. Owing to the haze conditions which existed at the target it is impossible to tell whether the enemy were able to engage our formations by "seen" methods. However, although the flak was at no time very accurate, it seems improbable that the enemy could have followed us round the turn so consistently by "unseen" methods considering the fact that both chaff and carpet were being used. We must have been within range of a considerable number of guns at the time, and it therefore seems likely that we were only engaged by batteries which were able to pick us up visually. Out of a total of 31 aircraft which attacked this target only 2 received minor damage.

*83 King*  
LT. COLONEL, R.A.

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Group 458thSTATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS  
(Part 1)Primary: Holzwickede M/YDate of Operation 14 March 1945Division Field Order No. 627Ordered Targets: Secondary: Giesgen M/Y

Squad- ron	Sorties		Credit Sort- ies	Effect ive Sort- ies	Non Effect ive Sort- ies	No. A/C Bomb- ing	Type of Tgt	Name of Target	Number and Type of Bombs on Targets	Aircraft Lost						Time of Take off	Total Time of Mis'n	Comments
	Total	Less Unused Spares								Total	Flak	Flak & E/A	E/A	Acc	U N K			
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	18	19	25	27	40
1d	9	9	9	9	-	9	PT	Holzwickede M/Y	328 100# M30 14 500# M17	-	-	-	-	-	-	1101	147	Dropped on smoke markers of preceding sqdn. Did not hit tgt
2	8	8	8	5	3	5	PT	Holzwickede M/Y	186 100# M30 8 500# M17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Entire sqdn scrubbed due to blast damage of A/C explosion.
4	7	7	7	7	-	7	PT	Holzwickede M/Y	240 100# M30 10 500# M17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTALS	24	24	24	21	3	21	PT	Holzwickede M/Y	754 100# M30 32 500# M17	-	-	-	-	-	-	1101	147	

## NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE SUMMARY (Part 3)

Total Non Eff Sort ies	Causes of Non-Effectives					Incidents of Mechanical and Equipment Failures															Comments
	Weather	Personne	Enemy Action	Other Non Mech.	Mech. & Equip.	Total	Engine	Oil System	Fuel System	Super- charger	Propeller & Governor	Communi- cation System	Guns & Turrets	Bomb Release	Bomb Bay Doors	Elect- rical System	Instru- ments	Oxygen System	Bomb- sights	A/C in general	
46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
3	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Footnote 1 1 Dep 1d. - 42-51939- 2nd Sqdn Footnote 2 3 Footnote 3																					

42-51939

42-51206

44-40475



LEAD SQUADRONBeno - MAJ RUE

J3 : 910D

Moran - CAPT BLACK

J3 : 669J

Scope

Krogh

Z5 : 196Q

RCM

Rosen

Z5 : 126L

K-22

2AD(Cont)

Rhodes

Z5 : 059T

K-21

8AF

Wallis

Z5 : 199A

8AF(Cont)

Hodge

Z5 : 366H

Herdtt

Z5 : 018J

K-21

Nutter

Z5 : 108B

SECOND SQUADRONDyer - COL KING

J3 : 902M

K-20 8AF-RCM

Tebbs

7V : 502E

K-21

Eisert

J3 : 939G

Scope

2AD-RCM

Sievertson

7V : 514B

2AD

Clutter

7V : 206S

8AF

Minor

7V : 567G

2AD

Grice

7V : 316H

K-21

Perry

7V : 4250

8AF

Burman

7V : 475D

K-21

THIRD SQUADRONHathorn

J3 : 261A

Scope

RCM

Montgomery

J4 : 287J

2AD

Hartwick

J4 : 408I

8AF

Sanders

J4 : 602E

8AF-RCM

Boucek

J4 : 273F

8AF-RCM

Dentler

J4 : 285H

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Languist

J3 : 557H

8AF

Hood

J4 : 555A

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FOURTH SQUADRONPollard

J3 : 628K

K-20

2AD

Thomas

Z5 : 179P

K-21

8AF

Minor

Z5 : 179P

8AF

Jackson, V.E.

7V : 352K

2AD

Brown

J4 : 116S

K-21

2AD

Hartman

7V : 200

Dahn

J3 : 743F

8AF

Laird

J4 : 141U

K-21

SPARES

J3 - 544E 39 GH

J3 - 936I 39 PFF

Z5 - 183U 51

MARSHALLING CHIEF - Lt. Vehslage - 752nd Sq.

MARSHALLING CREWS - Lt. W.L. Jackson 752nd Sq.

