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COPY NO. 29

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

15 APRIL, 1945

FIELD ORDER NO.

1988

TARGETS

SIXTEEN (16) ENEMY DEFENSIVE
INSTALLATIONS, CONSISTING OF
ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY
POSITIONS AND STRONG POINTS
COVERING THE GIRONDE ESTUARY
IN SOUTHWEST FRANCE.

OPERATION NO.

951

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REPORT OF

EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

15 April 1945

1. IDENTIFICATION.

- a. Operation No. 951 (Codeword: "Venerable")
- b. Assigned Targets

Eighteen (18) enemy defensive installations, consisting of anti-aircraft and artillery positions and strong points covering the Gironde estuary in southwest France. (See paragraph 3.b. (3) for specific targets).

2. INTRODUCTION.

a. Under plan "Venerable" whereby the combined efforts of the First U.S. Tactical Air Force (the 42nd Bomb Wing and Western French Air Force), the Eighth Air Force, the Sixth Army Group (Army Detachment of the Atlantic-French ground troops), and French naval units were to be directed toward elimination of German pockets which were denying to the Allies the use of port facilities in the Bordeaux area, the following operations had been accomplished prior to this date:

13 April - Western French Air Force: 76 aircraft dropped 60 tons on "Venerable" targets.

14 April - Western French Air Force: 193 aircraft sortied. 104 aircraft were effective attacking "Venerable" targets.

42nd Bomb Wing: 90 aircraft sortied, 86 aircraft were effective dropping 120 tons on "Venerable" targets.

Eighth Air Force: 1161 aircraft sortied, 1125 aircraft dropped 3310 tons on "Venerable" targets (See Tactical Report of Operation No. 948).

b. The ground assault phase of the operation was to be launched immediately after the second day's attack by Eighth Air Force heavy bombers, a second large-scale operation against essentially the same strong points and gun positions as had been the objectives on 14 April. With weather a controlling factor in air cooperation, D-Day was to be determined by Eighth Air Force based upon forecast conditions on or before 15 April.

3. EIGHTH AIR FORCE PLANNING.

a. Weather

On 14 April 1945, at 0900 hours, the forecast for 15 April indicated that western France and northern Germany would probably be visual; other Continental areas were expected to be overcast. By 1500 hours general conditions had improved to the extent that all of the Continent, with the exception of a small strip from Amsterdam to Vienna, was indicated as having less than 5/10 low cloud. The 2200-hour forecast confirmed visual weather in France and predicted visual conditions in northeastern Germany and varying overcast in western Germany. The overcast in southern England (7-10/10 low cloud, 4-6/10 middle cloud and 4-6/10 high cloud) indicated by the latest forecast, was expected to become nil low and medium cloud south of 48° 30' N. and give unimpeded visibility in the Gironde estuary area. Base conditions were reported as satisfactory for take-off.

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b. Target Selection and Force Assignment

(1) When the operation against ground installations in the Gironde estuary area was accomplished on 14 April, it was expected that the attacks would be renewed on 15 April, weather permitting. On the morning of 14 April forecasts showed probable visual conditions in the Bordeaux area for 15 April, but it was not until the afternoon operations conference that the decision was made to employ the entire Eighth Air Force against "Venerable" targets. The objectives were, on the whole, to be the same as those attacked on 14 April. The commander of the ground forces was informed that this second heavy bomber operation would be the signal for launching the ground assault.

