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HEADQUARTERS 2d AIR DIVISION
APO 558

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

FIELD ORDER NO.

1521

TARGET

RUHLAND
MAGDEBURG
ALT. LONNEWITZ

DATE

16 January 1945

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APO 558

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 : Auth: C. G. :
 : Hq 2d Air Division :
 : Initials *mmk* :
 : Date *22 March 45* :
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18 March 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Report of Mission, RUHLAND, MAGDEBURG, ALT. LONNEWITZ,
16 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, APO 634.

SUMMARY OF MISSION1. Data

a. Date of Mission - 16 January 1945.

b. Primary Targets and Order of Battle -

14th CBW (44th, 491st, 392nd BG) - Ruhland Synthetic Oil Refinery
 20th CBW (93rd, 446th, 448th BG) - Ruhland Synthetic Oil Refinery
 96th CBW (466th, 467th BG) - Alt. Lonnewitz A/F
 (458th BG) - Magdeburg Synthetic Oil Refinery
 2nd CBW (389th, 445th, 453rd BG) - Magdeburg Synthetic Oil Refinery

c. Secondary Targets -

Dresden M/Y - 14th, 20th CBW's, 466th, 467th BG's
 Magdeburg-Buckau Steel and Armament Works - 2nd CBW and 458th BG

d. Last Resort Target - Any military objective positively identified as being in Germany and east of the current bomb line.

2. Narrative

a. Planning

(1) Eighth Air Force called for a force of thirty-six Squadrons to attack visually Ruhland and Magdeburg Synthetic Oil Refineries and the A/F at Alt. Lonnewitz.

b. Execution

(1) The 93rd Group was late in taking off due to an accident. Only one Squadron of this Group was able to become airborne. The 448th Group took over the lead of the 20th Combat Wing, which caused some confusion, but the wing was in good order upon leaving the English coast. The 96th Combat Wing was late at the DAL, leaving the English coast last in the Division column, briefed third, but regained its proper position at the Continental coast.

(2) The mission was flown generally as planned with the following exceptions:

(a) Upon penetration, the 14th Combat Wing, leading the Division, was north of course approximately forty miles in the vicinity of 5320N-0800E. At this point, it was discovered that the H2X and GEE equipment of the lead A/C was inoperative. The deputy leader of the 14th Combat Wing assumed the lead and returned to the briefed course at 0900E. Deviations from the briefed route by other units of the Division did not exceed twenty miles.

(b) Upon return, all units were diverted to fields either in the UK or on the Continent due to poor visibilities in the base areas.

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Tactical Report of Mission, 16 January 19453. Bombing Tactics and Results

- a. Bombing was accomplished by visual and H2X methods.
- b. Because of cloud cover at the primary targets, all units attacked their secondary targets except the following:
 - (1) The 446th Group, the Lead Squadron of the 392nd Group and one Squadron of the 93rd Group visually attacked a target of opportunity, Lautz Aluminum Works. These units visually sighted this target on their way to the secondary target and chose to attack it rather than to bomb the secondary through cloud cover.
 - (2) The Low Left Squadron of the 392nd Group attacked a target of opportunity, Werminghoff, due to a C-1 malfunction at the secondary target.
 - (3) The Lead A/C of the High Right Squadron of the 392nd Group developed engine trouble near Wilhelmshaven and was forced to turn back. The deputy leader took over the lead and experienced a bombsight malfunction at the secondary target. Not being able to drop on some other unit's release, this Squadron jettisoned its bombs near Marbach.

c. Strike photographs show the following:

Dresden - Hits on primary rail choke point, rail over road bridges, heavily built-up areas, center of M/Y, rolling stock, industrial buildings, oil storage.

Magdeburg - Hits on rail junction, large industrial buildings, iron foundry and main shops, railroad work shops and Shaffer foundry.

Lautz - Hits on main power plant and foundry type buildings, open pit mine, workers' hutted area, flak battery, other foundry type buildings.

Werminghoff - Bursts in open type quarry, rail line and directly adjacent power plant.

4. Anti-Aircraft Gunfire

- a. Enroute meager to moderate and fairly accurate anti-aircraft was encountered at Minden, Wittenberg and Offenburg. The 491st and 44th Groups flew over Ruhland before attacking their secondary target at Dresden, and the 44th Group sustained most of their anti-aircraft damage at that point.
- b. Meager to moderate fairly accurate predictor control fire was encountered at Magdeburg, and it appears probable that only batteries which could engage by "seen" methods opened fire at our formations.
- c. Practically no anti-aircraft was encountered at Dresden, only one Group reporting a few inaccurate bursts.

5. Enemy Aircraft Encountered and Fighter Support

No enemy aircraft were encountered and fighter support was very good.

6. Losses and Claims

- a. Two aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire and one to an unknown cause.
- b. Claims were nil.

