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# TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

24 June 1944

FIELD ORDER NOS.

791

# TARGETS

# OPERATION NOS.

438

439

BREMEN, GERMANY WESERMUNDE, GERMANY TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

792

LAUNCHING SITES, SWITCHING AND TRANSFORMER STATIONS TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE APO 634

By authority of CG, Eighth Air Force Initials

COPY NO. 33

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 24 June 1944.

TO

Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25 D.C. (Through Channels).

1. IDENTIFICATION.

a. Operations No. 438 and No. 439.

b. Targets.

(1) Operation 438 (Morning).

- (a) Oil refinery at Bremen, seven G.A. F. airfields, two railway bridges and 12 Crossbow targets in France. See Paragraph 2 b. below for specific targets.
- (2) Operation 439 (Afternoon).
  - (a) Six switching and transformer stations and 12 Crossbow targets in northeastern France. See Paragraph 2 b. below for specific targets.

2. PLANNING.

a. Small amounts of low cloud with all medium cloud were predicted for northern and north central France. Substantial overcast, a minium of 6 to 8/10 low and medium cloud, was expected over the remainder of the Continent, with additional cloud at operating levels over southern and extreme esatern Germany.

The forecast for German target areas prompted the decision to Ъ. confine strategic operations to an attack by six B-17 Combat Wings against an oil refinery at Bremen which was selected from the highest priority oil targets in the area open to operations because of its favorable location in respect to H2X identification landmarks. Pathfinder operators were instructed to use the oil refinery as the Aiming Point if equipment were functioning perfectly; otherwise, to release on the industrial area of Bremen. B-17's were specified because of their better performance as compared with B-24's at the high altitude necessary in attacks against such well-defended targets. A limiting factor in the number of B-17's to be dispatched was the necessity for units of 3rd Bomb Division to prepare for a large-scale supply mission in aid of the French Forces of the Interior which was to be executed at the first favorable opportunity. In view of the visual conditions predicted for northern France it was further decided to detail a considerable bomber force, the greater part to consist of B-24's, against two railroad bridges across the Loire River at Saumur and Tours and seven operational . airfields south and southwest of Paris. In addition, a visual attack against 12 modified ski sites in the Pas de Calais was tentatively scheduled, Weather conditions near the French coast were uncertain but this effort was finally called for in the late morning. During the morning of 24 June when definite indications of clear weather over the Pas de Calais in the late afternoon were received, plans were made to dispatch another force



against 12 Crossbow sites, 11 of which had also been assigned for the earlier mission, and six electric switching and transformer stations. Detailed targets assignments for each operation were as follows:

# OPERATION 438 (MORNING)

Force I

(Tactical Unit - Combat Wings of three B-17 Groups of 18 aircraft each with one or more H2X Pathfinder aircraft per Group.)

Bremen Oil Refinery

1st Bomb Division 4 B-17 Combat Wings 3rd Bomb Division 2 B-17 Combat Wings

Force II

(Tactical Unit - Combat Wing of three B-17 Groups) of 12 aircraft each or four to six B-24 Squadrons of 12 aircraft each.)

Saumur Rail Bridge	lst	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-1</b> 7	Combat	Wing	
Tours/La Riche Rail Bridge			Division					
Melun Airfield	2nd	Bomb	Division	*]	B-24	Combat	Wing	(72)
Bretigny Airfield	2nd	Bomb	Division	*]	B-24	Combat	Wing	(60)
Buc Airfield	2nd	Bomb	Division	*1	B <b>-</b> 24	Combat	Wing	(60)
Toussus Airfield	2nd	Bomb	Division	*1	B-24	Combat	Wing	(72)
Orleans/Bricy Airfield	3rd	Bomb	Division	1	B <b></b> 24	Combat	Wing	(48)
Chateadun Airfield			Division					
Chartres Airfield	3rd	Bomb	Division	1	B-24	Combat	Wing	(72)

\*Two H2X Pathfinder aircraft detailed as navigational aids.

Force III

(Tactical Unit - B-17 Group or B-24 Squadron of 12 aircraft each)

Bachimont Launching Site Crepy Launching Site Fleury Launching Site	lst	Bomb	Division Division Division	1	B-17	Group Group Group
Belloy-sur-Somme Launching Site	10+	Bomb	Division	. 7	B-17	Group
			Division			Squadron
Haute Cote Launching Site			Division			Squadron
Coubronne Launching Site Cauche d'Ecques Launching	zna	DOMO	Division	1	<b>D™</b> ~4	Squadron
Site			Division			Squadron
Belle Croix Launching Site Blanc Pignon Ferme Launching	2nd	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-</b> 24	Squadron
Site	3rd	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-1</b> 7	Group
Beaumetz-les-Aire Launching Site	-		Division			Group Group
Crepieul Launching Site	Jra	amoa	Division	1	D=1/	aroub

OPERATION 439 (LATE AFTERNOON)

(Tactical Unit + Group or Squadron of 12 aircraft each)

Holque Switching Station	lst	Bomb	D <b>ivisio</b> n	1	B-17	Group	
Fleury Launching Site	lst	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-1</b> 7	Group	
Crepy Launching Site	lst	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-1</b> 7	Group	
Bachimont Launching Site	lst	Bomb	Division	1	B <b>-1</b> 7	Group	
Belloy Launching Site	lst	Bomb	Division	1	B-17	Group	
Fressin Launching Site	2nd	Bomb	Division	1	B-24	Squadron	
Haute Cote Launching Site	2nd	Bomb	Division	1	B-24	Squadron	
Fiefs Launching Site	2nd	Bomb	Division	1	B-24	Squadron	
Cauche d'Ecques Launching			1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	- 655			
Site	2nd	Bomb	Division				
Belle Croix Launching Site	2nd	Bomb	Division			Squadron	
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2nd Bomb Div Tingry Transformer Station Abbeville Transformer Station Mazingarbe Transformer Station Pont a Vendin Transformer Station2nd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron La Vaupaliere Transformer Station2nd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron Beaumetzples-Aire Launching Site 3rd Bomb Division 1, B-24 Squadron Crepieul Launching Site Blanc Pignon Ferme Launching Site

1 B-24 Squadron 2nd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron 2nd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron 3rd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron

3rd Bomb Division 1 B-24 Squadron

The Bremen force of six Combat Wings was to depart Cromer Ca . at 1100 hours at an altitude of 10,000 feet and follow a northeasternly track across the North Sea while climbing to 25,000 feet. The four 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings were to make landfall between Wesermunde and Cuxhaven while the two 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wings were to follow a more northerly course, reaching the German coast at the north bank of the Elbe, preference as to H2X checkpoints being responsible for this separation during the final stages of the route to the target. Bombing runs were to be downwind (almost due south) to lessen the interval during which the bombers would be subject to gunfire from the strong target defenses. After a sharp turn to the left to clear the target area, the bombers were to intersect the route followed on the penetration and return on its reciprocal. The over-water route; in addition to avoiding antiaircraft defenses, also permitted a minimum of fighter escort thus making it feasible to assign a majority of the Groups to support the forces which would be operating against the tactical targets during the morning.

The force assigned to rail bridges and airfields in the Tours d. and Paris areas was routed on essentially direct courses south and southeast to the targets, departing the south coast of England at Selsey Bill, Shoreham and Littlehampton from 0659-0725 hours and returning along similar routes north to Hastings. Bombing runs were to be downwind (southerly headings) to minimize target anti-aircraft fire except for the 2nd Bomb Division targets which required an upwind approach to avoid the much greater fire-power of the Paris defenses. Prescribed bombing altitudes, which were to be maintained over enemy territory except in the case of 2nd Bomb Division, ranged from 20,000 to 23,000 feet depending on the ground defenses in the immediately surrounding areas. Variations in the case of 2nd Bomb Division consisted of a climb to 22,500 feet to cross the French coast and descents of 1000 and 2000 feet after the target for the two Combat Wings assigned to Bretigny and Buc Airfields in order to gain the advantages of the better performances at low altitudes without undue exposure to ground defenses.

The third force scheduled to operate during the morning e. comprised the 12 units detailed against Crossbow targets in the Pas de Calais. Southeasterly courses from Dungeness and Selsey Bill to the Initial Points were specified, with upwind, downsun bombing runs on south to north axes to facilitate accuracy and thence direct withdrawals either on the reciprocal of the penetration route or due north to Orfordness. Each Bomb Division was allotted a 15-minute period in the target area, 1045-1100 for 2nd Bomb Division, 1100-1115 for 1st Bomb Division, 1115-1130 for 3rd Bomb Division, to enable the attacks to be carried out with a minimum of interference. For such portions of the routes as were common to two or more units, prescribed formation was Groups or Squadrons in trail at one or twominute intervals. With the exception of two B-17 Groups, all units were to fly at 25,000 feet while over enemy territory. The B-17 Groups detailed against Beaumetz-les-Aire and Crepiel were to maintain altitudes of 23,000 and 22,000 feet respectively.

f. The afternoon operation against Crossbow and electric power installations was governed by much the same considerations of direct routes, avoidance of ground defenses and common penetrations and withdrawals as far as practicable. Since there were six additional targets as compared with the earlier Crossbow mission, the time control was altered to permit

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each Bomb Division a 20 minute period in the target area, 1900-1920 hours for 2nd Bomb Division, 1920-1940 for 1st Bomb Division and 1940-2000 for 3rd Bomb Division. Bombing altitudes ranged from 23,000 to 25,500 feet. Routes generally consisted of penetrations from points on the south coast of England and withdrawals either on the reciprocals or directly north to Clacton, depending on the location of the specific target. The 1st Bomb Division Group assigned to Holque was to depart Clacton and return to the same point as its target was the most northerly.

g. Fourteen Groups from VIII Fighter Command were detailed to support the three forces executing the morning operation; three Groups were to fly second missions in support of the afternoon operation.

