

HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION  
APO 558

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16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 5 March 1945 - F. O. 619.


TO : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.


BATTLE ORDER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	A/C DISPATCHED	A/C OVER TARGET
2nd CEW	Hamburg (Vis.)	Hamburg (H2X)	39	36
96th CEW	" "	" "	29	29
20th CEW	" "	" "	39	38
14th CEW	" "	" "	31	29
		2nd	138	132

1. Weather Summary

a. Forecast



b. Actual



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c. Remarks

(1) Forecast - Moderate persistent contrails above 25,000 feet and within 1000 feet of high cloud. Base visibilities dropping locally to 500 yards or less after 0800 - becoming 1 - 2 miles by 1030. Target winds: at 25,000 feet - 010/85.

(2) Actual - Winds and temperatures as forecast. Dense persistent contrails - base 18,000 feet, becoming very dense and persistent at 23 - 25,000 feet on the route in and at the target but ceasing at the Continental coast on return. Very heavy haze base 16,000 feet, top unknown east of 0400E.

2. Takeoff and Assembly

a. Poor weather conditions were expected during this operation. Combat Wings were to allow extra time for assemblies since changes in assembly altitudes after 4/C had become airborne were anticipated. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were from fair to good. Combat Wings were slightly bunched at CP 1 on entry to the DAL, but because of the small force, twelve Squadrons, no serious difficulties ensued.

<u>Combat Wings</u>	<u>Assembly Altitude</u>	<u>First Actual Takeoff</u>	<u>Briefed Time For CP 1</u>	<u>Assembly Time</u>
2nd	10,000	0640	0800	1:20
14th	10,000	0645	0801	1:16
96th	10,000	0634	0802	1:28
20th	10,000	0631	0803	1:32

3. Penetration - Navigation

a. Landfall at the enemy coast was made within five miles of the briefed point by all units. The route in to landfall included a dogleg thirty to thirty-five miles south of course. This deviation, advised by the weather scouts, was necessary because of adverse weather conditions encountered in the vicinity of 0400E.

b. The route from landfall to IP was flown well with the maximum deviation from the briefed route being six miles.

c. Maneuver at the IP was normal with units being in good order despite the haze and high clouds encountered in this area.

4. Bombing Analysis

a. Twelve Squadrons bombed the synthetic oil plant at Harburg through 10/10 cloud cover. H2X equipment was used. All lead crews reported good coordinated runs. Due to high clouds, formations were forced to bomb at higher altitudes than briefed. Actual bombing altitudes ranged from 23,000 to 27,000 feet - the briefed altitude was 23,000 feet.

5. Withdrawal - Navigation

a. The rallies were effected well by three Wings - the 14th experienced some trouble in rallying after weather had split up its Squadrons.

b. Maximum deviation from the briefed withdrawal route was eight miles - all deviations were caused by adverse weather. Heavy haze and high clouds were encountered until the Continental coast out was reached.

c. At landfall all units were within four miles of the briefed point of exit. The Division column here, extended seven minutes in length.

6. Fighter Support

a. Fighter support assigned 2AD was the following: 4th Group on the 1st

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and 2nd Boxes, 479th Group on the 3rd and 4th Boxes - both Groups on close support. The 56th Group and the 355th Group were in the target area at the time the Bomber Force reached its IP. The 355th Group then swept the withdrawal route.

(1) The 4th Group assigned aircraft to escort the twelve ship Screening Force and the 479th Group furnished a two-ship escort for the command Mosquito

(2) The 479th Group reported that the command Mosquito was impossible to contact, either visually (as it dived through the bomber stream and was lost by escort), or by R/T. Escort called on both 8AF common and 2AD common.

(3) 4th Group reports Combat Wings strung out and the Screening Force high and to the rear of the 1st Box R/V - entire Bomber Force in poor formation.

7. Enemy Action Encountered

a. No enemy reaction against the effort was reported by Fighters.

8. Losses

a. There were no losses.

9. Scouting Force

a. Planning - The normal target force was planned. It was to report target weather twenty minutes before target time. In addition, a route Scouting Force was planned. It was to precede Bombers along the route by thirty minutes and report route weather. This force was planned because some difficulty was expected from weather enroute.

b. Execution - Multi-layer clouds, haze and contrails were encountered enroute. The Scouting Force recommended deviation from course which helped the Bombers effect penetration. Target force reporting was normal.

10. Screening Force

a. Planning - It was planned originally to use a six-ship Screening Force. Since the 1st Air Division and 3rd Air Division were attacking targets in the vicinity of 2d Air Division, we were expected to benefit from their chaff. However, at 2230 hours, 1st Air Division and 3rd Air Division targets in the Hamburg area were cancelled, and the 2d Air Division alone was to attack this heavily defended target. At this time, it was decided to use a 12-ship Screening Force due to the number of flak guns at the target. The 2nd and 20th Wings each furnished six A/C. These two six-ship elements were to fly together and go through the target area 500 feet above and one minute ahead of the Bombers.

b. Execution - The mission was executed as planned and the effectiveness of the chaff force is shown by the fact that the first two Squadrons over the target had no flak at all. Flak in general was moderate and inaccurate, over a target where it is generally intense and fairly accurate. No A/C were lost and battle damage was nil to light.