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W. E. Kepner
W. E. KEPNER
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding


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SECRETTACTICAL BOMBING MISSION REPORT - 16 January 1945

GROUP	DIR. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	FLEW AUTO-PILOT	FLEW MANUAL	RANGE & DEFLEC.	RANGE	TOTAL BOMBS AND TYPE	NO. A/C BOMBING	DROPPED ON H2X OR GH	VISUAL
							<u>DRESDEN</u>		H. E.			
44	188°	1½ min.	22,500'	1212	X		1	0	114x500	10		X
44	195°	30 sec.	22,000'	1215	X		1	0	114x500	10		X
44	220°	2 min.	23,400'	1217	X		H2X	1	102x500	9	H2X	
491	208°	1 "	22,500'	1213	X		1	0	68x500	8	H2X	Assist.
491	203°	3 "	22,000'	1213½	X		1	0	94x500	10	H2X	Assist.
491	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	94x500	10	H2X	Assist.
448	222°	3 "	22,500'	1213	X		1	0	78x500	9		X
448	160°	1 "	23,000'	1216	X		1	0	64x500	7		X
466	130°	1½ "	22,500'	1215	X		1	0	72x500	8		X
466	157°	2 "	22,500'	1216		X	1	0	88x500	9		X
466	137°	3 "	23,300'	1215½	X		1	0	85x500	9		X
467	93°	1 "	24,000'	1217	X		1	0	74x500	9		X
467	150°	40 sec.	23,600'	1217	X		0	0	100x500	10	Smoke Markers	
467	147°	4 min.	24,800'	1216½	X		1	0	84x500	9		X
							<u>LAJUTA T/O</u>					
392	100°	1 min.	22,800'	1209	X		1	0	92x500	9		X
446	78°	-	23,500'	1211	X		1	0	76x500	10		^
446	85°	1 min.	24,000'	1212½	X		1	0	52x500	7		
446	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	46x500	6		^
93	73°	1½ "	24,500'	1212½	X		1	0	76x500	10		^
							<u>BERMINGHAM T/O</u>					
392	96°	1½ min.	22,000'	1211		X	1	0	88x500	8		X
							<u>MARLBACH T/O</u>					
392	271°	Jettisoned	23,500'	1221	X		0	0	96x500	8		X

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SECRETTACTICAL BOMBING MISSION REPORT - 16 January 1945 (Cont.)

GROUP	DIR. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	FLEW AUTO-PILOT	FLEW MANUAL	RANGE & DEFLEC.	RANGE	TOTAL BOMBS AND TYPE	NO. A/C BOMBING	DROPPED ON H2X OR GH	VISUAL
									H.E.			
							MAGDEBURG ARM WORKS (SECONDARY)					
389	123°	7 min.	22,500'	1143	X		H2X	1	58x500	9	H2X	
389	120°	6 "	22,200'	1143½	X		H2X	1	101x500	11	H2X	
389	117°	6 "	22,800'	1144	X		H2X	1	83x500	10	H2X	
445	100°	-	22,000'	1144	X		H2X	1	83x500	10	H2X	
445	100°	-	23,000'	1144	X		H2X	1	83x500	11	H2X	
453	124°	1 min.	23,600'	1143	X		H2X	1	85x500	11	H2X	Assist
453	81°	1 "	22,500'	1144	X		H2X	1	92x500	11	H2X	
453	91°	1½ "	24,000'	1145	X		H2X	1	83x500	10	H2X	
458	130°	6 "	22,000'	1146	X		H2X	1	82x500	9	H2X	Assist
458	125°	-	21,800'	1146	X		0	0	80x500	8	H2X	
458	136°	4 "	22,500'	1146½	X		H2X	1	86x500	9	H2X	

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

45-299
A

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 261

PERIOD: 0001 hours 16 January to 2400 hours 16 January 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Missions	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	Losses					Total
							E/A	AA	N/E	OT		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	7	627	591	579	1454.9	0-0-0 A 0-0-0 G	0	0	6	72(a)	.82	
Fighter Escort(c)	11	595	562	0	0	0-0-0 A 25-0-0 G	0	0	7	363(b)	370	
Fighter Sweeps(d)	2	71	68	0	0	0-0-0 A 0-0-0 G	0	0	2	0	2	
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0 G	0	0	0	0	0	
Photo Recon.	1	1	1	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Weather Recon.	6	30	29	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Air/Sea Rescue	10	10	10	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Special Operations	7	36	34	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	1(e)	1	
Totals	44	1370	1295	579	1454.9	0-0-0 A 25-0-0 G	0	0	15	440	455	

- (a) includes 72 believed safe on Continent and 4 NLR unreported
(b) includes 362 believed safe on Continent
(c) 361st Group based on Continent
(d) 352nd Group based on Continent
(e) believed safe on Continent

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

627 a/c (263 B-17s, 364 B-24s) dispatched in two forces against two jet engine plants, two synthetic oil plants and A/F in central Germany. 10/10 overcast prevented three primaries from being attacked. 570 a/c dropped 1454.9 tons GP and LB on the two synthetic oil plants, four secondaries and several T/Os. Weather: 10/10 low cloud over three primaries, 2/10 to 6/10 over other targets. Heavy fog at home bases caused both forces to divert to other fields in UK and on Continent. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 32 a/c (77 B-24s of which 72 believed safe on Continent, and 5 B-17s four of which are NLR unreported).