(1) Force I (Bremen) required escort for only a short span of the overall route since it was to penetrate and withdraw over the North Sea. For that reason three P-38 and two P47 Groups were deemed adequate close escort. As the P-38's had considerably greater range than required for the overland portion of the route, the first P-38 Group was to rendezyous midway across the North Sea and maintain two Squadrons with the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings and one with the 3rd Bomb Divis on Combat Wings from the point of separation over Heligoland Bight. As the force neared the coast one P-47 Group was to join the escort of each Bomb Division and a second P-38 was to meet the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings (leading) at the Initial Point, augmented by the third P-38 Group at the This arrangement afforded substantial protection in the target target. area and during the withdrawal (all Groups would be able to remain with the bombers well beyond the coast on withdrawal), the enemy's capability to make a strong interception effort during this period being fully recognized. Additional support was to be provided by a P-51 Group (two Squadrons) detailed to sweep the Luneburg area during the bomber's penetration to disperse enemy fighters approaching from the east.

(2) Seven Groups, one P-47, one P-38 and five P-51, were to support Force II formations against the rail bridges and airfields. One P-51 Group was to provide close escort for the Saumur Combat Wing and one for the Tours/La Riche Combat Wing. A third P-51 Group was to cover the Bretigny and Melun Combat Wings and a fourth P-51 Group the Buc and Toussus Combat Wings. The P-38 Group was assigned to the Chartres Combat Wing and the P-47 Group to the Chateandun and Orleans Combat Wings. All Groups providing close escort were to rendezvous with assigned Combat Wings at the French coast and remain until the bombers recrossed the coast on withdrawal. The fifth P-51 Group was designated to provide general support, under Type 16 control, in the Dreux area. All Groups were instructed to return to the Paris-Amiens-Compiegne area to attack road and rail transportation targets, endurance permitting, after the bombers had cleared enemy territory.

(3) A single P-47 Group was assigned to patrol the Pas de Calais sector in support of Force III, attacking Crossbow targets during the morning.

(4) For the afternoon Crossbow operation two P-47 Groups were assigned to patrol sectors in the Pas de Colais, one under IN ground control, and one P-51 Group was to sweep the Beauvais area south of the targets under Type 16 ground control.

(Refer to Overall Plan in "Routes" Annex for details of bomber routes, timings and fighter rendezvous points or patrol areas).

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EXECUTION. 3.

> Operation 438 - Force I. 8.

> > (1) Targets Bombed.

- Deutsche Vacuum Ol A.G., Bremen, Germany (overcast (a)
- technique). Targets of opportunity including Wesermunde, Germany. (b)TULMO
- (2) Take-off and assembly.

(a) Four B-17 Combat Wings from 1st Bomb Division and two B-17 Combat Wings from 3rd Bomb Division composed this force detailed to attack the Deutsche Vacuum oil refinery either visually or, the efficiency of H2X equipment permitting, by overcast technique. One or more H2X Pathfinder aircraft were assigned to each Group. Combat Wings were ordered to fly in trail at three-minute intervals with the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings leading.

(b) There were 331B-17's airborne, 217 from 1st Bomb Division and 114 from 3rd Bomb Division. Assemblies were completed without incident. The 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings were one to three minutes early departing the English coast at Cromer while 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wings were on schedule.

# (3) Penetration.

(a) The first part of the course across the North Sea was flown according to plan with Combat Wings climbing to attain 25,000 feet before reaching the German coast, The low cloud gradually increased to 9-10/10 overcast. 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings, flying at a greater ground speed than anticipated, purposely executed a dog-leg north of the briefed route midway across the North Sea in order to conform to briefed landfall and target times. The maneuver was successful and at the Initial Point the four Combat Wings were within two minutes of schedule. The two 3rd Division Combat Wings also followed a more northerly course than briefed. En route Pathfinder equipment in the lead Group became inoperative and the Combat Wing leader resorted to a 360° turn to fall in behind the second Combat Wing in order to bomb on its Pathfinder marker. On this maneuver contact with the second Combat Wing was lost and considerable delay ensued. Faced with the prospect of arriving over Bromen approximately 30 minutes late, the leader of the low Group which had operative Pathfinders was instructed to take over and attack Wesermunde as an opportunity target. The second Combat Wing which had proceeded on towards the mouth of the Elbe also executed a 360° turn to consume a few minutes which had been gained during the over-water flight and to close up its formation. It reached the briefed Initial Point several minutes behind schedule.

(b) The first P-38 Group joined the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings 30-40 miles off the enemy coast, the bombers having reached the assigned rendezvous point ahead of the designated time. The 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wings flying to the north were not contacted. Before landfall one P-47 Group effected rendezvous with the 1st Bomb Division formation according to plan and another contacted the second Combat Wing of the 3rd Bomb Division. A second P-38 Group augmented the 1st Bomb Division escort at the Initial Point as briefed.

(c) No enemy aircraft were sighted during the penetration and no accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered.

#### (4)Target area.

(a) An undercast of 9-10/10 low cloud compelled attack by Pathfinder methods. The four 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings and one of the two 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wings attacked the Bremen oil refinery and the remaining 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wing released on the Pathfinder aircraft of the low Group at Wesermunde. Two 1st Bomb Division Groups also dropped on Pathfinder aircraft of other units due to malfunctioning of H2X equipment in their lead aircraft. All 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings were within two minutes of scheduled time over target while the 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wing attacking the primary target was eight minutes late. Altitudes were substantially as briefed except one high Group in a lst Bomb Division Combat Wing which bombed at 27,100 feet, 1100 feet higher ES Eal than briefed.

(b) A total of 317 B-17's attacked with 786.5 tons HE. Strike photographs were almost totally obscured but ground detail was visible at a few points and it was estimated that at least part of the bombfall was within the built-up areas of both Bremen and Wesermunde. Reconnaissance photographs confirmed the estimate and revealed considerable damage in the industrial d ock areas of each city. The following summ-aries are based upon interprotation of reconnaissance photographs: 副副周

Bremen (257 B-17's dropped 642.9 tons HE) - There were scattered items of business/residential damage throughout the city but the weight of the attack was confined to the dock area between the Seehausen and Oslebshausen (site of the oil refinery) districts with the concentration extending south into open areas across the Weser river. The oil refinery escaped dazage although the majority of bursts were within a mile of the target, and the northwestern part of the dense bomb pattern extended to within a few hundred feet of the oil storage tanks. The Junkers aircraft plant (Weser Flugzeugbau G.m.b.h.), three-quarters of a mile east of the oil refinery, sustained damage to 12 of the 14 main buildings, four being partially destroyed or severely damaged. The entire plant of one small industry was almost completely destroyed and there was damage to three buildings in the Deschimag Shipyard, the Nordeutsche Hurte Steelworks and Coke Oven Plant and several smaller industrial plants. One small cargo vessel and a barge received severe damage, and trackage in railroad sidings adjoining the docks was torn up by several direct hits.

We ermunde (Target of opportunity attacked by 53 B-17's with 127.5 tons HE) - Damage was concentrated in the eastern part of the dock area and included nine shop-type buildings in the Seebeck Shipyard, the Fischerai Hafen railroad station and several warehouses and shops. In this area and to the south there were scattered incidents of damage to readways and business/residential property.

(See "Bombing" Annex for reconnaissance photographs.)

(c) In addition to the fighter Groups already escorting the bombers, a third P-38 Group rendezvoused as planned with the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings at the target and one P-51 Group, after sweeping the Luneburg area uneventfully, provided target area support for 20 minutes and withdrew with the 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wings.

(d) One 1st Bomb Division Group reported a single, ineffective pass by a black Me-110 in an apparently chance encountered a few minutes after bombs away. This proved to be the only enemy aircraft sighted by either bombers or supporting fighters throughout the mission. Anti-aircraft fire at Bremen was moderate to intense of varying accuracy and at Wesermunde was meager and inaccurate. the bursts being considerably below the formation.

# (5) Withdrawal.

(a) Return courses varied little from the briefed route although there were slight deviations north of course, Landfall was made in the vicinity of Cromer, one to seven minutes ahead of schedule for 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings and 15 to 17 minutes late for 3rd Bomb Division Comabt Wings.