(2) As plans for the subject operation developed it was decided that inasmuch as stocks of Napalm incendiary bombs, originally intended for use against the Siegfried line, were on hand this would be a favorable opportunity to initiate their use by Eighth Air Force heavy bombers. It was believed that this type of incendiary would be ideally suited for use against the casemated and revetted emplacements (experimentation and use of this jellied gasoline bomb by fighter aircraft having indicated that upon impact a wave of flame sweeps over the surface filling depressions and rendering excavations and personnel shelters untenable.) Two varieties of these fire bombs were available, the British 108-gallon, paper, fighter belly tank reduced to a capacity of 85 gallons and the 75-gallon U.S. metal fighter belly tank modified for filling. These bombs were specified for use by the forces of two Air Divisions (2nd and 3rd) together with standard incendiary bombs. GP bombs of 1000 and 2000 lbs. were to be carried by both forces of the other Air Division (1st); its main force was to be dispatched against nine coastal batteries; a special force of three groups designated as a "circling fire brigade" was to orbit the initial point and at the discretion of the Air Commander was to be committed in six-aircraft sections against any installation which, after attacks by the main force, indicated combat effectiveness by the firing of its guns.

(3) The bombers, operating as four forces, were given specific assignments as follows:

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Locality</u>	<u>Type of Target</u>	<u>Grid Reference</u> GSGS 4246, 6M	<u>Number of Units</u>
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Force I - 3rd Air Division (B-17's)

(Tactical Unit - group of three 13-aircraft or four 10-aircraft squadrons)

1	Royan-Medis	Strong point	408755	5 groups 19 sqdns
33A	Royan	Strong point; various batteries, possible head- quarters building railway AA guns.	388754	5 groups 18 sqdns
33	Royan (Fort de Royan)	3x75 mm AA guns; light AA positions; strong point.	365744	4 groups 12 sqdns

Force II - 2nd Air Division (B-24's)

(Tactical Unit - combat wing of 6-10 squadrons each consisting of 10 or 11 a/c)

7	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	3x155 mm guns; 4 heavy AA guns	353771	1 C W 9 sqdns
8	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	349779	1 C W (7 sqdns
10	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	348771	(3 sqdns

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12	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	348767	1 C W	9 sqdns
11	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	6x155 mm guns (case-mated); 3x75 mm guns; 4x37 mm guns; ammunition depot	344760	1 C W	6 sqdns

Force III - 1st Air Division (B-17's)

(Tactical Unit - group of three 13-aircraft squadrons)

32	Royan/Pointe de Susac	6x75 mm coastal guns; 2x120 mm coastal guns; light AA guns.	401699	1 group	3 sqdns
17)	Pointe de Grave	4x155 mm guns (case-mated)	343693	1 group	3 sqdns
38)	(in close proximity)	4x105 mm guns (case-mated)	340691		
19	Pointe de Grave	4x165 mm guns (case-mated); 2x77 mm guns (case-mated); 3x75 mm AA guns	308650	1 group	3 sqdns
18	Pointe de Grave	3x77 mm AA guns (case-mated)	342628	1 group	3 sqdns
24	Pointe de la Coubre (LeFort)	2x105 mm AA guns (casemated)	302785	1 group	3 sqdns
29	Pointe de la Coubre	4x240 mm guns (case-mated)	239847	1 group	3 sqdns
26	Pointe de la Coubre	4x138 mm guns (case-mated)	239840	1 group	3 sqdns
27	Pointe de la Coubre	4x150 mm guns (case-mated)	229839	1 group	3 sqdns
28	Pointe de la Coubre	2x220 mm coastal guns (casemated); 4 medium AA guns.	214835	1 group	3 sqdns

Force IV - 1st Air Division (B-17's)

Three groups, each consisting of six 6-aircrafty squadrons, to orbit initial point and attack in single squadron strength any Force III target designated by the Air Commander.

- Note:
- With the exception of target 33A, all target numbers refer to a target designation sheet submitted by the French ground forces to all air forces involved in operation "Venerable."
 - Second priority targets for all forces were to be any objective assigned to other units as their first priority targets. All bombing was to be accomplished visually and therefore no other priorities were established.

(4) Coordination of the air operation with the assault by ground forces resulted in the stipulation that no bombs would be dropped after 1200 hours by units of the command excepting those in the special force (Force IV) which was to be under the direct control of the Air Commander.