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First Force

36 squadron formations (364 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) dispatched against Alt-Lonnwitz A/F and Synthetic Oil Plants at Magdeburg/Rothensee and Ruhland. Alt-Lonnwitz A/F not attacked. 332 a/c dropped 693.4 tons GP and 46.5 tons IB - total 739.9 tons - on Magdeburg/Rothensee and Ruhland Synthetic Oil Plants, Dresden M/Y, Magdeburg/Buckau Tank Plant and U/I T/Os at 1030 - 1230 hours from 18,000 - 24,000 feet. Bombing both visual and H2X. Leaflets dropped on Dresden and Magdeburg. Weather: 10/10 undercast prevented bombing of Alt-Lonnwitz. 2/10 to 6/10 cloud made it necessary to use H2X at two other targets. Heavy fog forced a/c to divert to other bases in UK and on Continent. Flak: moderate, accurate at Magdeburg; nil to meager, fairly accurate at Dresden. Battle damage: unknown. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 77 B-24s (72 believed safe on Continent, 5 cat "T").

Fighter Support: seven groups (392 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0850 - 0935 hours, down 1500-1515 hours. 368 sorties. Heavy fog at home bases forced majority of A/O to divert to bases on Continent. E/A opposition: nil. One group strafed Finsterwalde A/F. Claims: 25-0-0 ground. Losses: 281 a/c (273 believed safe on Continent, 1 to unknown reasons, 7 crash-landed in UK - 2 pilots killed).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage		Results
			GP	IB	
Magdeburg/Rothensee Synthetic Oil Plant	127	61	112.7		Good
Alt-Lonnwitz, Jet A/C Assembly Plant	59	NOT ATTACKED			
Ruhland Synthetic Oil Plant	178	67	149.5		Good
Dresden M/Y (Sec)		138	295.3	46.5	Good
Magdeburg/Buckau Tank Plant (Sec)		61	123.7		Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
U/I T/Os	—	5	12.2	—	Unobserved
Totals	364	332	693.4	46.5	

+ results based on crew observations

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Second Force

Seven group formations (263 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Dessau Aero Engine Plant and Muldenstein Junkers Engine Plant. Primaries completely overcast and not attacked. 247 a/c dropped 523.5 tons GP, 191.5 tons IB - total 715.0 tons - on Dessau M/Y, Bitterfeld and four T/Os at 1200-1247 hours from 24,000-27,000 feet. Bombing on HZX. Leaflets dropped on Dessau. Weather: 10/10 over targets; dense, persistent contrails. Poor visibility and low ceiling at home bases forced bombers to be diverted to A/Fs in the UK. Flak: meager, inaccurate, tracking at Dessau. Battle damage: unknown. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 B-17s (four of which are NTR unreported, 1 cat "E").

Fighter Support: four groups+ (203 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0924-0950 hours, down 1420-1600 hours. 194 sorties. Heavy fog at home bases forced majority of a/c to divert to bases on Continent. E/A opposition: nil. Losses: 89 a/c (all believed safe on Continent).

+ includes 361st Group based on Continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Dessau Aero Engine Plant	153	NOT ATTACKED			
Muldenstein Junkers Engine Plant	110	NOT ATTACKED			
Dessau M/Y (Sec)		146	310.5	119.5	Unobserved
Bitterfeld I.G. Farben Co. (Sec)		96	201.0	72.0	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
T/O (5222N-0816E)		1	3.0		Unobserved
T/O (5238N-0748E)		1	3.0		Unobserved
U/I T/Os		2	6.0		Unobserved
Totals	263	246	523.5	191.5	

+ results based on crew observations

2. Fighter Escort

Eleven groups+ (595 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0850-0950 hours, down 1420-1600 hours. 562 sorties. Heavy fog at home bases forced majority of a/c to divert to bases on Continent. One group strafed Finsterwalde A/F. E/A opposi-

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tion: nil. Claims: 25-0-0 ground. Losses: 370 a/c (362 believed safe on Continent, 1 to unknown reasons, 7 crash-landed in UK - 2 pilots killed).

+ includes 361st Group based on Continent

3. Fighter Sweeps

Two groups+ (56 P-47s, 15 P-51s - 71 a/c) dispatched. Up 0837, down 1400 hours. 68 sorties. P-47s patrolled Dummer Lake-Hannover area uneventfully in support of bombers. P-51s on uneventful patrol in Duren area. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-47s crashed in UK due to adverse weather - pilots safe.