(b) The six escorting fighter Groups all maintained their protection as far as the enemy coast and most of the Groups remained with the bombers a considerable distance over the North Sea, one P-38 Group to within 100 miles of the English coast. One P-47 Group returned inland after covering the bombers to the German coast and swept south through the Munster and Hamm areas, carrying gut strafing attacks against an airfield and rail transport,

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(c) Anti-airconaft defenses were in action at Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven, Heligoland, and several of the Frisian Islands but, as was the case during the peret nation, the bombers were sufficiently close to the briefed track to avoid these defenses.

(6) Fighter Support.

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(a) Other than the late rendezvous by the first scheduled P-38 Group, which did not affect the strength of the escort over German territory, fighter support was rendered according to plan by three P-38 Groups, two P-47 Groups and one P-51 Group. There were 271 fighters airborne and 260 flew sorties, 145 P-38's, 84 P-47's and 31 P-51's.

(b) Strafing attacks against an airfield and rail transport were carried out by one P-47 Group after escorting to the coast on withdrawal. Claims included two parked aircraft and nine locomotives destroyed.

# (7) Losses. Battle Damage and Claims.

(a) One B-17 was lost, shot down by the Bremen ground defenses. One B-17 sustained Category "E" (salvage) damage in a take-off collision. Category "A" combat damage was sustained by 70 B-17's and Category "AC" damage by 23, in all but two instances due to anti-aircraft There were no claims against enemy aircraft. fire.

(b) None of the supporting fighters failed to return. Three P-38's received limited damage. Claims against enemy aircraft were confined to the two aircraft destroyed on the ground by the P-47 Group.

b. Operation 438 - Force II.

- (1)Targets Bombed.
  - (a)
  - Railroad Bridge, Saumur, France. Railroad Bridge, Tours/La Riche, France. (b)
  - (c)Airfield, Toussus-le Noble, France (overcast technique).
  - Airfield, Orleans/Bricy, France. Airfield, Chateaudun, France. (d)
  - ( 0)
  - (f)Landing strip, Foret de Bourse near Essay, France, secondary target.
  - Targets of opportunity, including Conches Airfield. (g)

#### (2)Narrative.

(a) Force II comprised separate formations from each Bomb Division. Two B-17 Combat Wings were scheduled from 1st Bomb Division, one each against the rail bridges at Saumur and Tours/La Riche. They were ordered to fly in trail at an eight-minute interval during the penetration, thus permitting a closed-up withdrawal. Four B-24 Combat Wings from 2nd Bomb Division, to fly in trail at five-minute intervals in view of their large size, were assigned one each to the airfields at Melun, Bretigny, Buc and Toussus le Noble. Each of the four Combat Wings were assigned two H2X Pathfinder aircraft as navigational aids. Three B-24 Combat Wings from 3rd Bomb Division, to fly in trail at three-minute intervals, were detailed one each against the airfields at Orleans/Bricy, Chateaudun and Chartres.

(b) Four hundred eighty three bombers were airborne, 74 B-17's from 1st Bomb Division, 268 B-24's from 2nd Bomb Division and 141 B-24's from 3rd Bomb Division. Assemblies were accomplished without difficulty and departure from the south coast of England was at nearly scheduled times except for the 2nd Bomb Division Combat Wing assigned to Buc Airfield which was eight minutes late. The B-24 Combat Wing detailed against Melun Airfield flew directly to the barget from the French coast instead of following the more southerly course to the briefed Initial Point. Otherwise scheduled routes were adhered to on both penetration and withdrawal except for units which found primary targets cloud obscured and attacked secondary or opportunity targets.

(c) The five most northerly targets were overcast and the only one attacked was Toussus Airfield where the two Squadrons of the lead Group, by order of the Command Pilot, released on H2X Pathfinder indications and the two Squadrons of the following Group dropped on the leader. The remainder of the 2nd Bomb Division units sought opportunity targets, seven Squadrons attacking Conches Airfield, one Squadron attacking Dreux Airfield, one Squadron attacking the Pont Audemer port area and nine Squadrons returning with their bombs. The 3rd Bomb Division Combat Wing assigned to Chartres Airfield bombed its secondary target, the Foret de Bourse landing strip near Essay. The 3rd Division Combat Wings scheduled against the Chateaudun and Orleans/Bricy Airfields and the 1st Bomb Division Combat Wings against the Saumur and Tours/La Riche rail bridges and all attacked primary targets, encountering only the prodicted small amounts of low cloud which did not interfer with sighting. One Group in the Chateaudun Combat Wing was compelled to drop on the release of the immediately preceding Group because the leader and the deputy leader had returned early and the number three aircraft was not equipped with a bombsight. All units attacking primary targets were within three minutes of schedule and, except for two Squadrons against Toussus which were 1000 feet higher than briefed, precribed bombing altitudes were maintained.

(d) A total of 334 aircraft attacked with 811.5 tons HE, including 31 aircraft with 77.5 tons against a secondary target and 97 aircraft with 232.9 tons against opportunity targets. The following damage summaries are based upon interpretation of strike and reconnaissance photographs:

- Saumur Railway Bridge (38 B-17's dropped 89.5 tons HE) Although there was a pattern of at least 95 craters in the land traversed by the northern part of the bridge, there was only one direct hit. It caused a 20-foot hole in the track bed but apparently did not affect the bridge structure itself.
- Tours/La Riche Railway Bridge (36 B-17's dropped 108 tons HE) Two concentrations covered the general target area, extending from the rail junction south of the target to the northern approaches. The bridge received three direct hits which tore out portions of the structure, cut the east track in each instance, scattered debris over both tracks and possibly cut the west track at one point. The bridge was believed to have been rendered unserviceable. Tracks along the northern approaches were severed by two bursts and both approaches to the junction to the south were torn up by four direct hits. A small road bridge immediately west of the target was also damaged at its western end.
- Toussus le Noble Airfield (46 B-24's dropped 107.8 tons HE) -Strike photographs were cloud obscured and reconnaissance photographs revealed no bomb pattern within the target area although two parked aircraft appeared to be damaged, one severely, and there was evidence of slight damage to a small factory building. There was s group of craters immediately beyond the eastern end of the airfield.
- Orleans/Bricy Airfield (44 B-24's including one aircraft attacking as an opportunity target, dropped 87 tons HE) - The bombfall was concentrated in the center of the landing ground with scattered bursts elsewhere within the target area. In addition to the extensive cratering of the field and runways, two small buildings were damaged in the north fuellingarea.

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Chateaudun Airfield (23 B-221s) dropped 111.2 tons HE) - The largest concentration cover the center of the landing ground but other groupings were obtained in the southeast hangar and dispersal area, and both the north and south hangar areas. One small and one large hangar to the south were damaged, the latter still smoking several hours after the attack, and three previously damaged hangars to the east suffered further destruction. There were approximately 160 bursts on the landing ground with 40 runways and taxi. tracks.

### Secondary-

Foret de Bourse Londing Ground (31 B-24's dropped 77.5 tons HE) -The landing strip was blanketed by some 240 bursts of which at least 50% were directly across probable take-off and landing paths in the center and western portions of the field. Other bombs fell in words west of the field into which tracks from the strip were leading.

- Conches Airfield (Target of Opportunity 77 B-24's dropped 182.7 tons HE) - Except for the northwestern part of the target area, the airfield, installations and dispersal areas were blanketed by at least 550 bursts. Direct hits were obtained on two barracks, five aircraft shelters and the fuel stores while near misses damaged six barracks and three shelters. Runways were cratered by 40 to 45 bursts.
- Pont Audemer (Target of Opportunity 11 B-24's dropped 28.6 tons HE) - The weight of the attack fell northwest of the port area in open fields. One probable direct hit was obtained on a workshop or stores building.
- Dreux Airfield (Target of Opportunity 8 B-24's dropped 19.2 tons HE) - The bombfall was well south of the airfield and caused no damage.

(e) The P-51 Group detailed to support the Saumur Combat Wing was late and did not effect rendezvous until the vicinity of the target. The P-47Group the P-33 Group and the three other P-51 Group astimed as close escort to the other bomber formations furnished cover as planned from the French coast on penetration until it was recrossed on withdrawal. The additional P-51 Group ordered to patrol the Droux area under ground control executed an uneventful 105-minute sweep of the assigned area. Upon completion of bomber support requirements, all but the P-47 Group carried out strafing attacks according to plan except that low cloud in two instances necessitated leaving assigned strafing areas and proceeding westerly to the Le Mans-Chartres sector. Road and rail transport as well as Mo-109's dispersed around a grass airfield were targets and specific claims included four Me-109's, four locomotives and a rail tank car destroyed and two Me-109's, five locomotives, two military vehicles and 117 items of rolling stock damaged, There were 300 fighters airborne and sorties were flown by 288, 207 P-51's, 48 P-38's and 33 P-7's.

(f) No enemy aircraft were encountered by bombers or fighters. Anti-aircraft defenses were reported as meager and accurate at Tours and Saumur, moderate and fairly accurate at Toussus, Orleans, Conches and Dreux and inaccurate at other targets. En route meager to moderate, generally inaccurate gunfire was encountered from Neufchatel, Illiers Airfield, Evreux, Laigle and Dieppe.