11. Radar

a. H2X Analysis

<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C Over</u>	<u>Satisfactory</u>	<u>Satisfactory</u>
<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>For Navigation</u>	<u>For Bombing</u>
20	20	19	18

(1) H2X operation for this mission is considered very satisfactory. Neither the 2nd nor the 14th Combat Wings had set failures. One aircraft could

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\* not be used for navigation and two could not be used for bombing because of malfunctions which could not be corrected by the H2X navigator.

b. GEE operation for this mission was good. Light to moderate jamming was reported for both the penetration and withdrawal, but it did not interfere seriously with set operation.

11. Comments

a. Attention is directed to 2AD Tactical Doctrine, Section VIII, Paragraph 8b, which is quoted in part: "Leaders of Task Forces are authorized to abandon the mission when elements of their Task Force are required to exceed 24,000' unless, in their opinion, the conditions encountered are so temporary that abandonment of the mission would entail greater risks through loss of fighter cover.

b. The aggressiveness of our Air Commanders is highly commendable. It is not the intention of this Headquarters to curb aggressiveness. However, it is pointed out that aggressiveness must be tempered with sound judgment.

c. The situation on this mission is very well summed up by the following quotation from the 20th Combat Wing critique. "The advisability of continuing the mission against the adverse weather conditions is questioned. It is felt that more consideration should be given to the problems present before taking a formation to altitudes over the prescribed limits, especially when there is small chance of hitting the assigned target visually."

By command of Major General KEMPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD  
Brigadier General USA  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*Robert H. Terrill*  
ROBERT H. TERRILL  
Colonel GSC  
Dep C of S for Operations

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Group 458

## STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

(Part 1)

Primary: Harburg Oil Ref. (Vis)Ordered Targets: Secondary: Harburg Oil Ref. (H2X)Date of Operation 5 March 1945Division Field Order No. 619

Squadron	Sorties		Credit Sorties	Effective Sorties	Non Effective Sorties	No. A/C Bombing	Type of Tgt	Name of Target	Number and Type of Bombs on Targets	Aircraft Lost						Time of Take off	Total Time of Mis'n	Comments
	Total	Less Unused Spares								Total	Flak	Flak & E/A	E/A	Acc	U N K			
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	18	19	25	27	40
1d	9	9	9	9	0	9	ST	Harburg Oil Ref.	96 500 RDX	-	-	-	-	-	-	0631	160	Bombed H2X
2	10	10	10	10	0	10	ST	Harburg Oil Ref.	114 500 RDX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	" "
3	10	10	10	10	0	10	ST	Harburg Oil Ref.	113 500 RDX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	" "
TOTAL	29	29	29	29	0	29	ST	Harburg Oil Ref.	323 500 RDX	-	-	-	-	-	-	0631	160	" " "

## NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE SUMMARY (Part 3)

Total Non Eff Sorties	Causes of Non-Effectives					Incidents of Mechanical and Equipment Failures															Comments
	Weather	Personne	Enemy Action	Other Non Mech.	Mech. & Equip.	Total	Engine	Oil System	Fuel System	Super-charger	Propeller & Governor	Communication System	Guns & Turrets	Bomb Release	Bomb Bay Doors	Electrical System	Instruments	Oxygen System	Bomb-sights	A/C in general	
6	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Footnote 1	Nil																				
Footnote 2	Nil																				
Footnote 3	Nil																				

- 1 500 RDX Jett.

FORMATION PLAN458TH ONLY GROUP - 96TH WINGLEAD SQUADRON

<u>DANE-BREEDING</u>		8 AF Cont.	8 AF
<u>HATHORN-RUE</u>	J3 : 936I	<u>BARNHART</u>	<u>SPRATT</u>
J3 : 837L	Scope	TV : 487R	TV : 457Q
Scope	8 AF	RCM-2 AD	2 AD
	<u>SIMPSON</u>	<u>JACKSON-W.L.</u>	<u>BURMAN</u>
	TV : 270I	TV : 110M	TV : 206S
<u>O'REAGAN</u>	K-22	K-21	K-21
TV : 502E		TV : 514B	

2ND SQUADRON

<u>HEALY-GARDNER</u>		2 AD	8 AF
<u>BISERT</u>	J3 : 557H	<u>EIDELBERG</u>	<u>BUUCK</u>
J3 : 740Q	K-20	J4 : 163M	J4 : 273T
	RCM	2 AD	8 AF
	<u>MCCORMICK</u>	<u>HARTSWICK</u>	<u>KELLY</u>
	J4 : 287J	J4 : 408I	J4 : 285H
2 AD	K-22		
<u>HOEY</u>	8 AF	<u>HCCO</u>	
J4 : 912D		J4 : 555A	
K-21	<u>WILLIAMS-D.G.</u>		
	J4 : 602E		