+ includes 352nd Group based on Continent.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

1 Spitfire dispatched for D/A photos in Berlin and Misburg area. A/c landed on the continent.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

30 a/c (20 P-51s, 5 B-17s, 5 Mosquitoes) dispatched as follows:

- 15 B-17s completed routine weather flights over the NW of Lands End.
- 1 B-17 completed routine flight from the Azores.
- 1 B-17 completed routine flight to the Azores.
- 3 Mosquitoes completed special weather reconnaissance over Holland, Belgium and Germany.
- 2 Mosquitoes flew Mickey missions over western Germany.
- 20 P-51s scouted weather for bombers. 19 sorties.

No losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

10 P-47s dispatched on routine patrol missions. No incidents. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

36 a/c (12 B-24s, 3 B-17s, 19 P-51s, 2 P-47s) dispatched as follows:

5 B-24s on RCM mission. All a/c completed mission and were diverted to Scotland.

9 a/c (2B-17s; 7 B-24s) dropped leaflets in Holland and Germany. No losses.

15 a/c (1 B-17, 12 P-51s, 2 P-47s) dispatched as radio relays. 5 P-51s returned to England but did not get to home base. 1 P-51 NRE, believed safe on Continent.

7 P-51s escort to PRU mission. 5 sorties. A/C landed safely at bases on continent.

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C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Due to adverse weather over home bases the majority of fighters and bombers landed away and no information regarding enemy activity is yet available. Preliminary indications are that the GAF did not operate, although weather conditions should not have completely prohibited enemy fighters from taking off from bases in central Germany.

2. Flak

Dessau - meager, inaccurate, tracking
Ruhland - intense, accurate
Magdeburg - moderate, accurate
Dresden - nil to meager, fairly accurate

3. Observations

Nil.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Photo interpretation unavailable due to diversion of a/c.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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HEADQUARTERS
65TH FIGHTER WING
APO 558 AAF Station T-370

NUMBER 251

17 January, 1945.

"B" AND "C" CHANNEL REPORTS ---- 65TH FIGHTER WING OPERATIONS ROOM.
Period of Operations: 0000 - 2400 hours 16 January, 1945.

This Wing controlled Channel "B" (Air Sea Rescue) and Channel "C" (Fighter-Bomber) for Eighth Air Force fighters and bombers.

I. GENERAL.

No comments.

II. "B" CHANNEL (Air Sea Rescue) (Capt. Aldrich, Lt. Godfrey, Lt. Graham, Controllers.)

There were no maydays but there were two or three bailouts over England. There were five emergency fighter homings and seven emergency bomber homings handled on this channel today.

Borax 47, 355-c Group, called at 0925 hours for a steer to Great Yarmouth. He was inland when fixed and given a steer.

Hellcat 54, 55th Group, 38th Squadron, called at 0959 hours and reported a flare coming up from the water at a position ten miles east of Lowestoft. Teamwork 31 and 54 were vectored to the position together with Seagull 17. Teamwork 52 and 53 relieved 31 and 54 and search continued until 1215 hours with nil results.

Farmhorse 51, 356th Group, 359th Squadron, reported several oil slicks forty miles east of Lowestoft. The Teamworks were diverted who found oil slicks but no debris. It is believed the slicks were caused from bombs jettisoned.

Catapulting "M" for Mike called at 1138 hours crossing out alone from the enemy coast and on three engines. He wanted to be tracked across and crossed in okay at 1228 hours.

Barday "G" for George called at 1214 hours for an emergency steer. He had two motors out and was fixed off the enemy coast at Bergen. He was advised to fly south and land on the Continent. At 1242 hours, he was fixed crossing in again at Westhoofd. The last message was given at 1247 hours when he advised he would be in friendly territory in one minute and to call Sweepstakes. This was acknowledged.

At 1245 hours, Russar "D" for Dog called for an emergency steer. He was fixed sixty miles off Great Yarmouth on three motors at 14,000 feet. He was tracked and fixed to a safe cross in at Yarmouth at 1311 hours.

From 1300 to 1500 hours over 100 calls were heard and identified on "B" Channel. This does not take into account many instances where the air was jammed by two or three or four transmissions being made at the same time by planes calling Sweepstakes, Everatt, Bluefrock, Martini, Messenger, Applejack, Manager as well as Colgate. This confusion was, of course, due to the appalling weather conditions. Teamwork aircraft were grounded after 1330 hours because of the weather and the impossibility to control properly as aircraft could not fly high enough for fixing and communications.

Roundtable "J" for Jig called at 1428 hours for an emergency steer to Everett. He was overland and vectored 0200 for five miles and told to call Everett for landing instructions. The plane landed at 1450 hours.

