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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION
APO 558

EE-S-4

373.2

3109

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 7 March 1945 - F. O. 620.

TO : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.

<u>BATTLE ORDER</u>	<u>PRIMARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>A/C DISPATCHED</u>	<u>A/C OVER TARGET</u>
96th CBW	Soest M/Y (GH or Vis.)	Siegen M/Y (H2X)	82	78
2nd CBW	" " " " "	" " " "	76	71
20th CBW	Bielefeld " " "	Bielefeld M/Y (H2X)	53	52
14th CBW	" " " " "	" " " "	41	40
		2AD	252	241

1. Takeoff and Assembly

a. Takeoffs

<u>Combat Wings</u>	<u>First Actual Takeoff</u>	<u>Assembly Altitudes</u>	<u>Briefed Time For CP 1</u>	<u>Assembly Time</u>
96th	0715	12,000	0855	1:40
2nd	0657	12,000	0858	2:01
20th	0657	12,000	0900	2:03
14th	0715	12,000	0902	1:47

(1) Takeoffs occurred without event.

(2) Some A/C of the 2nd and 14th Combat Wings reported moderate to severe clear icing during the instrument climb. At least two A/C aborted on this account - one of these went into a spin but recovered after four crew members had bailed out. This condition appears to have been localized and was not discovered by the weather scouts.

b. Assemblies

(1) Assemblies were normal. Units departed in good order, being one minute late.

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. Landfall was made at the briefed point by all units. The Division column here was eleven minutes in length. All units were forced to make a 360° turn in order to gain altitude to top clouds over the Channel. Some units were forced up to 23,000 feet.

b. The briefed penetration route was flown by all units.

c. The approach to the IP was executed as briefed. The only conflict at the IP was between the 20th and 14th Wings. The 14th Combat Wing did not keep its interval and over-ran the 20th Wing. This did not cause any serious trouble and all bomb runs were made on briefed headings.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. The 96th and 2nd Combat Wings attacked Soest M/Y by GH methods through 10/10 clouds. All results were unobserved. The high right Squadron of the 389th Group had a GH equipment failure but bombed on smoke markers of the preceding unit

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without difficulty. The Lead Squadron of the 458th Group failed to uncover properly at the IP and interfered with the third Squadron of the 467th Group on the bomb run.

b. The 20th and 14th Combat Wings attacked the Bielefeld Viaduct. There was 7-8/10 cloud cover in the target area and only limited visual assistance existed. Results were unobserved to excellent with probable hits on the viaduct and its approaches. The deputy lead of the lead Squadron of the 93rd Group took over on the bomb run due to a GH equipment failure in the lead ship. This Squadron and the 11 Squadron of the 392nd Group had excellent results and there was evidence of superior GH navigator and bombardier coordination. The Lead Squadron of the 392nd Group had an equipment failure on the bomb run and, in violation of Paragraph 13 of 2AD F.O. 620, bombed its tertiary target, Paderborn M/Y, by H2X with unobserved results. Paragraph 13 states H2X secondary and tertiary targets will be attacked only in event of GH station failure. Units with equipment failure will drop on smoke markers of preceding unit.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. The 96th Combat Wing over-ran the rally point by five miles but corrected back to the briefed route before the next turning point was reached. The 2nd Combat Wing cut short the rally point in order to close the interval between itself and the 96th Combat Wing. The 14th and 20th Wings made good rallies.

b. All Wings flew withdrawal as briefed until the battle line was crossed in this vicinity, because of poor navigation, the 96th and 2nd Wings flew ten miles north of course. The 20th Combat Wing flew about eight miles south of course on withdrawal. The 14th Combat Wing flew as briefed.

c. The 96th and 2nd Wings made landfall out ten miles north of course. The 14th and 20th Wings made landfall out as briefed.

d. Due to the fifteen minute loss of time over the Channel on penetration Wings were fifteen minutes late throughout the mission.

5. Fighter Support

a. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, assigned two Fighter Groups as close support for 2d Air Division: 56th Group on the first two Boxes and 361st Group on the last two Boxes. The 479th, 78th and 356th Groups under MEW control were on patrol and performing area support in the target area and along the route. The 361st Group was unable to get off and the 479th Group took over its assignment via R/T directions from MEW.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy A/C reaction nor losses reported by the Fighters.

b. Flak at Soest was light inaccurate, at Bielefeld, nil.

7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Plan

(1) For one force to report target weather twenty-five minutes before TOT. This time was so set to enable the Screening Force and units on the Soest M/Y to use the alternate route should visual conditions exist.

(2) For one force to report route weather twenty minutes in advance of the bombers.

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b. Execution

(1) Route force reported middle cloud from 18,000 to 20,000 feet, lying forty miles west of the Dutch coast, thus enabling the Division to make a 360° climbing turn and get over the layer.

c. Bomber Reports

(1) Information good - 14th and 2nd Combat Wings received it through the other Wings.

d. Scout Report

(1) Target weather - 10/10 with large break over IP.

(2) Communications excellent.