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c. Bomber Flight Plan

(1) In view of the unfavorable cloud conditions indicated for assembly in the normal areas of southern England, all forces were to effect Continental assemblies in northeastern France. After forming, the forces were to converge at the common point, Orleans, (Force I at 0856 hours, Force II at 0948 hours, Force III at 1008 hours and Force IV at 1026 hours) and proceed on a southwesterly heading to the initial point situated east of the target area. A westerly bomb run was prescribed for all forces, giving an upwind (wind forecast at 10 knots from 270°) and downsun (from 102° azimuth at 26° elevation) approach. It was necessary in the case of units carrying the Napalm bombs to attack as directly upwind as possible in order to avoid any cross trail effects which might cause these fire bombs to drift substantially; furthermore, the downsun approach was highly desirable to facilitate identification of the pin-point targets. Bombing altitudes of 15,000 feet were specified to promote accuracy, this being considered feasible in the light of the ineffective anti-aircraft opposition encountered on the earlier mission. Times of attack were set as follows: Force I (3rd Air Division) 1016-1055 hours; Force II (2nd Air Division) 1105-1119 hours; Force III (1st Air Division) 1127-1145 hours; and for Force IV as directed by the Air Commander. All forces were to rally to the west of the target area over the Bay of Biscay, withdraw in a northerly direction, and depart the Continental coast at the northeastern tip of the Normandy peninsula. Force I and II crossing in the English coast at Selsey Bill and Forces III and IV at Anvil Point.

(2) The usual B-17 and P-51 weather scouts were to be provided to report on route and target conditions. It was planned, furthermore, to provide Force III with a special screening force of four Mosquitoes in addition to the "carpet" and "chaff" measures normally employed by all forces.

(3) Special instructions primarily designed to prevent bomb-falls within friendly lines and to facilitate accuracy included:

(a) Extreme caution to be exercised to guard against early releases. If any doubt existed a sufficient interval of delay was to be introduced to insure "overs" rather than "shorts".

(b) Bomb bay doors, rack switches and intervalometers to be checked while crossing Channel as a precaution against accidental release over friendly troops.

(c) Specific briefing as to location of French encampment (GSGS 4249, Sheet 6M: 275855 to 280845 to 312842 to 328060 to 290868) situated in the Pointe de la Coubre area 2 5/8 miles due west of Target Numbers 26 and 29, and 3 5/8 miles due north of Target No. 24.

(d) Briefing to avoid French naval units lying off shore in vicinity of targets when jettisoning as well as when bombing.

(e) Bombing runs for units carrying Napalm to be as close to wind as possible to avoid high drift factor.

(f) All forces to attack in smallest practicable bombing unit.

(g) Second runs authorized and encouraged, with units undertaking such to return to point on penetration route prior to initial point before attempting new approaches.

Note: See "Routes and Targets" Annex for Over-all Plan showing details of bomber routes and timings and Flak Map for relationship of routes to known enemy anti-aircraft defenses. Target assignments (by units) and Flight Order Interval are also found in this Annex.

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d. Fighter Support

No enemy fighters were based in the Royan area and no enemy fighters could be expected to leave their distant bases in Germany to intercept the bomber formations operating in western France. Accordingly, none of the 15 Eighth Air Force fighter groups were required to support this mission.

4. EXECUTION

a. Targets Bombed

Sixteen (16) of the wighteen (18) first priority targets were bombed. Nine (9) of the first priority targets were attacked by other than assigned units as second priority objectives and two batteries were bombed as targets of opportunity (See paragraph 4.d. (6) for specific targets bombed).

b. Take-off and Assembly

Take-Offs were accomplished on schedule and all forces assembled over their designated beacon areas in northeastern France substantially as planned. In Force I, one group experienced some interference from another of its groups which was briefed to assemble 2,000 feet higher; a third group was forced to assemble using pilotage since its buncher was inoperative. Force II assembled without incident. One squadron of a Force III group failed to assemble with the forces and followed at the end of the column. Force IV, assembling together with Force III, experienced no difficulties. A total of 1340 heavy bombers sortied on this mission: 523 B-17's in Force I (3rd Air Division); 359 B-24's in Force II (2nd Air Division); 344 B-17's in Force III (1st Air Division) and 114 B-17's in Force IV (1st Air Division).

c. Penetration

Because of a tendency to narrow the interval between groups and forces, certain deviations from the prescribed penetration routes were necessitated in order to maintain the formations.