(g) One B-17 and three B-24's were lost to antiaircraft fire. Two additional B-24's sustained Category "E" (salvage) damage. The 1st and 3rd Bomb Division reported 51 instances of Category "A" damage and 7 instances of Category "AC" damage. The 2nd Bomb Division did not report combat damage for the three missions of the day separately but of the 25 aircraft reported for the entire day, it is indicated that about one-half of the incidents were incurred during this phase with anti-aircraft fire responsible. There were no bomber claims against enemy aircraft. One P-38 was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and one P-51 received minor damage. Fighter claims against enemy aircraft were four destroyed and two damaged on the ground.

- Operation 438 For
  - (1) Targets Bombed.
    - (a) Rouen Industrial Area Target of opportunity.
  - (2) Narrative.

(a) Twelve 12-aircraft units, four B-17 Groups from 1st Bomb Division, five B-24 Squadrons from 2nd Bomb Division and three B-17 Groups from 3rd Bomb Division, were detailed to attack visually 12 Crossbow sites in the Pas de Calais. Refer to Paragraph 2 b. (Planning) for detailed list of target assignments, Groups or Squadrons were instructed to fly in trail at one or two-minute intervals.

(b) One hundred forty-five bombers were airborne, 48 B-17's from 1st Bomb Division, 60 B-24's from 2nd Bomb Division and 37 B-17's from 3rd Bomb Division. After normal assemblies all units followed briefed routes to the French coast. A complete undercast covered the Pas de Calais and several units elected to turn back along the penetration route. Others continued as planned but were unable to attack, and, after circling the area in unsuccessful attempts to find a break in the clouds, all but one unit withdrew along briefed withdrawal courses and returned without bombing. One 3rd Bomb Division B-17 Group flew far south of course in an attampt to locate a suitable opportunity target and eventually released through 6/10 cloud on the Rouen industrial area, thereafter withdrawing directly north.

(c) Twelve aircraft attacked the Rouen industrial area as an opportunity target, dropping 30 tons HE. The bombfall was several miles short, falling in open areas and extending through the village of Grand Couronne, four miles southeast of Rouen.

(d) One P-47 Group accorded planned area support sweeping the Pas de Calais and extending its patrol to Paris, St. Omer and Evreux during the period 1022-1200 hours. Thirty-six P-47's were airborne and 35 completed the mission.

(e) There was no enemy aircraft opposition. Meager to moderate, accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered at Calais and Rouen.

(f) One B-17 from the Group which attacked Rouen was lost to anti-aircraft fire. There were three cases of Category "A" damage and one of Category "AC" all caused by anti-aircraft fire. The supporting P-47's sustained no losses but one P-47 received limited battle damage. There were no claims against enemy aircraft.

d. Operation 439.

(1) Targets Bombed.

- Holque Switching Station. (a)
- Crepy Launching Site. (b)
- Bachimont Launching Site. .c)
- Belloy-sur-Somme Launching Site. d)
- Fressin Launching Site. e
- Cauche d'Ecques Launching Site. f
- Belle Croix Launching Site.
- Tingry Switching and Transformer Station.
- Abbeville Switching and Transformer Station.
- Pont a Vendin Switching and Transformer Station.
- La Vaupalière Switching and Transformer Station. Beaumetz les Aire Launching Site.

-10-

Targets of opportunity, including St. Pol Marshalling Yards. Colored and a second and a seco

(2) Narrative

(a) Eighteen 12-aircraft units, frite B-17 Groups from 1st Bomb Division, ten B-24 Squadrons from 2nd Bomb Division and three B-24 Squadrons from 3rd Bomb Division were scheduled to attack 18 launching sites and power stations in the Pas de Calais area. The 2nd Bomb Division units were to fly at one-minute intervals and 1st and 3rd Bomb Division units at two or three-minute intervals for the portions of the penetration and withdrawal routes common to two or more units.

(b) There were 228 bombers airborne, 61 B-17's from 1st Bomb Division, 129 B-24's from 2nd Bomb Division and 38 B-17's from 3rd Bomb Division. Such assemblies as were required were accomplished without difficulty and all units departed the English coast close to the scheduled times. Several 2nd Bomb Division Squadrons flew several miles north of course before correcting at the Initial Point. The remaindor of the units followed briefed penetration routes closely. Withdrawal tracks also adhered to the scheduled routes except for minor deviations to avoid anti-aircraft fire or, in the case of two Groups, to attack opportunity targets. Manouvering in the target areas resulted in several Groups returning to England as much as 30 minutes behind schedule. The target area was clear and 12 of the 18 Groups and Squadrons attacked as planned. Units assigned to Fleury, Haute Cote, Fiefs, Mazingarbe, Crepieul and Blanc Pignon Ferme were unable to identify their targets and did not attack. The Group assigned to Fleury subsequently attacked the St. Pol marshalling yards and the one detailed against Blanc Pignon Ferme attacked an unidentified probable Crossbow installation at 5030N-0205E. The remaining four units returned without bombing. Prescribed altitudes were maintained and attack times were in most instances within the 20-minute period allotted to each Bomb Division.

(c) A total of 163 aircraft attacked with 418.8 tons HE. Strike and reconnaissance photographs indicate the following results:

Electrical Stations.

Holque (13 B-17's dropped 39 tons HE) - There were at least nine bursts within the target area although the weight of the bombfall lay immediatley to the west in open fields. A near miss damaged the transformer building and yard. A direct hit partially wrecked a building just outside the area and others cut the adjacent roadway and railroad at several points.

Tingry (12 B-24's dropped 31.1 tons HE) - A concentration of at least 150 bursts was centered on the target area. The intricacy of structure of the installations made exact assessment of the severe damage difficult but direct hits upon the east and west edges of the bank of unhoused equipment and 50% destruction of an L-shaped building were evident and at least 15 craters were counted within a 50-yard radius.

Abbeville (14 B-24's dropped 36.4 tons HE) - The target was not hit, the bombs falling in open fields to the west,

-11-

Pont a Vendin (12 B-24's dropped 36 tens HE) - The target was not damaged, the bombfall being several hundred yards to the west in open fields.

他们原则啊! La Vaupaliere (13 B-24 s dropped 36.5 tons HE) - The concentration was approximately two miles southeast of the target in an industrial area. At least three large and 19 small buildings were affected and there was a direct hit on the Rouen-Dieppe railroad line.

# Crossbow Installations.

Category "A" - Concentrations of bursts within target are with direct hits upon one or more important buildings.

Belle Croix (12 B-24's dropped 30.7 tons HE)

Category "B" - Bursts within target area with hitsnear enough to important buildings to cause damage or direct hits on less important buildings.

\* Beachimont (11 B-17's dropped 24.8 tons HE)

Category "C" - Bursts within target area but no serious damage to installations.

Fressin (9 B-24's dropped 23.6 tons HE)

Category "D - No bursts within target area.

Crepy (12 B-17's dropped 26 tons HE)

\*Possible Category "A".

Category "D" - No bursts within target area.


Belloy (9 B-17's dropped 20 tons HE) Cauche d'Ecques (10 B-24's dropped 24 tons HE) Beaumetz (12 B-17's dropped 33.7 tons HE)

# Opportunity Targets.

- St. Pol Marshalling Yards (12 B-17's dropped 27 tons HE) The pattern covered the center of St, Pol and the railroad lines leading to the chokepoint. There were at least five direct hits on the rail lines and many buildings in the business/ residential area were affected. Severe damage inflicted upon the marshalling yards in a previous attack had not been repaired.
- Installation at 5030N-0205E (12 B-17's dropped 30 tons HE) The unidentified installation, which appeared to be a small launching platform, was blanketed by a tight cluster of bursts.

(d) Fighter support according to plan was provided by one P-51 Group which swept the Beauvais area under ground control and by two P-47 Groups which patrolled the Pas de Calais, one under ground patrol. Both P-47 Groups condected strafing attacks against rail transport and airfield targets after the bombers had withdrawn. One of the F-47 Groups also dropped one 500 1b. HE and one 500 1b. Incendiary Bomb on Montdidier airfield with poor results. Strafing claims included one twin-engine enemy aircraft, one locomotive and one truck destroyed and 10 freight cars and one truck damaged. There were 121 flighters airborne and 118 sorties flown, 69 by P-47's and 49 by P-51's.

(e) There was no enemy aircraft opposition. Meager to moderate, fairly accurate aircraft fire was reported from most targets assigned to the 1st and 2nd Bomb Divisions. Anti-aircraft defenses were also in action at several other points in the Pas de Calais, but were generally inaccurate.







(f) None of the bombers were lost. Of the 1st Bomb Division force, four B-17's received Category "A" damage and 10 Category "AC" damage, all from anti-aircraft fire. No separate figures are available for the 2nd Bomb Division force, but approximately one-half of the total of 25 cases reported for the entire day's operations are attributed to this force. The 3rd Bomb Division force sustained no damage. None of the supporting fighters are missing. Three P-47's received limited combat damage. Claims against enemy aircraft were one destroyed on the ground.

