
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS 2d BOMBARDMENT DIVISION APO 558 FIED T H I S TACTICAL MISSION REPORT P A FIELD ORDER NO. TARGET DATE G E 490 9 MARCH 1944 ERANDENBURG I S U N C L TABLE OF CONTENTS A S 2d BOMBARDMENT DIVISION S ANNEX 1 - ROUTES I F ANNEX 2 - BOMBING I E ANNEX 3 - ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE D ANNEX 4 - ENLAY AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERS ANNEX 5 - COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX 6 - STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS .



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HEADQUARTERS 2d BOMBARDMENT DIVISION APO 558

. BECRET By Auth of CG 2d Bomb Div :Initials_ :Date 10MARLU 1111111111

29 March 1944

SUBJECT : Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944.

: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, AAF 101, APO 634,

1. Data.

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- a. Date of Mission 9 March 1944.
- b. Primary Target Arado Flugzeugwerke, Brandenburg, Germany.
- c. Secondary Target Center of Brandenburg.
- d. Last Resort Target Any military objective positively identified as being in Germany,
- e. Units Participating 20th CBW (446th, 448th, 93rd BG). 2nd CBW (445th, 389th, 453rd BG). 14th CBW (392nd, 44th BG). 96th CEW (458th BC).

2. Narrative.

a. This was planned as a visual mission against the important aircraft factory at Brandenburg, Germany. The center of Brandenburg was the secondary target in case clouds obscured the primary. Two PFF aircraft were assigned to the Division, one to the lead Combat Wing and one to the 2nd Wing in trail. Four Groups of P-47s, two Groups of P-51, and P-38s furnished excellent support.

b. The 2nd and 14th Wings assembled without incident. The 20th Wing, leading, due to a 70 knot wind and failure of navigation equipment in the lead ship, had difficulty in assembling. This Wing was forced to fly an intercepting course, crossing the coast south of the briefed departure point and assuming the Division lead at mid-channel. The H2X equipment of the lead aircraft worked intermittently throughout the entire mission, the navigator reporting poor range and very poor definition on the scope. The 20th Wing then made a 360° turn and fell in trail of the Division. The 2nd Wing assumed the lead but its H2X equipment had a range of only six miles. Its Air Cornander made the decision to attack, as a target of opportunity, a city that had been picked up by the Pathfinder. A turn to the left was made and a run made on a flak area since this Pathfinder failed on the bomb run. The 14th Wing leader, seeing the 2nd Wing make a sharp 180° turn through a heavy flak barrage, made a wider turn around the barrage and lost sight of the 2nd Wing. The leader, ascertaining that his Wing was in good formation, proceeded to the Berlin area with the possibility of bombing

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
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Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944 (cont'd)

on B-17 flares. After flying to a point east of Berlin and sighting no other aircraft or flares, the Wing made a 180° turn toward base attacking a target of opportunity. The leader of the 20th Wing remained in trail of the 14th Wing until he saw that no open areas existed and, realizing that neither Wing had a Pathfinder, made the decision to return to base, hoping to find a target of opportunity.

- c. The 2nd Wing bombed the Hanover area; the 14th Wing bombed the Brunswick area; and the 20th Wing bombed in the vicinity of Nienburg all Wings using concentrated flak as aiming points. These were targets of opportunity and results were unobserved.
- d. The flak encountered in the target areas was moderate to heavy and of the predictor controlled "unseen" type. Light to moderate and accurate gunfire was encountered at scattered parts along the route, all "unseen" predictor controlled type.
- e. Only one Group experienced enemy attacks. This Group reported four ME 109s near Amsterdam in very weak attacks. Two aircraft were lost, one to anti-aircraft fire, the other to unknown causes and there were no claims.

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Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944

2. Bombing.

a. Data.