3RD SQUADRON

<u>POLLIARD-BRECKENRIDGE</u>		RCM-8 AF	RCM
<u>WILLIAMS-D.K.</u>	J3 : 628K	<u>EVERETT</u>	<u>HODGES</u>
J3 : 504S	K-20	Z5 : 196Q	Z5 : 126L
K-21	2 AD	K-21	8 AF
8 AF	<u>BESTEN</u>	2 AD	<u>HEARDT</u>
<u>MINOR</u>	Z5 : 120M	<u>DYE</u>	Z5 : 456D
Z5 : 199A	8 AF	Z5 : 298E	
	<u>NUTTER</u>		
	Z5 : 179F		

Assembly Aircraft 743Z: Lt Josephson - 752nd  
 Marshalling Chief: Lt Chimples - 755th  
 Marshalling Crews: Lt Krogh - 754th  
 Lt Ellis - 755th


ORDER OF TAKE OFF

EAST					WEST				
DISP	SHIP	NO	SHIP	DISP	DISP	SHIP	NO	SHIP	DISP
36	743Z	1			40	287J	16		
51	936I	2			38	273T	17		
35	837L	3			43	555A	18		
		4	487R	27	40	912D	19		
		5	270A	33	47	285H	20		
		6	457Q	34	42	408I	21		
		7	514B	29	45	602E	22		
		8	502E	30	4	196Q	23		
		9	206S	28	9	120M	24		
Hgr 5	110M	10			8	126L	25		
		11	557H	27	1	298E	26		
		12			7	199A	27		
		13			3	640Q	28		
Rwy 35	504S	14			6	456D	29		
		15			5	179F	30		

BATTLE ORDER

2nd Air Division

96th Wing



458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	BARNHART, L	197	16			44-10487	487	R	7V	37	Girl on surfboard (no name)	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	BESTEN	197	34			42-95120	120	M	Z5	80	HOOKEW COW / BETTY	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	BOUCEK	197	31			44-40273	273	T	J4	45	HOWLING BANSHEE	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	BURMAN	197	15			42-51206	206	S	7V	47	THE PIED PIPER	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	CHIMPLES	197	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 755TH
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	DANE	197	25	BREEDING	L1	42-51936	936	I	J3	18	UNKNOWN 027	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	DYE	197	1			44-40298	298	E	Z5	36	THE SHACK	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	EIDELSBURG	197	20			42-110163	163	M	J4	66	TIME'S A WASTIN	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	EISERT	197	24			42-50740	740	Q	J3	27	OUR BURMA	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	ELLIS	197	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 755TH
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	EVERETT	197	17			42-51196	196	Q	J3	44	THE GYPSY QUEEN	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HARTSWICK	197	9			42-100408	408	I	J4	47	LADY LUCK / THE BEAST	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HATHORN	197	25	RUE	D1	44-48837	837	L	J3	15	UNKNOWN 041	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HEALY	197	24	GARDNER	L2	42-95557	557	H	J3	29	LADY PEACE	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HERDTI	197	11			42-50456	456	D	Z5	41	DOROTHY KAY SPECIAL	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HODGES	197	34			44-40126	126	L	Z5	64	SPITTEN KITTEN / SKY TRAMP	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HOEY	197	27			42-50912	912	D	J4	16	THE TRAVLIN' BAG	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	HOOD	197	30			42-50555	555	A	J4	26	BABY SHOES	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	JACKSON, WL	197	11			42-51110	110	M	7V	84	TOP O' THE MARK	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	JOSEPHSON	197	ASSY			41-28743	743	Z	7V	--	EASTERN BEAST	ASSEMBLY CREW - 752
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	KELLY	197	11			44-40285	285	H	J4	72	TABLE STUFF	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	KROGH	197	MSHL			--		--	--	--		MARSHALING CHIEF- 754TH
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	McCORMICK	197	34			44-40287	287	J	J4	48	BACHELOR'S BEDLAM	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	MINOR	197	17			42-51199	199	A	Z5	30	UNKNOWN 023	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	NUTTER	197	3			42-51179	179	P	Z5	71	DUSTY'S DOUBLE TROUBLE	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	O'REGAN	197	13			42-50502	502	E	7V	41	LARRUPIN' LINDA	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	PATAK	197	17			42-50640	640	O	Z5	29	BUGS BUNNY	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	POLLIARD	197	16		L3	42-95628	628	K	J3	15	UNKNOWN 038	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	SIMPSON	197	25			42-51270	270	A	7V	18	MY BUNNIE II	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	SPRATT	197	13			42-52457	457	Q	7V	98	FINAL APPROACH	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	TEBBS	197	29			42-51514	514	B	7V	21	BIG CHIEF LIL' BEAVER	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	WILLIAMS, DG	197	20			44-10602	602	E	J4	34	TEN GUN DOTTIE	
05-Mar-45	HARBURG	WILLIAMS, DK	197	13			42-50504	504	S	J3	27	UNKNOWN 019	