For the Commanding General:

W att 2. José d WALTER E. TODD, Brigadier Goncral, USA Dep. C/S for Operations








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# BOMBING DATA

Operation No. 438 24 June, 1944

anorr	DIRECT.	LENGTH		TIME OF	A 701070	<b>N# 3 3777 6 T</b>	NUMBER OF		DROPPED
GROU	P OF RUN	OF RUN		RELEASE	AFCE	MANUAL			ON LDR.
		- - -	lst	BOMB DIV	ISION		40th & 41s	t C.W.	(
Brem	en			1993 1997 1997 1997					
92A	182	4 Min.	25,100	1252	X		323x250 HE	l PFF	17
92B	210	4 Min.	23,600	1254	X		305x250 HE	l PFF	17
92-30	06* 192	5 Min.	26,100	1253	X		215x250 HE 108x250 HE		11-6
306 <u>A</u>	204	6 Min.	25,700	1256	X		20 <i>5</i> x500 HE	1 PFF	17
306B	205	6 Min.	24,100	1256	x		216x500 HE	l PFF	17
30 <b>5</b>	198	7 Min.	26,000	1250	X		213x500 HE	l PFF	17
303A	204	7 Min.	24,000	1300	х		191x500 HE	l PFF	15
303B	211	7 Min.	25,100	1302	X		288x250 HE	1 PFF	15
384A	209	7 Min.	27,100	1301	Х	2 	215x500 HE	l PFF	17
3794	** 205	en e		1305	}	х	322:250 HE		17
379B	196	8 Min.	25,050	<b>1</b> 305	X		340x250 HE	l PFF	18
384B	221	4 Min.	26,098	1301	X		324x250 HE	l PFF	17
* ]	D <b>ro</b> pped on	markers of	92A Grou	p - PFF :	inopera	ative.			
<del>**</del> I	)ropped on	markers oi	: 379A Gro	up - PFF	inoper	ative.			
			3RD	BOMB DIV	ISION	• •	4,13,45 Com	bat Win	gs
Breme	ən	· .			•				
452				· · · ·			•		
Comp.	188	ll Min.	25,050	1223	X		240x250 HE	l PFF	11
390	190	ll Min.	26,098	1325	Х		295x250 HE		16
96 Comp	. 185	ll Min.	24,000	1324	X		170x500 HE		17
Wese	rmunde (T.C	)•)							
385	150	15 Min.	25,200	1330		X	150x500 HE	-	15
447	118	8 Min.	25,900.	1330	S X I	NR M	170x500 HE		17,
94	150	8 Min.	24, 200	1-330))	341	₩ <b>X</b>	340x250 HE	l PFF	16
			1 - 1 - 1 - L		-				

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BOMBING DATA (Continued)

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						•			
GROUP	DIRECT. OF EUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE M	ANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMB <b>S</b> F	DR ANGE ON	OPPED
· · · ·			lst b	OMB DIVIS	ION	••• • • • •	lst Combat W	ing	
 Saumur					,				
91A	182	4 Min.	20,300	0824	X		24x2000 HE	1	11
91B	192	2 Min.	19,800	0825	Х		24x2000 HE	1	11
910	192	3 Min.	20,840	0826	X		166x500 HE	1	13
Tours/	La Riche		•					C.	
381A	184	3 Min.	23,600	0825	Х		72x1000 HE	1	11
381B	176	$2\frac{1}{2}$ Min.	23,000	0826	X		72x1000 HE	l	11
3810	180	90 Sec.	23,900	0822	X		72x1000 HE	1	11
-				BOMB DIVI	STON	<b>റ</b>	20,95,96 C.	111	
Potecui	s Airfield	a	ZIND		21.01/	، و <i>ب</i> م	20,99,90 0.	ξ¥ e	
466	40	8 Min.	20,500	0818		X	220x500 HE	່າວວັດ	22
467	18	8 Min.		0820	X	Α	1014x100 HE		f., f.,
	s Airfield	-	000ور ي	0020	Δ.		IOIAAIOO III:		
453	285		22,600	0846		X	104 <b>9</b> x100 HE	2	20
458	315	3 Min.		0837	X	Δ		2	19
93	350	l Min.	21,930	0850	X		592x100 HE	2	19
			21,950 20,500		A	X	800x100 HE	2	19
446	334.		20,500	0640		A.	SOOXIOO HE	2	Т.Ә
	udemer (T	•0•) 2 Min•	21 200	0858	<b>T</b> .		572x100 HE	ri,	10
491 Dmours	335		00% و 1%	0656	X		572XIUU HE	4	10
	Airfield		0.000	odio		77			đ
93	268	5 Min.	21,000	0840		X	384x100 HE	1	8
			3RD B	OMB DIVIS	ION	92,	93 Combat W	ings	
Orlean	s/Bricy						ана) 1910 - Алар		
490A	140	7 Min.	22,050	0817	17	THE R	472x100 HE	1	11
490B	145	7 Min.	23,500	0818	X	Ed 5	380x100 HE	1	9
493A	143	4 Min.	21,010	0819	X	And	400x100 HE	1	9
<b>493</b> B	143	4 Min.	21,050	0819	X		440x100 HE	1	10
· •			gie tot						

- 2 -



BOMBING DATA (Continued)

				,	
DIRECT. GROUP OF RUN		TIME OF RELEASE AFCE MAI	NUMBER ( NUAL BOMBS		DROPPED ON LDR.
	3RD B	OMB DIVISION (Con	ntinued)		
Chateaudun	•		•		
34A 143	7 Min. 22,100	0817 X	624x100	HE 1	11
34B 141	7 Min. 22,400	0818	X 520x100	HE 1	9
487A 150	4 Min. 21,400	0819	X 560x100	HE 1	10
487B* 150	4 Min. 21,400	0820	520x100	HE	10
Foret De Bourse	E Landing Strip near	r Essay (Seconda)	ry)		
486A 352	6 Min. 22,060	0846 X	240x250	HE 1	11
486B 350	4 Min. 22,620	0847 X	140x250	HE 1	6
486 <b>C</b> 003	7 Min. 21,240	0848	X 240x250	HE 1	11
* Released on	487A Group - Leader	and deputy lead	er aborted and	no bomba	sight

in number three aircraft.

4th and 13th Combat Wings

Rouen Industrial Area (T.O.) 100 340 1 Min. 21,080 1156

6 1

240x250 HE 1 11





# INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K-2584 - BREMEN

# Details of Damage

Practically all points of damage, with the exception of about 45 incidents of business/residential damage, are shown on the annotated print accompanying this report. Numbers refer to the annotations on Print 4095 attached.

# DREYER U. HILLMAN

1. Large warehouse at dockside - two holes in roof.

# RAILWAY SIDINGS

2. S.E. sidings of M/Y - 7 hits on tracks and several on embankment.

UNIDENTIFIED WAREHOUSE (N.E. end of Hafen-C)

3. Medium sized building - over half destroyed.

### MARCEI WERKE

4. Complex of buildings - entire plant practically destroyed.

# WESER FLUGZEUGBAU G.m.b.H. (Airframe Factory)

5. Cycle shelters - two direct hits.

- 6. Store (large) direct hit to east end, large hole in roof.
- 7. Unidentified (low, medium sized building) slight damage to w. wall.
- 8. Unidentified small building one third destroyed.
- 9. Office building (medium) direct hit to one wing.
- 10. Office and/or Canteen direct hit destroying 1/10 of building.
- 11. Workshop (medium) direct hit on S.E. side making hole in roof and S.E. wall.
- 12. Unidentified small building one third destroyed.
- 13. Workshop (medium) slight damage to S.E. corner.
- 14. Workshop (medium) 3 direct hits, 1/3 of roof gone.
- 15. Assembly shop (large) 3 or more direct hits. Roof destroyed along S.E. side.

- 1 -

- 16. Machine or Press Shop-Wing off S. corner half destroyed.
- 17. Unidentified small building 3/4 destroyed.
- 18. Workshop (large) very large hole in S.W. corner.

# K-2584 (Continued)

Workshop (medium) - 1/3 of roof gone and severe internal damage. 19.

20. Workshop (large) - 60% of roof stripped, severe damage.

Unidentified small building - 1/2 destroyed. 21.

22. Workshop (large) - 1/3 of roof stripped.

23. Workshop or store (medium) - practically destroyed.

# UNIDENTIFIED

(Appears to be in the nature of girders for hangars or bridges stored for shipment. Gantry crane overhead leading to dock.)

24. Unidentified small building - 1/3 destroyed.

25. Seven direct hits among stored (possible) girders.

DEUTSCHES KALISYNDICAT (Potash Shipment)

26. Six main storage sheds (large) - 1/3 destroyed.

# UNIDENTIFIED

27. Small shed - direct hit destroying small section.

UNIDENTIFIED INDUSTRY (Between Hafens E and F)

28. Large building - two holes in roof.

29. Eleven bay building (very large) - hole in S.W. end.

# DESCHIMIG SHIPYARD

Assembly shops (medium) - 1/3 destroyed. 30.