GROUP	DIRECT CF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	FIAW AUTO PILOT	FLEW MANUAL	RANCE & DEPLECT	RAIGE	NO. 140
				HAU	OVER				
389th	320°		21,000 ft	131.7	I		No Sighting	or PFF	11
453rd	360°		20,800 ft	1320		X	PFF	PFL	5
445th	2100		21,000 ft	1321	Z.		PPP	FFF	16
458th	2500		22,000 ft	144.3	X		No Sighting	or PFF	17
4000	2,0		22,000 20		ISDOIT				
93rd	226°		21,500 ft	8סית	X		No Sighting	or PFF	21
2214	220		22,500 20		EMBERG				
446th	329°		21,000 ft	74.00	The Louisian of the	X.	No Sighting	or PFF	12
448th	2850		19,000 ft	1403		X	No Sighting		18

- b. The primary target was Brandenburg.
- c. Due to the special equipment failing to function properly, secondary targets were attacked by dropping bombs on anti-aircraft fire areas. Brunswick was attacked by 20 A/C and one Group of 25 A/C dropped its bombs at 52°58 N 11°20 E.
- d. The 14th Wing bombed Brunswick area when leader was hit by flak and jettisoned his bombs with the remainder of the Wing dropping on him.
- e. One A/C attempted to salvo through bomb bay doors but this failed. One A/C did not bomb due to mechanical difficulty.
- f. All A/C dropped bombs through 10/10 cover and all bombing was unobserved.

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Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944

3. Anti-Aircraft Fire.

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- a. (1) The 2nd Combat Wing encountered no AA fire until after bombs were dropped but they were then engaged accurately by intense predictor control "unseen" fire. The 14th Combat Wing encountered intense predictor control "unseen" fire both during their bombing run and after it.
 - (2) Gunfire was encountered on route at Gardelegen, Brunswick, Stendal, Osnabruck, Magdeburg and the Dummer Lake-Diepholz area. Gunfire was also encountered at various other places which cannot be located accurately.
 - (3) Some very large red bursts were seen in the Nienburg area.
 - (4) Rockets leaving spiral trails of smoke and bursting into red smoke puffs were seen. One of these passed through the middle of a formation, but continued on and burst 1000 to 1500 ft too high.
 - (5) Gunfire bursting with green flashes was seen in the Hilversum area.
- b. Anti-Aircraft Officer's Comment.
 - (1) It is interesting to note that the ground defenses held their fire until after bombs were dropped during the first attack on this target. This seems the logical thing to do when 10/10th cloud conditions exist, and it surprising that the enemy does not do it more often.
 - (2) The enemy's "unseen" fire appears to have been exceptionally accurate, and this is an indication of what he is capathe of doing when no countermeasures are employed.

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Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944

4. Enemy Aircraft Encounters.

- a. The 2nd Bombardment Division was ordered to fly this mission with three Combat Wings. The 20th Combat Bomb Wing to lead, the 2nd Combat BombWing second, and the 14th Combat Bomb Wing with the 458th Group of the 96th Combat Bomb Wing last.
- b. The only Group to experience an attack from enemy aircraft was the 458th Group of the 14th Combat Bomb Wing. They reported 4 ME 109s near Amsterdam, but their attacks were not pressed home. The 453rd Group of the 2nd Combat Bomb Wing reported 4 ME 109s about 30 minutes after bombs away. This Group also reported a large black ball which was discharged from a SE A/C in the target area but no results were observed.
- c. Although the fighter support was reported as excellent, this does not account for the fact that practically no enemy aircraft came up to attack the formation. Most of the enemy aircraft bases were closed in but according to available information, it was not an impossibility for them to get off the ground. However, it was apparent from our route into Germany that the target would not be visual and it is entirely possible that the Sector Controller elected to keep the enemy aircraft on the ground because no precision bombing was likely, together with the fact that operations from their own airfields might prove hazardous due to weather conditions.
- d. Our losses were two aircraft, one to AA and one to causes unknown.

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Tactical Report of Mission, 9 March 1944

5. Communications.

- a. Communication Channels.
 - (1) Reception on communication channels were normal. Division W/T frequencies had a great deal of interference. This was caused by poor net discipline.
- b. Navigational Aids.
 - (1) GEE operated satisfactorily. QIM's were obtained from base station. No MF/DF fixes were taken.
- c. Equipment Failures and Performance.
 - (1) Equipment Failures were of a minor nature.
- d. Radar and Radio Countermeasures.
 - (1) "Window" was used by all aircraft in 20th Combat Wing plus lead Groups of 14th Combat Wing and 2nd Combat Wing.
- e. Pathfinder Equipment and Performance.
 - Two H2X equipped ships from 814th Sq. were used on this
 mission,