Bently 62, 355th Group, 358th Squadron, called at 1506 hours that he had ten gallons of gas and could not find a field. He was fixed first just inland from Bradwell Bay. He was told to fly 320. He was last fixed over Andrews Field at 11,000 feet and he was bailing out. He got out and down okay.

Bently 38, 355th Group, 358th Squadron, called at 1512 hours and asked for the nearest point of land. He was fixed five miles north of Manston and was told to fly 180 for five miles. No further calls were received. He is believed to have bailed out.

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Mission Report Cont'd for 16 Jan 45.

At 1515 hours, Uncle, 355th Group, Leader, called for an emergency fix. He was fixed five miles off Manston and told to steer 270, five miles to Manston. There were no further calls.

At about 1516 hours, Custard 31, 355th Group, 357th Squadron, called for an emergency fix. He left "B" Channel before the fix was given. His position was twelve miles southeast of Manston. This is the same aircraft as mentioned in paragraph 12.

At about 1516 hours, Uncle 25 called for an emergency fix. He left "B" Channel before the fix was given. He was fixed over the Continent in St. Omer area.

At about this same time, Newcross 51, "G" for George and "R" for Roger were all trying to land at Woodbridge and were calling repeatedly for steers and landing instructions. The fog dispersal system did not seem to be of much help to aircraft flying at 4000 feet for they repeatedly flew back and forth over Woodbridge without seeing it.

At about 1600 hours, "D" for Dog called d Air Sea Rescue. No fix was obtained and no steer was given because of R/T interference from Woodbridge, Bluefrock and planes being homed by them and from Continent Control Stations and their planes.

At 1601 hours, Fiction "P" for Peter called and requested weather at Carnaby. This information was passed okay.

~~From about 1600 hours to 1630 hours, Willie "F" For Fox, Winner "G" for Uboe and Winner "R" for Roger were trying to land at Woodbridge and the air was more or less taken up with these homings.~~

At 1625 hours, Balance "G" for George called for Q.D.M. to Dalton. He was fixed in area of Wash fifteen miles south of Strubly. Gave vector 325°, 100 miles to Dalton. He then elected to land short and we advised him to call "Cooperfield" on Darky Channel and land there (North Coates). There were no further calls.

At 1638 hours, Carlisle "R" for Roger called for Q.D.M. to Lindholme. He was fixed over Honington and vectored 325°, 105 miles to Lindholme. Advised he was low on gas. Last fixed near Lincoln and advised him to get below overcast and land at first field he saw. The last transmission was heard at 1715 hours and he advised he was going down through and try to fly contact.

Communications were good except when jammed.

III. CHANNEL "C" (Fighter-Bomber)(T/Sgt Ramdin, S/Sgt Cypher, Controllers), Eighth Air Force Channel C Report.

Only one timing was called in on this channel, that of Vinegrove 11 at Control Point 1.

An unusual amount of traffic on the channel was caused by aircraft landing at forward bases.

Communications were good, reception was very good and range fair.

Second Air Division Channel C Report.

No information was received or passed on this channel.

Quite a few ship called the emergency homere on this channel apparently thinking they had the eighth air force "C" Crystal in their ship. Suggest all pilots be briefed as to what "C" Crystal they have.

Communications were good, range being about 150 miles.

Ray H. Larrabee
RAY H. LARRABEE, 12/1/44
Major, A F Corps,
Senior Controller.

Distribution: Special.
65th FW R g. No. 974

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HEADQUARTERS
STATION 123 APO 558
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

REPORT ON CRITIQUE OF MISSION 16 JANUARY 1945

MAGDEBURG/BUCKAU

1. COL ISBELL OPENED THE CRITIQUE, WHICH WAS HELD ON 18 JAN 45, BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE ROUGHEST MISSIONS FROM AN OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT THAT THIS GROUP HAS EVER FLOWN. IT WAS THE LONGEST HIGH ALTITUDE ROUTE AND THE OVERALL DISTANCE, INCLUDING THE EXTRA FLIGHT TO THE DIVERSIONARY BASES, WAS ABOUT 1450 MILES.

2. LT COL WILLIAMSON, COMMAND PILOT OF THE LEAD SQUADRON, OUTLINED THE MISSION AS FOLLOWS:

ASSEMBLY: THE ASSEMBLY WAS EFFECTED ALL RIGHT. ONE TIME THE FORMATION GOT SOUTH OF BUNCHER 15 AND THERE WAS A THREAT OF INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER WINGS, BUT IT WORKED OUT ALL RIGHT. 96-B WING TAGGED ON 96-A WING IN GOOD POSITION BUT 96-A WAS LATE ON THE D.A.L. THE 2CBW CAME IN ON TIME, SO THEY WENT OUT AHEAD OF THE 96CBW.