31. Machine Shop (large) - slight damage to N.E. corner.

Boiler Shop (large) - large hole in roof and nearly all roof lights 32. broken.

# BOATS

- 33. Barge (2001) in Kali-Hafen one end damaged and lowered into water.
- 34. Cargo Vessel (250-300!) in Hafen B submerged into water at bow end.

### MILTENBERG U. KRIESE (Woodworking)

35. Main building (medium) - direct hit on center of plant destroying 1/2 of roof of small center bay.

# NORDDEUTSCHE HUTTE A.G. (Steelworks and Coke Oven Plant)

- Long medium size building (N. of main plant) direct hit, small 36. hole.
- 37. Small shed destroyed.
- 36. Large industrial building . N.E. corner slightly damaged by direct hit. and all the


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# BOMBING DATA

24 June, 1944 Operation No. 439


					-		
DIDECT. GROUP OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN A	LTITUDE	TIME OF RELFASE A	FCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS RA	DRO ANGE ON	DPPED LDR.
	, ,	lst	BOMB DIVISI	NC	94th Combat 1	Ving	
Holque							
457A 163	3 Min.	25,000	1921	X	156x500 HE	1	12
Crepy				· · ·	· · ·		
351B 119	3 Min.	25,500	1918	X	208x250 HE	1	11
St. Pol Harshal	ling Yards	(T.O.)	•	с. Х			
3510 135	3 Min.	25,000	1923	X	216x250 HE	1	11
Belloy-Sur-Somm	le				in an		•
401D 34	40 Sec.	<b>25,</b> 500	1923	X	160x250 HE	1	8
Bachimont							
401E 170	2 Min.	24,500	1921	X	198x250 HE	1,	10
		2ND	BOMB DIVISI	NC	20,95 Combat	Wings	
Cauche D'Ecques	,					· · ·	
<b>46</b> 6 <b>33</b> 0	45 Sec.	24,000	1921	X	100x250 HE	<b>1</b> ,	4
Fressin					•	· ·	1 I.
489 40	6 Min.	24,000	1851	X	189x250 HE	1.	8
Tingry	• •						
489 009	31 Min.	24,300	1855	x	622x100 HE	1	11
La Vaupaliere						2.1 8	
491 170	50 Sec.	24,000	1908	X	146x500 HE	1	12
Abbeville		•				-	,
491 339	$2\frac{1}{2}$ Min.	24,000	1903	X	728xlò0 HE	1	13
Belle Croix						•	
389 342	5 Min.	24,000	1920	x	613x100 HE	l	11
Pont A Vendin			•				
<b>453</b> 005	2 Min.	23,400	1914	X en la constante de la consta	144x500 HE	1	11
			DINA MIL				
		5 E -					




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
GROUP		ENGTH F RUN		IME OF ELEASE	AFCE	MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS		DROPPED ON LDR.
			3RD BOM	B DIVIS	ION		93rd Com	bat Win	g
Beaume	tz-Ies-Aire								
34A	056	l Min	23,320	1943	X		270x250 H	E 1	11
T.O. a	t 5030 N - (	0205 E							
490A	051	4 Min.	24,100	1954	Х		240x250 H	E 1	11


WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO TOURS - ORLEANS.







WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO PAS de CALAIS AREA









# OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 24 JUNE 1944

### Targets - Airfields in France

1. Base to Target to Base.

Scattered clouds to broken clouds with haze becoming clear to scattered clouds at target and scattered clouds to broken clouds on return. 0-3/10 stratocumulus except 7-9/10 base 1500-2000 tops 3000 feet, on coastal bases becoming generally 0-3/10 at target and becoming 2-4/10 to bases on return except 5-7/10 on coastal bases. Nil medium cloud. Nil high cloud becoming 2-4/10 fine cirrus above 25,000 feet at bases on return. Freezing level 12,000 feet, nil icing. Visibility 2-4 miles becoming unrestricted at altitude and 6 miles plus at bases on return.

2. Winds and Temperatures.

Surface	<u>Base to Target</u> 100 <sup>0</sup> 15 knots	Temperatures 12° C.
5000 feet	360 20	04
10,000	360 20	00
15,000	360 25	-07
20 <b>00</b>	360 30	-17
25,000	<b>360 3</b> 0	-26
30,000	<b>360 3</b> 5	-40

3. Indicated and True Altitude and Mean Temperatures.

Ind. Alt.	True Alt.	Mean Temps.	
16,000 feet	16,250 feet	1.5°C.	
18,000	18,310	0	
20,000	20,416	-1	Base altimeter
22,000	22,497	-2.5	setting on return
24,000	24,592	-4	30.12 inches.
26,000	26,647	-6	

4. Remarks.

Nil contrails at flight level.

OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 24 June 1944

### Target - Bremen

1. Base to Target.

Clear to scattered clouds with broken clouds in extreme coastal bases, with haze, becoming broken clouds. Nil-3/10 stratocumulus except 6-8/10 in extreme coastal bases, base 2-3000 tops 4000 feet, becoming 6-8/10 small cumulus over North Sea tops 5000 feet, becoming gradually 6-8/10 large cumulus tops 12-14,000 feet. Nil medium cloud. Nil high becoming 2-4/10 fine cirrus above 26,000 feet in target area. Freezing level 12,000 feet, becoming 5000 feet, over target, moderate clear ice in cumulus tops. Visibility 4-6 miles becoming unlimited aloft.

2. Target to Base.

Broken clouds becoming scattered clouds. 6-8/10 large cumulus tops 12-14,000 feet decreasing gradually to 2-4/10 small cumulus base 3000 tops 4000 feet in base. Nil medium cloud. 2-4/10 high cloud above 26,000 feet. Freezing level 5000 feet becoming 12,000 feet over England, moderate clear ice in cumulus tops. Visibility unrestricted aloft becoming 6 plus at bases on return.



# 24 June 1944

# OPERATIONAL FORECAST

3. Winds and Temperatures.

	Base	to 04 <sup>0</sup> E	04 <sup>0</sup> E	to Targ	et	Temperatures
Surface	0100	15 knots		20 kno	ts	12° C.
5000 feet	360	20	360	30		02
10,000	360	30	360	40		-03
15,000	360	<b>3</b> 5	360	50		-10
20,000	350	40	<b>3</b> 50	60		-20
25,000	350	40	340	70		-31
30,000	350	45	340	75		-41

4. Indicated and True Altitude and Mean Temperatures.

Ind. Alt. 18,000 feet 20,000 22,000 24,000 26,000 28,000	<u>True Alt.</u> 17,940 feet 19,940 21,983 24,034 26,098 28,116	<u>Mean Temporatures</u> -4° C. -6 -7.5 -9 -10.5 -12.5	Base altimeter setting on return 30.15 inches.
28,000	28,116	-12.5	

<sup>5.</sup> Remarks.

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**.** 2

Contrails moderate non-persistent above 25,000 feet, east of 06°E.

# HEADQUARTERS EIG TH AIR FORCE APO 634

# SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 24 JUNE 1944

#### Base at Take-off (0420-0515 hours): 1.

Over England and route out 1-3/10 stratocumulus base 2500-3000 feet, tops 3000-4000 feet. Visibility 5-8 miles with light haze. Over England 0-3/10 stratocumulus tops 4-5000 feet increasing rapidly on approaching Continental Coast to 7-9/10 stratocumulus tops 5-7000 feet, clouds breaking inland again to 2-4/10 stratocumulus tops 5-6000 feet. Visibility unrestricted aloft. Visibility downward 10-20 miles.

### 2.

Target: Orleans, Chateaudun (0815-0845 hours): Target area clear for 2-5/10 stratogumulus tops 5-6000 fee most groups. Occasional patches of 3-5/10 stratocumulus tops 5-6000 feet. Visibility downward 10.20 miles. Saumur (0825 hours): Clear. Visibility 20-25 miles in haze.

Temperatures 22,000 feet - 22° C. Smoke drifted WSW from target. Melun, Toussus le Noble, Buc, Bretigny (0820-0905 hours): Gen-

erally 8-10/10 stratocumulus, tops 4-5000 feet over primary area, breaking westward to 3-7/10 variable stratocumulus over secondary targets. Nil medium or high clouds. Visibility downward 15-30 miles.

#### Return Route: 3.

4-7/10 stratocumulus tops 5-6000 feet over northern portion of Continent and Channel breaking over southern England to 2-3/10 cumulus tops 3-4000 feet. 10/10 stratoculuulus over Channel to east of route. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Base on Return (1015-1050 hours):

0-3/10 cumulus base 2-2500 feet, tops 3-4000 feet. Visibility 6-8 miles.

#### Remarks: 5.

Winds and temperatures as briefed. One report of contrails above 30.000 feet.

### SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 24 JUNE 1944

#### Take-Off (0840-0930 hours): 1.

1-4/10 light cumulus, bases 2500 feet, tops 3-3500 feet. Visibility 6-8 miles, locally 3 miles in haze. Route out 2-3/10 patchy cumu-lus and stratocumulus base 2500 feet, tops 3-4000 feet, increasing after 03°E to 5-6/10 tops 5-7000 feet and 6-9/10 swelling cumulus, tops 10-12,000 feet, at the Continental Coast. 1-3/10 altocumulus from 9-12,000 feet, between 03 and 05°E, otherwise nil. Nil-2/10 cirrus above 30,000 feet, East of 05°E. Visibility aloft unrestricted.

#### 2. Targets:

Bremen and Wessermunde (1319-1336 hours): 7-9/10 swelling cumulus, tops 10-12,000 feet, 1-2/10 cirrus above 30,000 feet. Bombing pathfinder.

Bremen (1252-1304 hours): 9-10/10 swelling cumulus tops 10-12,000 feet 1/10 altocumulus tops 12,000 feet. Nil high cloud. Visibility unrestricted.

#### Roturn Route: 3.

Similar to route out over Continent and North Sea, except 3-5/10 altocumulus from 9-12,000 feet, from 04-06°E. 3-5/10 patchy light cumulus, base 3500 feet, tops 4500-5000 feet, over England.

# Base on Return (1548-1600 hours):

1-5/10 light cumulus from 3500-5000 feet, visibility 5-10 miles in light haze.


- 1 -


Remarks: 5.

変態目示

Nil contrails. Forecast accurate. Winds - comments conflicting.

WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO PAS de CALAIS AREA





# HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE APO 634

# OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 24 JUNE 1944

# Crossbow Operations

# <u>lst Mission</u>

1. Base to Target to Base.

Cloudless to scattered clouds except broken clouds to overcast on extreme coast with haze becoming cloudless to scattered clouds. Nil-3/1C stratocumulus base 2500 tops 4000 feet except 8-10/10 on the immediate coast, nil-3/10 over the entire route and over the target and over the bases on return. Nil medium cloud. Nil high cloud becoming nil-3/10 cirrus above 26,000 feet on return. Freezing level 12,000 feet, nil icing. Visibility 2-4 miles becoming unrestricted aloft becoming 6 plus miles at bases on return.

2. Winds and Temperatures.

	Base	to Target	Temperatures
Surface	3600	and the second	13° C.
5000 feet	ં <b>3</b> ⊖	15	05
10,000	360	20	02
15,000	360	25	• <b>10</b>
20,000	350	30	-20
25,000	340	35	-32
30,000	330	35 -	-44

3. Indicated and True Altitude and Mean Temperatures.

Ind. Altitude	True Altitude	Mean Temperatu	res
18,000 feet	18,448 feet	0,50 0.	
20,000	20,482	-1.5	н - станата с
. 22,000	22,559	-3	Base altimeter
24,000	24,602	-5	setting on return
26,000	26,648	-7	30.15 inches
28,000	28,694	-9	

4. Remarks:

Nil contrails at flight level.

### 2nd Mission

1. Base to Target to Base.

Scattered clouds to broken clouds. 2-4/10 small cumulus, base 3000 tops 5000 feet becoming nil at bases on return. 2-4/10 altocumulus base 10,000 tops 12,000 feet becoming nil over target and then 3-5/10 at bases on return base 10,000 tops 14,000 feet. Nil high cloud. Freezing level 10,000 feet, nil icing. Visibility 6 plus miles becoming unlimited at flight level and 15-20 miles downward.

## 2. Winds and Temperatures.

Surface 5000 feot	3000	to Target 10 knots 25	Temperatures 16°C. 08
10,000	330 330	25 25	03
15,000	340	30	-07
20,000 25,000	350 360	30 35	-19 -29
30,000	360	35	-43
		1 Marca	AR WA
i an A	EL V_N		· · · · ·
		•	

# OPERATIONAL FOREGAST (Cont.)

LULMer-2-

24 June 1944

## 3. Indicated and True Altinde and Mean Temperatures.

Ind, Altitude	Fine Altitudo	Mean Temperatures	
14,000 feet	14,352 feet	6° C.	
16,000	16,428	4.5	
18,000	18,511	3	
20,000	20,566	1 Base altimeter	
22,000	22,622	-1 setting on return	
24,000	24,683	-3 30.03 inches.	
26,000	26,146	<b>-</b> 5	
28,000	28,310	<b>~</b> 7	

4. Remarks. Light non-persistent contrails at 25,000 feet and above.



#### SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 24 JUNE 1944

#### Crossbow Operations

#### lst Mission

#### 1. Base at Take-Off. (0825-0850 hours):

Over England and route out no clouds except for traces of cumulus at 2000 fect and altocumulus in vicinity of 10,000 feet. Visibility 5-7 miles. 0-2/10 stratocumulus tops 2-3000 feet, over England and Channol, becoming 10/10 stratocumulus tops 5-8000 feet, over Continent. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

#### 2. Target:

Noball (1047-1200 hours): 9-10/10 stratocumulus tops 5-8000 feet, breaks to 6/10 stratocumulus in vicinity of Rouen. No middle or high clouds. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Floury (1058): 9-10/10 stratocumulus tops 9000 feet. Nil medium or high cloud. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Noball (1047-1056 hours): 10/10 low cloud, tops 4-6000 feet. Nil medium or high cloud.

### 3. Return Route:

Similar to route out with an additional 1-2/10 stratocumulus in vicinity of 10,000 feet, over England on Return.

4. Base on Return (1215-1315 hours):

1/10 cumulus in vicinity of 3-4000 feet. 1-2/10 altocumulus in vicinity of 10,000 feet. Visibility 8 miles.

5. Remarks:

Winds good. No contrails observed.

#### 2nd Mission

1. <u>Base at Take-Off (1625-1700 hours)</u>: Over England route out 3-4/10 cumulus base 3500-4000 feet, tops 5-6000 feet. Visibility 10 miles. Over England 3-5/10 cumulus tops 5-6500 feet, becoming nil over Channel and Continent. Visibility aloft unrestricted and light haze.

2. Target:

Pas de Calais area (1854-1955): No clouds. Visibility unrestricted aloft, visibility downward 20 miles.

Tactical Targets(1852-1920 hours): 1-2/10 low cloud, tops 4-5000 Nil medium or high clouds. Downward visibility 10-15 miles in haze. feet.

3. Return Route:

Nil clouds over Continent and Channel, Over England 3-5/10 alto-cumulus base 9-10,000 feet, tops 10-11,000 feet. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Base on Return (2050-2100 hours):

2-3/10 altocumulus in vicinity of 9-10,000 feet. Visibility 7-8 miles.

Remarks:

Dense persistent contrails reported above 30,000 feet. Wind reported lighter than forecast.



24 June, 1944 Operation No. 438

	BRETIGNY	TOUSSUS	BUC	MELUN	HAUTE COTE
Number A/C Dispatch Number Sorties Attack. Pri. Attack. T.O.	62 0	72 67 45 21*	62 58 0 11**	70 67 0 (8***33* 41)	12 1 0 0
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE) T.O.	0 52•9	107.8 60.2	0 28.6	0 (19.2 69.6 88.	•8)
Number A/C Lost AA	1 1	0	0 0	2 2	0
Casuelties , Wounded M.I.A.	1 10	0	0 0	0 20	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

#### 2ND BOMB DIVISION

\* 77 Aircraft attacked Conches Airfield. \*\* 11 Aircraft attacked Pont Audemer Port Area. \*\*\* 8 Aircraft attacked Dreux Airfield.

	FRESSIN	CAUCHE D'ECQUES	COU- BRONNE	BELLE CROIX	2ND B.D. TOTAL
Number A/C Dispatched Number Sorties Attack. Pri. Attack. T.O.	14 12 0 0	10 7 0 0	12 12 0 0	12 10 0 0	328 296 46 96
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE) T.O. (HE)	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	107.8 230.5
Number A/C Lost AA	0	0	0 0	0	3 3
Combat Damage		ailable by Oj ed in Grand 1		чУ	۰ ۲۰
Casualties Wounded M.I.A	0 0		0 0	0 0	1 30
E/A Emcounters	0	0	0	0	0






24 June, 1944 Operation No. 439

# 2ND BOMB, DIVISION

	BELLE CROIX	MAZIN- GARBE	PONT A BENDIN	FIEFS
Number A/C Dispatched Number Sorties Attacl, Pri.	12 12 12	12 12 0	12 12 12	10 10 0
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE)	30.7	0	36.0	0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage		ailable by Missi Fotal for Day.	lons - Include	d in
Casualties	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

	HAUTE COTE	FRESSIN	TINGRY	ABBEVILLE
Number A/C Dispatched Number Sorties Attack, Pri.	14 14 0	14 10 9	14 12 12	16 15 14
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE)	0	23.6	31.1	36.4
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damege		ilable by Miss otal for Day,	sions - Include	d in
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	, O	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	. 0



### 24 June, 1944 Operation No. 439

#### 2ND BOMB DIVISION


	LA VAUPALITRE	CAUCHE D'ECQUES	2ND B.D. TOTAL
Number A/C Dispatched Number Sorties Attack. Pri.	13 13 13	12 12 10	129 122 82
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE)	36.5	24.0	218 <b>.3</b>
Number A/C Lost	O	0	0
Combat Damage		ole by Mission otal for Day.	s - Included
Casualties	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0

### 3RD BONB DIVISION

	BEAUMETZ LES-AIRE	CREPIEU	BLANC PIGNON	FERME
Number A/C Dispatched Number Sorties Attack. Pri. Attack. T.O.	12 12 12 0	14 14 0 0	12 12 0 12*	
Bombs on Target Pri. (HE) T.O. (HE)	33 <b>.</b> 7 0	0 0	0 30.0	
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	
Combat Damage	N¢ Available in Grand Tot	by Missions - I al for Day.	ncluded	
Casualties	0	0	0	
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	

\* Unidentified installation at 5030N - 0205E.