Lt. Minsker - 755th Sq.

MARSHALLING PLAN ON REVERSE

## 458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	BENO	203	17	RUE	L1	44-49910	910	D	J3	4	UNKNOWN 044	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	BOUCEK	203	ACC			44-40273	273	T	J4	--	HOWLING BANSHEE	DAMAGED (MAJ) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	BROWN, R	203	ACC			44-40118	118	S	J4	--	WE'LL GET BY	DESTROYED IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	BURMAN	203	17			44-40475	475	D	7V	34	JOLLY ROGER	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	CLUTTER	203	2			42-51206	206	S	7V	53	THE PIED PIPER	LISTED MIA - LANDED AT B-53
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	DAHM	203	27			42-51743	743	F	J3	19	UNKNOWN 006	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	DANTLER	203	ACC			44-40285	285	H	J4	--	TABLE STUFF	DAMAGED (MAJ) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	DYER	203	22	KING	L2	44-49902	902	M	J3	2	UNKNOWN 043	CMD P - COL KING - OBSERVER (SEE REPORT)
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	EISERT	203	26			42-51939	939	G	J3	24	UNKNOWN 028	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	GRICE	203	NT0			42-95316	316	H	7V	--	PRINCESS PAT	NO TAKE OFF - FLAT TIRE
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HARTSWICK	203	ACC			42-100408	408	I	J4	--	LADY LUCK / THE BEAST	DAMAGED (MIN) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HATHORN	203	REC		L3	44-49261	261	A	J3	--	UNKNOWN 042	RECALLED
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HERDTI	203	14			42-95018	018	J	Z5	88	OLD DOC'S YACHT	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HINER	203	12			41-29567	567	G	7V	16	MY BUNNIE / BAMBI	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HODGE	203	11			42-100366	366	H	Z5	69	MIZPAH	LANDED OFF LOCATION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HOEY	203	ACC			42-50912	912	D	J4	--	THE TRAVLIN' BAG	DAMAGED (MIN) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HOOD	203	ACC			42-50555	555	A	J4	--	BABY SHOES	DAMAGED (MAJ) IN GROUND EXPLOSION - SHOTS FROM THIS A/C
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	HURTENBACH	203	2			UNK		?	7V	--		LAST 3 & RCL ILLEGIBLE
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	JACKSON, WE	203	12			41-29352	352	K	7V	79	WOLVE'S LAIR	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	JACKSON, WL	203	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 752ND
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	KROGH	203	13			42-51196	196	Q	J3	46	THE GYPSY QUEEN	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	LAIRD	203	ACC			42-110141	141	U	J4	--	BREEZY LADY / MARIE / SUPERMAN	DAMAGED (MIN) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	LANQUIST	203	REC			42-95557	557	H	J3	--	LADY PEACE	SHIP WAS RECALLED
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	MINOR	203	21			42-50578	578	F	Z5	43	SKY ROOM	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	MINSKER	203	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 755TH
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	MONTGOMERY	203	ACC			44-40287	287	J	J4	--	BACHELOR'S BEDLAM	DAMAGED (MIN) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	MORAN	203	21	BLACK	D1	42-51669	669	J	J3	17	UNKNOWN 026	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	NUTTER	203	6			42-95108	108	B	Z5	65	ENVY OF 'EM ALL II	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	PERRY	203	30			42-100425	425	O	7V	65	THE BIRD	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	POLLIARD	203	19		L4	42-95628	628	K	J3	17	UNKNOWN 038	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	RHOADES	203	20			42-110059	059	T	Z5	68	UNKNOWN 056	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	ROSEN	203	11			44-40126	126	L	Z5	66	SPITTEN KITTEN / SKY TRAMP	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	SANDERS	203	ACC			44-10602	602	E	J4	--	TEN GUN DOTTIE	DAMAGED (MAJ) IN GROUND EXPLOSION
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	SIEVERTSON	203	28			42-51514	514	B	7V	23	BIG CHIEF LIL' BEAVER	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	SIMPSON	203	28			42-51270	270	A	7V	23	MY BUNNIE II	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	TEBBS	203	32			42-50502	502	E	7V	47	LARRUPIN' LINDA	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	THOMAS	203	3			42-51179	179	P	Z5	77	DUSTY'S DOUBLE TROUBLE	
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	VEHSLAGE	203	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 752ND
14-Mar-45	HOLZWICKEDE	WALLIS	203	7			42-51199	199	A	Z5	35	UNKNOWN 023	LANDED OFF LOCATION