ROUTE IN: REALIZING THAT THE ORDER OF BOMBING WOULD BE SERIOUSLY EFFECTED BY THE CHANGE IN DIVISION POSITION, THE 96B WING CUT THE TURN OVER THE CHANNEL AND FLEW ABREAST OF THE 2CBW. HOWEVER, 2CBW THEN WENT AHEAD SO THE BEST 96-B COULD DO WAS TO CLOSE UP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, WITH 96-A WING. THE WING WAS A LITTLE LOW CROSSING THE COAST BUT NO FLAK WAS SEEN. THE BRIEFED ROUTE WAS FOLLOWED PRETTY CLOSELY, INCLUDING THE DOG LEG TURN. (HERE COL ISBELL EXPLAINED THAT THE TURN WAS INCLUDED IN THE ROUTE TO ALLOW THE DIVISION COLUMN A CHANCE TO CLOSE UP A BIT.)

I.P.: THE WEATHER SCOUTS HAD REPORTED THAT THERE WAS 8-10/10 CLOUD AT THE PRIMARY, SO THE CODE WORD FOR ATTACKING THE SECONDARY HAD BEEN GIVEN OUT. THE TURN AT THE I.P. WAS CUT A BIT SHORT.

BOMB RUN: THE BOMB RUN WAS NORMAL WITH THE 96-B WING COMING IN AT A TWO MINUTE INTERVAL BEHIND THE 2CBW OVER THE TARGET.

TARGET: THE MICKEY OPERATOR STATED THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET (ROTHENSEE) WAS EASIER TO PICK UP ON THE SCOPE THAN THE SECONDARY. IN FACT, USING SCOPE ONLY HE WAS COMING IN TO THE RIGHT OF THE M.P.I., WHEN THE LEAD BOMBARDIER MANAGED TO IDENTIFY A CHECK POINT ON THE FROZEN RIVER. ACCORDINGLY, FIFTEEN SECONDS BEFORE BOMBS AWAY, THEY MADE A 12 DEGREE CORRECTION TO THE LEFT. THIS LATE TURN DID NOT BOTHER THE LOW LEFT SQUADRON WHICH DROPPED ON THE LEAD. THE LEAD SQUADRON SAV SHOWED 20% IN 2000' WITH GOOD DAMAGE AND THE LOW LEFT'S SAV SHOWED 80% IN THE 2000' CIRCLE, ALSO WITH GOOD DAMAGE. THE HIGH RIGHT, USING ONLY MICKEY, HIT OFF TO THE RIGHT OF THE M.P.I.

RALLY: SOME SCATTERED BUT ACCURATE FLAK WAS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE RALLY.

ROUTE OUT: IN GENERAL, THE 2CBW WAS FOLLOWED OUT ON THE BRIEFED ROUTE. THE DEPUTY LEAD A/C LEFT THE FORMATION SHORTLY AFTER THE RALLY. HOWEVER, IT FLEW BELOW THE FORMATION AND WAS STILL IN SIGHT WHEN THEY REACHED FRANCE. LET DOWN TO 9000' WAS MADE OVER FRANCE. ACKERMAN GAVE THE DIVERSION BASES JUST AS THE COAST WAS REACHED. THREE A/C LEFT THE FORMATION AT THE CHANNEL. THE REMAINDER FLEW OVER HORSHAM AND ON NORTH. (COL ISBELL COMMENDED LT COL WILLIAMSON FOR CHANGING OVER TO STATION FREQUENCY TO TALK TO CONTROL TOWER.) THE FORMATION FOUND WOMB-LETON AND AS SOON AS THE PEEL OFF WAS STARTED, THE LEAD A/C HEADED FOR CARNABY.

PEEL OFF: ALL A/C WERE LOW ON GAS SO THE PEEL OFF WAS RAPID.

3. COL ISBELL HAD SOME REMARKS TO MAKE CONCERNING THE MISSION:

- A. HE COMMENDED THE LEAD SQUADRON FOR A FINE SHOW.
- B. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST MISSION ON WHICH 2 AD USED A CONSTANT INTERVALOMETER SETTING AND GREAT DAMAGE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IF A VISUAL ASSIST IS ACHIEVED, THE SMALL INTERVALOMETER SETTING WILL ACCOMPLISH MORE THAN THE HERETOFORE LARGE SETTING USED ON INSTRUMENT BOMBING.

4. SEVERAL OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS COMMENTED THAT THE LATENESS OF THE FIELD ORDER HINDERED EFFICIENT BRIEFING.