Number A/C Dispatched382281137Number Sorties382211120Attack. Pri.12139602Attack. Sec.0031Attack. T.O.1224193Bombs on Target1224193Pri. (HE)33.7361.81505.8Sec. (HE)0077.5T.O. (HE)30.057.0463.5Number A/C Lost006Combat Demage014197*Cat. "AC"0046Cat. "AC"003Cause of Damage014197AA008Casualties003Wounded0058E/A Encounters000		3RD B.D. TOTAL	TOTAL OPERATION NO. 439	TOTAL - 24 JUNE OPS. 438 and 439
Pri. (HE) $33.7$ $361.8$ $1505.8$ Sec. (HE)0077.5T.O. (HE) $30.0$ $57.0$ $463.5$ Number A/C Lost006AA006Combat Demage014197*Cat. "A"046Cat. "A"010Cat. "A"010Cat. "A"010Cat. "B"00Cat. "E"014Cat. "E"00Cause of Damage014Others00Casualties00Wounded00M.I.A.058	Number Sorties Attack. Pri. Attack. Sec.	38 12 0	221 139 0	1120 602 31
AA006Combat Demage014197*Cat. "A"04147Cat. "AC"01046Cat. "B"001Cat. "E"003Cause of Damage014197AA014189Others008Casualties003Wounded0058	Pri. (HE) Sec. (HE)	0	0	77.5
Cat. "A"04147Cat. "AC"01046Cat. "B"001Cat. "E"003Cause of Damage014197AA014189Others008Casualties003Wounded003M.I.A.0058				
AA       0       14       189         Others       0       0       8         Casualties       0       0       3         Wounded       0       0       3         M.I.A.       0       0       58	Cat. "Au Cat. "AC" Cat. "Bu	0 0 0	4 10 0	147 46
Wounded         0         0         3           M.I.A.         0         0         58	AA	· 0	14	189
E/A Encounters 0 0 0	Wounded			
	E/A Encounters	0	0	0

Includes 19 category "A", 5 category "AC", 1 category "B" and 2 category "E", reported by 2nd Bomb Division for the entire day's operations. ¥

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### FIGHTER SUMMARY

24 June, 1944

	GROUP	TYPE	TYPE SUPPORT		SOR-		CASUALTI K. or MI				CLAIN DES.		DAM .
			•	OF	ERATI	ON NO.	438 (MOR	NING)	х. 	· .			
	• •			SUF	PORT	to for	CEI-	BREMEN					
	479	P-38	Pen. Tgt. W/D	48	45	0	0	0	.0	1	0	0	0
· · ·	353	P=4.7	Pen. Tgt. W/D	37	36	0	0.	0	0	0	2	0	0
	356	P-47	Pen. Tgt. W/D	48	48	- 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	20	P <b></b> 38	Pen. Tgt. W/D	54	51	0	0	0	° O	0	0	0	0
	364	P-38	Tgt. W/D	52	49	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
	<b>3</b> 52	P-51.	Sweep of Luneburg		31 - the	0 n Tgt.	O ₩ <b>∕</b> D	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total			271	260	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	`O,
	• • • • •		SUPPORT TO	D FORC	EII	- AIRF	IELDS AND	BRIDG	es in FR4	ANCE			
	357	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D			0 W•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	339	P-51	Tgt. W/D Saumur C		42	0	0 -	0	0	1	0,	0	0
	359	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D			0 Mulun	0 C.W.'s	0	0	0	0	0	0
·••	361	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D					0	0	0	0	0	0
	55	P-38	Pen. Tgt. W/D				1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	78	P-47					0 eans C.W.	0	0	0	0	0	0
	355	P-51	Type 16 Patrol -				0	0	0	0	4	0	2
	Total	<i>2</i>		300	288	1	1	0	0	<u>]</u>	4	0	2



24 June, 1944 FIGHTER SUMMARY (Continued) TYPE A/C SOR- A/C CASUALTIES BATTLE DAM. CLAIMS SUPPORT A/B TIES LOST K. or MIA WAD. CAT. "E" OTH. DES. PROB.DAM. GROUP TYPE SUPPORT TO FORCE III - CROSSBOW TARGETS 56 P-47 Pas 36 35 0 0 0 · 0 1. 0 0 0 de Calais Area Patrol TOTAL OPERATION 607 583 1 1 0 6 0 2 NO. 438 0, 5

OPERATION NO. 439 (LATE AFTERNOON)

÷ .			/								
78 P-4'	7 Pas de Calai				0	0	0	2	0	0	0
56** P-4	7 Pa <b>s</b> de Calai	36 .s Area		0 Dl	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
357 P-53	L Type 16 Patrol -			0 rea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OPERA NO. 439	TION	121	118	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0
TOTAL OPER/ NOS. 438 ar		728	701	1	ĺ	0	0	8	7	0	2

\* Dropped 1x500 lb HE and 1x500 lb IB on Montdidier Airfield in attack after completion of area patrol. Results poor.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

### HEADQUARTERS STATION 123 APO 558 OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

25 JUNE 1944

SUBJECT: S-2 REPORT, MISSION 24 JUNE 1944 (NOBALL)

: COMMANDING OFFICER, AAF 123, APO 558.

ENEMY AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

1. NO E/A ENCOUNTERED.

### ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

2. MEAGER BUT ACCURATE FLAK OF THE CF VARIETY WAS ENCOUNTERED AT 4935-0210. AT NOYON AND IN THE TARGET AREA, MEAGER BUT INACCURATE FLAK WAS SEEN. OUR A/C 219, 752ND SQ. WAS HIT BY AA AT APPROXIMATELY 4930-0225 NECESSITATING THEIR JETTISONING THEIR BOMBS AND TURN BACK. IT WAS NOTED THAT #1 AND #4 ENGINES WERE FEATHERED ON TURN-BACK. THIS A/C MADE AN EMERGENCY LANDING AT MARSDEN AND FURTHER DETAILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

TWO OF OUR A/C SUFFERED MINOR BATTLE DAMAGE AND ONE WILCPPROBABLY BE CLASSIFIED AS MAJOR WHEN DAMAGE IS ASCERTAINED.

# OBSERVATIONS

3. A/F AT BRETEUIT WITH ABOUT 40 A/C PARKED IN MEADOWS. A LARGE OIL FIRE WAS OBSERVED SOUTH OF ST. JUST-CHAUSS.

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JOHN H. DAVIS, CAPT. AC, GROUP S-2

#### SECRET

#### HEADQUARTERS 458TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF 123 APO 558

26 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Statistical Summary of Operations, Mission #3 of 24 June 1944.

TO :


Commanding General, 2d pombardment Division. Attention: Statistical Control.

#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

B.C. D.E.F.G.H.	Group Division F.O. No. Date of Operation Ordered Primary Target. A/C Dispatched A/C Sorties A/C Attacking A/C Not Attacking A/C Not Attacking A/C Attacking Primary Target.	* * * * * * *	• • •	367 24 June 1944. No Bell' - Cauchie D'Eques 6 5
K. Lo	A/C Attacking Secondary Target. A/C Attacking Last Resort Target. A/C Attacking Opportunity Target. A/C Lost.	:	•	Nil

For the Commanding Officer:

JOSEPH S. WILLIAMS 1st Lt, AC Group Statistical Officer



TAKE OFF	AND MAS	RSHALLING	ORDER
DISP	EAST	Server &	a see .
20	OOBR	1.	
31	117M	2.	
16	735V	3.	
18	183U	4.	
34	219W	5.	
33	4550	6.	

#### 458th Pilots and Aircraft as listed on Formation Plans

Date	Target	Pilot	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name	Comments
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	GIBSON, S	79	14			42-95183	183	U	J3	13	BRINEY MARLIN	MSN #3
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	HANNAMAN	79	9			42-95008	800	R	J3	18	UNKNOWN 035	MSN #3
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	HAUSER	79	8			41-28735	735	V	J3	28	UNKNOWN 005	MSN #3
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	HAYZLETT	79	7			42-52455	455	0	7V	35	PLUTOCRAT	MSN #3
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	THOMPSON	79	18			42-95117	117	М	7V	24	YOU CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU	MSN #3
24-Jun-44	ST OMER	WALKER	79	9			42-95219	219	W	7V	1	PATCHIE	MSN #3 - SHOT UP -CRL MANSTON - WALKER DFC B5344-82