(1) As units of Force I approached the initial point each preceding group deviated to the left of the unit ahead in order to increase the interval. The last units were 35 to 40 miles left of the briefed course at the turn to the initial point, with the result that the runs were made on headings that varied from 262° to 300°. The last group of Force I lost visual contact with the other units prior to reaching the initial point area and cut inside the preceding group when the turn to the initial point was made. The group leader attempted to position his group in the wing column and did not discover his error in sufficient time to avoid interference with the other group. The Force I units reached the initial point at substantially the scheduled time (briefed 1001-1040 hours; actual 0958-1047 hours).

(2) Force II B-24's with their higher cruising speed than the preceding B-17's, gained more than the allotted three-minute differential to overrun Force I near the initial point. To avoid interference, all units maneuvered to lose time. The maneuver consisted generally of bearing off to the left and turning into the initial point several miles east of the briefed point. It was generally successful but it caused some units to make their bombing runs from initial points different than the briefed (headings varied from 265° to 323°). Timings at the initial point were essentially as planned (briefed 1050-1102 hours; actual 1054-1103 hours.)

(3) Force III flew its prescribed penetration route as planned, arriving at the initial point at 1110-1135 hours (briefed for 1110-1128 hours).

(4) The last three groups of 1st Air Division groups designated as Force IV arrived in the initial point area immediately after the units of

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Force III. They orbited as planned, but were not called upon to cross the initial point on their bomb runs until an hour to an hour and a half thereafter (1249-1308 hours).

d. Target Area

(1) General

As predicted, the bomber forces found nil low cloud, nil medium cloud and 0-3/10 cirrus above bombing altitudes; downward visibility of about 25 miles was reported. With few exceptions the units attacked their assigned first priority targets by the prescribed visual technique. Due to smoke obscuration, some second runs were necessitated and some second priority and opportunity objectives were attacked through inability or failure to properly identify first priority targets.

(2) Force I (3rd Air Division)

(a) The 14 B-17 groups of this force, made up of 49 squadrons, were assigned their objectives, Targets Nos. 1, 33 and 33A, in the Royan area. All were attacked but there were several cases of faulty identification and second runs due to personnel errors, inadequate target briefing material, and smoke obscuration. One of the 19 squadrons assigned to the strong point designated as No. 1 bombed Target No. 24, a gun position, second priority. One of the 12 squadrons assigned to Fort de Royan, Target No. 33, was non-effective due to interference on its bomb run and the restriction against bombing after 1200 hours caused it to jettison in the Bay of Biscay. Four of the 18 squadrons dispatched against the strong point known as Target No. 33A attacked Target No. 33, second priority.

(b) Bombing was accomplished at 1010-1104 hours (briefed 1016-1055 hours) from 14,040-16,200 feet (briefed for 15,000 feet). In this force 504 B-17's participated in the attacks, dropping 800.8 tons; 455 aircraft releasing 725.1 tons on first priority targets and 49 releasing 75.7 tons on second priority targets.

(3) Force II (2nd Air Division)

(a) This force, made up of five B-24 combat wings having an aggregate of 34 squadrons, was assigned to five targets (Target Nos. 7, 8, 10, 12, 11), closely grouped in the Royan/Vaux-sur-mer area. Although smoke interfered with the sightings of numerous squadrons, and H2X aid was utilized in three instances all units attacked their designated objectives with the exception of two which bombed second priority targets.