5. COL ISBELL HAD SOME FURTHER REMARKS TO MAKE BEFORE CLOSING THE CRITIQUE:

- A. THE S.O.P. REGARDING CONTROL POINT MESSAGES IS FOR EACH WING LEADER TO SEND THEM. IT IS THE COMMAND PILOT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ASCERTAIN THAT THEY ARE SENT CORRECTLY AND RECEIPTS OBTAINED.
- B. HE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR GOOD TEAM WORK ON ALL CREWS, ESPECIALLY ON LEAD CREWS. EACH MAN ON THE CREW HAS HIS JOB AND HAS HIS CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION.
- C. THE CURRENT WAR NEWS WAS DISCUSSED AND COL ISBELL POINTED OUT THAT IF THIS GROUP AND THE 8AF KEPT BOMBING WITH THE ACCURACY OF THE PAST FEW DAYS, IT WILL CERTAINLY TIE IN WITH THE RUSSIAN DRIVE TO BRING THE WAR TO A CLOSE

W. H. Von Elm
W. H. VON ELM,
CAPT, AC,

DIST:
CG-98CBW
CO-458TH BG
✓ S-3-458TH BG
MISSION FOLDER

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

GROUP 458

ORDERED TARGET: Primary: Rothensee Oil Plant
Secondary: Magdeburg Krupp Works

DATE OF OPERATION 16 January 1945

DIVISION FIELD ORDER 575

SQUADRON	A/C Airborn		A/C SORT.	A/C NOT ATKG.	A/C ATKG.	TGT	NAME OF TARGET	NO. & TYPE BOBS ON TARGET	IED OR LOST						TIME OF T.O.	AVG. FLEIGHT	COMMENTS
	TOTAL	LESS UNUSE SPARE							TO-TAL	FLAK	FLAK & E/A	E/A	ACC	UN-KN.			
"B" Wing	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
A L	9	9	9	-	9	ST	Magdeburg Krupp Wks	72 X 500 RDX 10 X 500 GP	1*	-	-	-	-	1*	0802	9:00	Bombed H2X
A LL	10	10	10	2	8	ST	Magdeburg Kurpp Wks	33 X 500 RDX 47 X 500 GP 3 X M47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Bombed H2X
A HR	10	10	10	-	9	ST	Magdeburg Kurpp Wks	58 X 500 RDX 28 X 500 GP 1 X M47	1*	-	-	-	1*	-	-	-	Bombed H2X
					1	OT	Ruhland Oil Plant	10 X 500 RDX									Bombed with 446th
Totals	29	29	29	2	27	-	-	-	2*	-	-	-	1*	1*	0802	9:00	

GROUP 458

DATE 16 January 1945

DIVISION FIELD ORDER 575

BOBE TYPE	EXPENDED						FUSES				AMMUNITION				PYROTECHNICS	
	INITIAL LOAD	ON TGT	JETT	UNACTD FOR	RETD		HOSE FUSE	HOSE DELAY	TAIL FUSE	TAIL DELAY	CALIBER	LINKAGE	LINKAGE RATIO	AMOUNT EXPEND.	TYPE	AMOUNT EXPEND.
19	20	21	22	23	24		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
500 RDX	193	173	20	-	-		M 103	.1	M 101	.025	.50	API-T	2-1	1100 (7000)	-	-
500 M64	85	85	-	-	-		M 103	.1	M 101	.025	-	-	-	-	-	-
M47 Smokemarker	4(3)	4	-	-	-		M 126	Inst	-	-	-	-	-	-	M-8 Grenade	16
CHB Skymarker	5(3)	5	-	-	-		M100 Al	.1	M100 Al	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-

FORMATION PLAN458th Composite B Wing -- 96th CWLead Squadron -- Lincoln Red # 1

LAMERS-WILLIAMSON
 J3 : 569J 2 BD Cont. 2 BD
MORAN-PHILLIP Scope LA JEUNESSE WARRILL
 J3 : 954A 8 AF 912D: K-21 J4 8AF Cont. J4: 103M RCM
WILLIAMS-DK WILLIAMS-DK K-21 HARTSWICK
 J4 : 555A 2 BD J4 : 285H J4 : 449W
K-21 KELLY
WIDELBERG J4 : 277P
 J4 : 118S
 K-21

Low Left Squadron - Lincoln Red # 2

RCM FLOYD
BESTEN J3 : 608J 2 BD Cont.
 J4 : 800V K-22 SHERILL
 K-21 25 : 298E
 2 BD CHIMMIS 2 BD 2 BJ
MINOR J3 : 740Q DAYRE
 25 : 059T 25 : 120M 8 AF Cont.
SKIDMORE 25 : 305N
RHOADES K-21 EVERETT
 25 : 018J RCM 25 : 183U
BROGH
 25 : 196Q
 K-21

High Right Squadron - Lincoln Red # 3

ALLEN
 J3 : 939G 8 AF Cont. 8 AF
BISERT BURMAN SIMPSON
 J3 : 602A 7V : 475D 8 AF 7V : 561G
 K-21 PERRY K-21 K-20 JOSEPHSON
 2 BD-RCM 7V : 425C 2 BD Cont. 7V : 457J
LEHR LIPD K-21
 7V : 110M 2 BD 7V : 179X (RCM)
B.RNH-AT SPARES: 936I-J3-24 PFF Scope
 7V : 424F 504G-J3-17 Lead
 K-21 134R-J3-47
 231R-J4-43