9. Screening Force

a. Plan

(1) For Screening Force to precede the main force through the target area on a route and times based upon the wind vector and chaff rate of fall.

b. Execution

(1) Normal - as planned.

10. Radar

a. H2X Analysis

Group	<u>A/C</u> <u>Dispatched</u>	<u>A/C Over</u> <u>Target</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Navigation</u>	<u>OK For</u> <u>Bombing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
389th	5	5	5	5	
445th	2	2	2	1	1 equipment failure
453rd	3	3	3	3	
44th	3	3	3	2	1 equipment failure
392nd	2	2	2	1	1 equipment failure
491st	0	0	0	0	
93rd	2	2	2	2	
446th	4	4	4	4	
448th	0	0	0	0	
458th	3	3	3	3	
466th	5	5	5	4	1 equipment failure
467th	4	4	4	3	1 equipment failure
	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>28</u>	

(1) H2X operation for this mission was satisfactory. All sets were satisfactory for navigation. Five sets were unsatisfactory for bombing, having malfunctions which could not be corrected in flight.

b. GEE - operated satisfactorily beyond 0800E on both the Ruhr and Reims chains. Some ineffective jamming was reported on both chains.

c. GH - stations 115 and 114 were used with good results. Of twenty-five A/C dispatched, twenty attacked, using GH methods. Good signals were reported. The five failures consisted of: two - GH equipment failures, one - (deputy) dropped

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on a lead ship, one - bombed H2X, after being forced out on the GH run, one - deputy lead took over too late to bomb by GH, but dropped using H2X equipment.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD
Brigadier General USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Robert H. Terrill
ROBERT H. TERRILL
Colonel GSC
Dep C of S for Operations

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - Weather Summary

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
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Tactical Analysis of Mission 7 March 1945CONFIDENTIALWeather Summary

a. Forecast - Occasional patches of haze between 18,000 feet and 23,000 feet over the Continent, with visibility restricted to 1 - 2 miles. Contrails, moderate non-persistent above 22,000 feet becoming dense persistent above 25,000 feet in haze patches. Target winds: at 20,000 - 350/60, at 25,000 - 350/70.

b. Actual - Temperatures as forecast. Winds about 10 degrees more northeasterly than forecast. Light rime ice to moderate rime ice and some clear ice on ascent and light rime ice on let down in top layer of low cloud. Light to moderate semi-persistent contrails, base 16,000 feet - top 20,000 feet east of 0300E.

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Group 458

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

(Part 1)

Primary: Soest M/Y
Ordered Targets: Secondary: Siegen M/Y
Tertiary: Giessen M/YDate of Operation 7 March 1945Division Field Order No. 620

Squadron	Sorties		Credit Sorties	Effective Sorties	Non Effective Sorties	No. A/C Bombing	Type of Tgt	Name of Target	Number and Type of Bombs on Targets	Aircraft Lost						Time of Take off	Total Time of Mis'n	Comments
	Total	Less Unused Spares								Total	Flak	Flak & E/A	E/A	Acc	U N K			
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	18	19	25	27	40
La	9	9	9	9	-	9	Pt	Soest M/Y	154 250 M57 12 M-17	-	-	-	-	-	-	0720	168	-
2	10	10	9	9	-	9	Pt	Soest M/Y	174 250 M57 12 M-17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	10	10	10	10	-	10	Pt	Soest M/Y	204 250 M57 12 M-17 2 M-47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	29	29	28	28	-	28	Pt	Soest M/Y	532 250 M57 36 M-17 2 M-47	-	-	-	-	-	-	0720	168	-

NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE SUMMARY (Part 3)

Total Non Effective Sorties	Causes of Non-Effectives					Incidents of Mechanical and Equipment Failures															Comments
	Weather	Personne	Enemy Action	Other Non Mech.	Mech. & Equip.	Total	Engine	Oil System	Fuel System	Super-charger	Propeller & Governor	Communication System	Guns & Turrets	Bomb Release	Bomb Bay Doors	Electrical System	Instruments	Oxygen System	Bomb-sights	A/C in general	
6	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
1	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Footnote 1 Nil Footnote 2 Nil Footnote 3 B-24J 42-51514																					

26X250 M57 Jett.

Lead Squadron - Lincoln Red # 1Dane-Phillips

J3 : 544E

8AF

Fletcher

Z5 : 199A

2AD

Miner

Z5 : 578F

Healy-Quinn

J3 : 557H

2AD

Skidmore

Z5 : 120M

K-22

8AF

Rhodes

Z5 : 179P

K-21

8AF Cont.

Hodge

Z5 : 366H

2AD Cont.