(b) Attacks by Force II were made from altitudes of 13,100-17,500 feet (briefed 15,000 feet) and bombing times were 1108-1130 hours (briefed 1105-1119 hours), the intervals between wings having extended somewhat due to the maneuvers just prior to reaching the initial point. In this force 339 B-24's participated in the bombing, releasing 678.3 tons: 316 aircraft dropping 628.9 tons on first priority targets and 23 aircraft dropping 49.4 tons on second priority targets.

(4) Force III (1st Air Division)

(a) The nine B-17 groups, totalling 27 squadrons, comprising this force had for their objectives four installations on the south side of the estuary on the Pointe de Grave (Target Nos. 17, 19, 18 and 38), one target southeast of Royan at Pointe de Susac (Target No. 32), one target northwest of Royan at Le Fort (Target No. 24) and four targets situated further to the northwest at Pointe de la Coubre (Target Nos. 29, 26, 27 and 28). Many units reported difficulty in identifying their assigned aiming points due to smoke from bursts of preceding formations. Second runs were made in several cases

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to overcome the limitations on visibility or to avoid collision courses. One squadron was unable to identify its target on the second run and returned its bombs to base as there was not sufficient time for a third run. With the exception of Targets 26 and 29, all first priority targets were attacked. The two groups assigned to these two targets were unable to identify their objectives due to smoke obscuration and bombed four second priority targets and two targets of opportunity.

(b) Bombs were released at 1123-1158 hours (briefed 1127-1145 hours), except for one squadron, which, contrary to instructions prohibiting bombing after 1200 hours for the first three forces, attacked at 1210 hours on its second run. Altitudes of release ranged from 14,500-16,600 feet (briefed 15,000 feet). In this 1st Air Division force a total of 325 B-17's bombed with 967.5 tons: 251 releasing 748.0 tons on first priority targets; 49 dropping 146.0 tons on second priority targets and 25 releasing 73.5 tons on targets of opportunity.

(5) Force IV (1st Air Division)

(a) This special "follow-up" force of 1st Air Division, consisted of three B-17 groups, a total of 18 six-aircraft squadrons. As previously related these units orbited east of the initial point awaiting instructions to attack such Force III targets as the Air Commander might designate. After circling for more than an hour instructions from the command aircraft sent six squadrons to bomb Targets 17 and 38 situated within 50 yards of each other; six squadrons to attack Target 18 and the last six squadrons to strike at Target 19. All squadrons bombed their designated targets, except one which as a consequence of an identification error missed its MPI by a mile and a half.

(b) Force IV squadrons carried out their attacks from altitudes of 14,400-17,200 feet (briefed 15,000 feet). Bombing times were from 1258-1327 hours, since no prohibition existed against bombing after 1200 hours for this force. A total of 112 B-17's released 333.5 tons on their first priority targets.

(6) Bombing Results

The assessment of available photographic cover of these attacks which involved 1280 heavy bombers dropping a total of 2780.0 tons, reveals the following results, with which are tabulated pertinent bombing data:

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Aircraft Attacking</u>	<u>Total Bombs Dropped</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>FORCE I</u>				
1	189	175	893x550 Napalm 1050x70 IB	Good
24(Second Priority)		13	543x70 IB	
33A	189	149	662x550 Napalm 1502x70 IB	Good
33(Second Priority)		36	206x550 Napalm	Prob. Good
33	145	131	597x550 Napalm 1256x70 IB	
		523	504	2358x550 Napalm 4351x70 IB

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FORCE II

7	97	91	619x550 Napalm 442x70 IB	Unobserved
8 (Second Priority)		1	8x550 Napalm	
8	70	67	5x500 HE 448x550 Napalm 286x70 IB	Unobserved
7 (Second Priority)		1	8x550 Napalm	
10	28	26	181x550 Napalm 104x70 IB	Unobserved
12 (Second Priority)		1	52x70 IB	
12	97	89	2x500 HE 572x550 Napalm 401x70 IB	Unobserved
11	67	43	264x550 Napalm 313x70 IB	Unobserved
8 (Second Priority)		10	78x550 Napalm 1x70 IB	
24 (Second Priority)		10	79x550 Napalm 1x70 IB	