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
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-11 UNIT	2d BD	2nd (1911)	445	453	44	392	93	20th CBII	9 Mare
NO. A/C Taking OFF	180	12	20	12	28	26	2/4	17	18
NO. A/C DISPATCHED	163	12	16	12	26	25	22	13	18
NO. A/C ATTACKING	163	- 11	16	9	20	25	21	12	18
NO. A/C NOT ATTACKING	34	1	1	1,	A	1	2	5	
NO. A/C SORTIES	157	11	16	9	25	25	22	12	18
T NO. A/C	_	CARREST COMMUNICATION OF THE CONTRACT							
NO. A/C NO. A/C NO. & TYFE		-	-			ļ. <u>.</u>		<u> </u>	
TONNAGE	-	-		-	-	-	-	ļ	
TARGET	-	ST-Hanover	ST-Hanover	T-Henover	ST-Brunswie	ST - A	ST-Hunsdorf	ST-Mionburg	ST-Nienburg
R NO. OF A/C	148		16	8	20	25	21	12	18
E NO. & TYPE	2200x100II 1201x50003	108x5000F	160x50000	416×10018	240x500GP	300x500@P	250x5000P	1/3×500GP	900×100IB
S TONNAGE	420.3		40	20.8	60	75	62.5	35.8	45
TOTAL TONNAGE ALL TARGETS	410.3	27	40	20.8	60	75	62.5	95.8	45
A/C LOST TO FLAK	1		1				-	-	-
A/C LOST TO E/A							<u> </u>		1.
A/C LOST TO FLAK-E/A		_				_			
A/C LOST TO ACCIDENT									
A/C LOST UNKNOWN	1								1
CASUALTIES - KILLED, MOUNDAI SER., SLT., MIA	0-1-0-20	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-10	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	0-0-0-0	0=0=0=0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-10
CLAIMS - E/A DESTROYED, PROB., Daw., NO CLAIM	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-
A/C BATTLE DamaGE CAT. A-AC-B-E	25-13-2-0	1-7-0-0	13-2-0-0	1-0-1-0	1-1-1-0	4-3-0-0	0-0-0-0	2-0-0-0	3-0-0-0



458th Pilot List

DATE	TARGET	PILOT	458th Msn #	Pilot Msn#	Cmd / Inst Pilot	LD	Serial	Last 3	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn#	A/C Name	Notes
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	BRAUER	6	4			41-28682	682	I	Z5	6	UNKNOWN 003	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	BRUDOS	6	4			41-28678	678	М	J3	4	UNKNOWN 002	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	BURTIS	6	3			42-52441	441	I	J3	4	LAST CARD LOUIE	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	CRAGUN	6	2			42-52457	457	Q	7V	1	FINAL APPROACH	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	DAVIDSON	6	3			41-29300	300	М	J4	5	LORELEI	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	GLENN	6	3	OLLUM	D1	42-100433	433	В	J3	3	BIG DICK HARD TO HIT	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	GRANT	6	4			42-52382	382	J	7V	4	WURF'LESS	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	HETZLER	6	4			41-28718	718	М	7V	6	во	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	KINGSLEY	6	2			42-52353	353	J	Z5	5	UNKNOWN 049	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	LAMB	6	3	HENSLER	L2	42-100341	341	Α	J4	4	SATAN'S MATE	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	MANGERICH	6	4			41-29329	329	L	7V	3	FRITZI	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	MARTIN, J	6	3			42-52455	455	0	7V	1	PLUTOCRAT	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	ROUBAL	6	4			41-29303	303	Н	Z5	4	LIBERTY LIB	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	SCHAAF	6	3			41-29302	302	Р	7V	3	NOKKISH	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	SHAW, C	6	3			41-28671	671	K	J4	4	UNKNOWN 001	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	SLATON	6	2	O'NEILL	L1	42-100362	362	Α	Z 5	4	SWEET LORRAINE/BOOMERANG	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	UMPHREY	6	4			41-29273	273	Q	J4	4	FLAK MAGNET	
09-Mar-44	BRANDENBURG	WELLS	6	3			42-52432	432	Р	J3	4	BACHELOR'S PARADISE	