Thomas

Z5 : 6400

RCM

RCM

Sharp

Z5 : 126L*

K-21

2nd Squadron - Lincoln Red # 2Allen

J3 : 261A

(Scope)

8AF-RCM

Haynes

7V : 502E

Minsker

J3 : 499U

8AF

Craven

7V : 475D

K-21

Perry

7V : 4250

8AF

Ferriell

7V : 457Q

K-20

2AD-RCM

Gievertson

7V : 514B

2AD

Hiner

7V : 206S

K-21

2AD

Laird

7V : 316H*

8AF

Barnhart

7V : 487R

3rd Squadron - Lincoln Red # 3Blum

J3 : 618T

K-20

2AD

Hoey

J4 : 912D

2AD

Warrell

J4 : 163M

Dahm

J3 : 504S

8AF

Boucek

J4 : 273T

K-22

2AD

Beckstrom

J4 : 277P

8AF-RCM

Kelly

J4 : 768Y

2AD

Bidelsberg

J4 : 408I

8AF-RCM

Hood

J4 : 555A

8AF

McCoy

J4 : 285H*

K-21

Bomb Load - 24 x 250 GP's

NN - 1/40T

* A/C with 12 x M17's

Marshalling Chief-Lt Everett-754th
Marshalling Crews- 753 & 754th Sqdns.

SPARES	DISP.
J3-337L (PFF)	R/W 35
J3-608W (Vis)	41
Z5-456D 8AF	6
Z5-298E 2AD	1
7V-110M 2AD	31
J4-141U 8AF	40

ORDER OF TAKE OFF

WEST				EAST		WEST				EAST	
DISP.	A/C	NO.	A/C	DISP.	R/W 05	DISP.	A/C	NO.	A/C	DISP.	R/W 05
		1	544E	39				16	502E	28	
		2	557H	51				17	316H	30	
5	199A	3						18	206S	29	
4	120M	4						19	514B	27	
		5	578F	44				20	457Q	34	
1	126L	6						21	487A	28	
3	6400	7						22	912D	42	
6	366H	8						23	273T	38	
5	179P	9						24	163M	40	
		10	261A	21				25	285H	47	
		11	499U	19				26	408I	42	
		12	618T	51				27	768Y	36	
		13	504S	21				28	277P	43	
		14	4250	32				29	555A	45	
		15	475D	33							

458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
07-Mar-45	SOEST	ALLEN, G	198	27		L2	44-49261	261	A	J3	8	UNKNOWN 042	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	BARNHART, L	198	17			44-10487	487	R	7V	38	Girl on surfboard (no name)	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	BECKSTROM	198	31			44-40277	277	P	J4	48	MISS USED	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	BLUM	198	28		L3	44-10618	618	T	J3	7	UNKNOWN 038	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	BOUCEK	198	32			44-40273	273	T	J4	46	HOWLING BANSHEE	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	CRAVEN	198	26			44-40475	475	D	7V	30	JOLLY ROGER	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	DAHM	198	26			42-50504	504	S	J3	28	UNKNOWN 019	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	DANE	198	26	PHILLIP	L1	44-49544	544	E	J3	6	OH MONA!	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	EIDELBERG	198	21			42-100408	408	I	J4	48	LADY LUCK / THE BEAST	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	EVERETT	198	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 754TH
07-Mar-45	SOEST	FERRIELL	198	17			42-52457	457	Q	7V	99	FINAL APPROACH	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	FLETCHER	198	21			44-40298	298	E	Z5	37	THE SHACK	REPLACE 199
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HAYNES	198	32			42-50502	502	E	7V	42	LARRUPIN' LINDA	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HEALY	198	25	QUINN	D1	42-95557	557	H	J3	30	LADY PEACE	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HINER	198	10			42-51206	206	S	7V	48	THE PIED PIPER	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HODGE	198	8			42-100366	366	H	Z5	66	MIZPAH	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HOEY	198	28			42-50912	912	D	J4	17	THE TRAVLIN' BAG	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	HOOD	198	31			42-50555	555	A	J4	27	BABY SHOES	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	KELLY	198	12			42-50768	768	Y	J4	35	ARISE MY LOVE AND COME WITH ME	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	LAIRD	198	10			42-95316	316	H	7V	89	PRINCESS PAT	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	McCOY	198	10			44-40285	285	H	J4	73	TABLE STUFF	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	MINOR	198	18			42-50578	578	F	Z5	40	SKY ROOM	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	MINSKER	198	1			42-50499	499	U	J3	35	COOKIE/OPEN POST	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	PERRY	198	29			42-100425	425	O	7V	61	THE BIRD	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	RHOADES	198	18			42-51179	179	P	Z5	72	DUSTY'S DOUBLE TROUBLE	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	SHARP	198	2			44-40126	126	L	Z5	65	SPITTEN KITTEN / SKY TRAMP	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	SIEVERTSON	198	ABT			42-51514	514	B	7V	--	BIG CHIEF LIL' BEAVER	ABORT - #3 ENG ROUGH, UNABLE TO FEATHER
07-Mar-45	SOEST	SKIDMORE	198	35			42-95120	120	M	Z5	81	HOOKEM COW / BETTY	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	THOMAS	198	1			42-50640	640	O	Z5	30	BUGS BUNNY	
07-Mar-45	SOEST	WARRELL	198	29			42-110163	163	M	J4	67	TIME'S A WASTIN	