359	339	7x500 HE 2257x550 Napalm 1600x70 IB	
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FORCE III

32	38	36	72x1000 HE 72x2000	Good-Very Good
17 and 38	42	42	84x1000 84x2000	Good-Very Good
19	42	40	80x1000 80x2000	Good-Very Good
24 (Second Priority)		1	1x1000 2x2000	
18	37	37	68x1000 74x2000	Good-Very Good
24	31	31	62x1000 62x2000	Good-Very Good
29	37	(Not attacked)		
17 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good
18 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Unobserved
16 (Target of Opportunity)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Fair
26	39	(Not attacked)		
28 (Second Priority)		12	23x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good
38 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good

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14 (Target of Opportunity)	13	25x1000 25x2000	Good
27	39	26 51x1000 52x2000	Good
28	39	39 77x1000 77x2000	Good-Very Good
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	344	325	639x1000 HE 648x2000
<u>FORCE IV</u>			
	114	--	---
* 18		38	228x1000 HE Good-Very Good
* 19		38	76x1000 Good-Very Good
* 17		36	69x1000 Good-Very Good 71x2000
<hr/>			
	114	112	373x1000 HE 147x2000

* Designated for attack by Air Commander.

Note: See "Bombing" Annex for diagrammatic bomb plots reconnaissance photographs, bomb plot and extracts of interpretation reports.

(7) Enemy Opposition

Some units of Forces I and II encountered meager, generally inaccurate fire over the target area, but no effective opposition developed.

e. Withdrawal

The briefed return routes were followed without important deviations. With the exception of Force IV, all forces were several minutes ahead of schedule on arrival at the English coast. Force IV, attacking targets by squadron at the discretion of the Air Commander, did not rally into group formation after bombing and each of the six-aircraft sections returned to base independently without untowards incident.

f. Sorties, Losses, Battle Damage and Claims

(1) Bombers

A total of 1340 bombers sortied on this operation and made 1285 effective sorties, including 4 aircraft dropping leaflets only and 1 scout aircraft. A total of 1280 bombers released 2780.0 tons: 1134 aircraft dropping 2435.4 tons on their first priority targets; 121 aircraft dropping 271.1 tons on second priority targets; and 25 aircraft dropping 73.5 tons on targets of opportunity. Aircraft of Forces I and II, assigned to carry Napalm bombs as well as other incendiaries and some HE, dropped 2628 Napalm bombs (722.7 tons). There were no losses arising out of this operation. Two instances of category "E" (salvage) damage and 12 cases of category "A" damage were the total battle damage from this operation (10 instances occasioned by anti-aircraft fire, and the remaining 4 by other causes). Force I reported 4 cases of category "A" damage, Force II experienced 8 instances of category "A" damage and 2 of category "E"; Forces III and IV gave negative reports.

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(2) Fighters

A total of 20 P-51's made effective sorties as weather scouts.

5. COMMENTS.

As this mission represented the first operational use of Napalm fire bombs by heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, a ground survey party was dispatched to the area to study effectiveness of this weapon. It was found that the Napalm tanks which fell in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a tendency to bury to a depth which made them practically ineffective; those fire bombs which struck upon harder surfaces such as roadways and strong point areas had a somewhat larger burning radius but were relatively ineffective as to heat intensity or scattering of fire. On an average, the effective, though far from deadly, radius of these incendiaries was 10-15 feet. Based on first-hand observation, prisoner of war interrogation, and information obtained from French Staff Officers, it was concluded that the pill boxes, gun encasements and underground shelters were not physically damaged by this weapon and that open trenches and dugouts were only slightly affected. The psychological effect upon troops was also found to be generally negligible. Enclosures in the "Bombing" Annex of this report summarize in some detail the experience of the Eighth Air Force in adapting the Napalm bomb to heavy bomber use and treat at considerable length the findings of the ground survey team.