Assembly Ship: Capt Evans - 755th
 Marshalling Chief: Lt Smith - 752nd
 Marshalling Crews: Lt Hicks - 752nd
 Lt Hale - 754th

ORDER OF TAKE OFF

WEST	SHIP	NO.	SHIP	DISP	EAST	SHIP	NO.	SHIP	DISP
1	669J	1			17	960V			
2	697Z	2			18	183U			
26	954A	3			19	018J			
		4	912D	48	20	305N			
		5	555A	45	21	059T			
		6	163M	41	22	196Q			
		7	277P	39	23		475D	31	
		8	118S	40	24		424F	31	
		9	449W	38					
		10	285H	44	30	561G			
11	608J	11			32	179X			
18	740Q	12			31	110M			
14	939G	13			27	514B			
21	602A	14			33	457J			
5	298E	15			31	424F	30		
4	120M	16							

458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	ALLEN, G	171	18			42-51939	939	G	J3	14	UNKNOWN 028	OFF LOCATION
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	BARNHART, L	171	3			44-40424	424	F	7V	3	MONYA	OFF LOCATION
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	BESTEN	171	25			41-28980	980	V	J4	19	UNKNOWN 009	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	BURMAN	171	5			44-40281	281	Q	J4	29	A DOG'S LIFE	ON FP FLYING 44-40475D
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	CHIMPLES	171	17			42-50740	740	Q	J3	16	OUR BURMA	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	DWYRE	171	ABT			42-95120	120	M	Z5	--	HOOKEM COW / BETTY	ABORT - #4 ENG PIECE OF PISTON IN OIL PUMP (long rpt)
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	EIDELSBURG	171	9			44-40118	118	S	J4	29	WE'LL GET BY	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	EISERT	171	16			44-10602	602	A	J3	26	TEN GUN DOTTIE	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	EVANS	171	ASSY			41-28697	697	Z	Z5	A50	SPOTTED APE	ASSEMBLY CREW - 755
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	EVERETT	171	7			42-95183	183	U	Z5	72	BRINEY MARLIN	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	FLOYD	171	25			42-50608	608	W	J3	18	FILTHY McNAUGHTY	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	HALE	171	MSHL			--	--	--	--	--	--	MARSHALING CHIEF- 754TH
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	HARTSWICK	171	1			42-50449	449	W	J4	35	HEAVENLY HIDEAWAY	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	HICKS	171	MSHL			--	--	--	--	--	--	MARSHALING CHIEF- 752ND
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	JOSEPHSON	171	21			42-51514	514	B	7V	3	BIG CHIEF LIL' BEAVER	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	KELLY	171	1			44-40277	277	P	J4	34	MISS USED	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	KROGH	171	2			42-51196	196	Q	J3	28	THE GYPSY QUEEN	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	LAIRD	171	1			42-95179	179	X	7V	73	HERE I GO AGAIN	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	LaJEUNESSE	171	8			42-50912	912	D	J4	3	THE TRAVLIN' BAG	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	LAMERS	171	27	WILLIAMSON	L	42-51669	669	J	J3	5	UNKNOWN 026	OFF LOCATION
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	LEHR	171	24			42-51110	110	M	7V	64	TOP O' THE MARK	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	MINOR	171	8			42-110059	059	T	Z5	57	UNKNOWN 056	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	MORAN	171	16	PHILLIP	L	42-50954	954	A	J3	12	UNKNOWN 021	NO MACR-Crew bail out France - RET TO HORSHAM
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	PERRY	171	18			42-100425	425	O	7V	45	THE BIRD	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	RHOADES	171	7			42-95018	018	J	Z5	71	OLD DOC'S YACHT	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	SHERRILL	171	8			44-40298	298	E	Z5	20	THE SHACK	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	SIMPSON	171	17			42-51561	561	G	7V	3	LUCKY 13	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	SKIDMORE	171	23			44-40475	475	D	7V	21	JOLLY ROGER	305 NO TAKE OFF - (SEE ops rpt)
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	SMITH, WF	171	MSHL			--	--	--	--	--	--	MARSHALING CHIEF- 752ND
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	SPRATT	171	5			42-52457	457	Q	7V	79	FINAL APPROACH	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	WARRELL	171	15			42-110163	163	M	J4	49	TIME'S A WASTIN	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	WILLIAMS, DG	171	7			44-40285	285	H	J4	53	TABLE STUFF	
16-Jan-45	MAGDEBURG	WILLIAMS, DK	171	8			42-50555	555	A	J4	13	BABY SHOES	