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DATE OF MODIFICATION	23
DATE OF ISSUE	05
GRADE	57
NO. OF SHEETS	112

HEAVY GUNS
8450
14 APRIL 1945



MAP No. 0121

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90
91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

FLAK MAP # 115 15 APRIL 1945 (SECRET)

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TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

15 April 1945

CHART REF NO. TARGET FORCE* T.O.T. ALTITUDE

1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE III

A	(32	384th Gp (3 Sqs)	1126	15,000
	(17, 38	379th Gp (3 Sqs)	1128	15,000
	(19	303rd Gp (3 Sqs)	1130	15,000
	(18	381st Gp (3 Sqs)	1132	15,000
	(24	398th Gp (3 Sqs)	1134	15,000
	(29	91st Gp (3 Sqs)	1136	15,000
	(26	306th Gp (3 Sqs)	1138	15,000
	(27	305th Gp (3 Sqs)	1140	15,000
(28	92nd Gp (3 Sqs)	1142	15,000	

1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE IV

401st, 457th and 351st Groups, each consisting of six 6-aircraft squadrons, to orbit at I.P. and attack in single squadron strength any Force III target designated by the Air Commander.

2ND AIR DIVISION - FORCE II

B	(7	14th CW: 392nd Gp (3 Sqs)	1105	15,000
	(491st Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(44th Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(8	96th CW: 466th (4 Sqs)	1109	15,000
	(467th (3 Sqs)		
	(10	96th CW: 458th (3 Sqs)	1111	15,000
(12	20th CW: 93rd (3 Sqs)	1113	15,000	
(446th (3 Sqs)			
(448th (3 Sqs)			
(11	2nd CW: 389th (3 Sqs)	1117	15,000	
(445th (3 Sqs)			

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I

C	(1	447th (4 Sqs), 486th (4 Sqs)	1016-1025	15,000
	(487th (4 Sqs), 94th (4 Sqs)		
	(34th (3 Sqs), Groups		
(33a	95th (4 Sqs), 390th (4 Sqs)	1028-1037	15,000	
(100th (4 Sqs), 385th (3 Sqs)			
(33	490th (3 Sqs), 388th (3 Sqs), 452nd (3 Sqs)	1040-1047	15,000	
(96th (3 Sqs), 493rd (3 Sqs) Group.			

* Tactical Unit: 1st Air Division - Group of three 13-aircraft B-17 squadrons.
2nd Air Division - Combat Wing of 6-10 Squadrons of 10 or 11 B-24's.
3rd Air Division - Group of three 13 aircraft B-17 Squadrons or four 10 aircraft B-1 Squadrons.

Note: See Flight Order and Interval.

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FLIGHT ORDER AND INTERVAL

15 April 1945

Force I - (T.O.T. 1016-1047 hours) - 3rd Air Division - to Royan area.

447th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes; 486th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
487th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes; 94th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
34th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 95th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
390th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes; 100th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
385th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 490th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;
388th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 452nd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;
96th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 493rd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;

13 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force II - (T.O.T. 1105-1117 hours) - 2nd Air Division - to Royan area.

14th CW (9 Sqs): 4 minutes; 96th CW (10 Sqs): 4 minutes;
20th CW (9 Sqs): 4 minutes; 2nd CW (6 Sqs).

8 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force III - (T.O.T. 1126-1142 hours) - 1st Air Division - to Royan area.

384th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 379th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
303rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 381st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
398th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 91st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
306th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 305th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
92nd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes.

2 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force IV - (T.O.T. Discretion of Air Commander) - 1st Air Division - to Royan area.

401st Gp (6 Sqs): 2 minutes; 457th Gp (6 Sqs): 2 minutes;
351st Gp (6 Sqs).

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
TRACK CHART

DATE 15 APRIL 1945

TARGETS

PRIMARIES AS LISTED ON TARGET ASSIGNMENT SHEET

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY *1st Air Div.* A
 2nd .. B
 3rd .. C




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TRACK CHART
Date 15 APRIL, 1945
1ST A.D.

Route Followed by _____
APPROX ROUTE FOR 1ST DIVISION _____



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TARGET
Primary


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ROBIN AREA

DATE 15 APR 1945

Route followed by BRIEFING

466 ACTUAL
458 "
467 "

96CBW
D.A.D.



COMBATS

- F.W. 190 ○
- M.E. 109 ⊙
- J.U. 88 ⊙
- M.E. 110 ⊙
- D.O. 217 ⊙

FLACK
HEAVY ■
LIGHT ◀

	CP1	Bordeaux	CP2	IP	CP3	ENGLISH COAST
96CBW	0858		0952	1054	1251	1316
BRIEFING	10000		10000	15000	5000	5000
466	0901		0949	1054½	1246½	133½
ACTUAL	10000		10000	15000	5500	3200
467	0900		0953	1058½	1248	1313
ACTUAL	11000		10500	15500	5000	3000
458	0904		0951	1106	1247	1313-
ACTUAL	12100		12100	16000	6000	3000

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TRACK CHART


TARGET
Primary

ROYAN AREA

DATE 15 APR. 1945
2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING
389 ACTUAL

---	---	---
---	---	---
---	---	---
---	---	---
---	---	---
---	---	---



COMBAT

- F.W. 190 ○
- M.E. 109 ⊙
- J.U. 88 ⊙
- M.E. 110 ⊙
- D.O. 217 ⊙

FLACK

- HEAVY ■
- LIGHT ▲

	CPI	CP2	IP	T	CP3	ENGLISH COAST
2 CBW	0906	1000	1102	1117	1259	1324
BRIEFING	10000	10000	15000	15000	5000	5000
389	0903	0955	1103	1118	1250	1315
ACTUAL	12000	15300	15300	15300	4000	4000
445	0903	0956½	1106	1127	1255½	1327½
ACTUAL	13500	15000	15000	15000	4000	3500

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TRACK CHART

TARGET
Primary ROYAN AREA

DATE 15 APR. 1945

14CBW


2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING

392 ACTUAL

44

491



COMBATS

- F.W. 190 ○
- M.E. 109 ⊙
- J.U. 88 ⊗
- M.E. 110 ⊗
- D.O. 217 ⊕

FLACK

- HEAVY ■
- LIGHT ◀

	CP1	CP2	IP	T	CP3	ENG. COAST
14CBW	0854	0948	1050	1105	1247	1312
BRIEFING	10000	10000	15000	15000	5000	5000
392	0855	0938	1054	1108	1239	1258
ACTUAL	10000	10000	15000	15000	4000	4000
491	0856	0941	1102	1110	1230	1258
ACTUAL	11800	12100	15500	15500	3900	3500
44	0858½	0942½	1058	1110	1238	1303
ACTUAL	9500	10000	14000	15000	4000	4000

TRACK CHART

TARGET

Primary **ROYAN AREA**

DATE 15 APR. 1945

Route followed by BRIEFING


93 ACTUAL

448 "

446 "

20 CBW

2ND A.D.



COMBATS


- F.W. 190 ○
- M.E. 109 ○
- J.U. 88 ○
- M.E. 110 ○
- D.O. 217 ○

- FLACK**
- HEAVY ■
- LIGHT ◀

	20 CBW	CPI	CP2	IP	T	CP3	ENGLISH COAST
BRIEFING	10 000	0902	0956	1058	1113	1255	1320
93	0902	10 000	10000	15000	15000	5000	5000
ACTUAL	0902	0954	1107	1121	1258	1324	1324
446	10000	10000	15000	15000	4000	4000	4000
ACTUAL	0904	0953	1059	1123	1257	1327	1327
448	11800	11800	16500	16500	6200	2500	2500
ACTUAL	0906	0956	1126	1131	1259	1325	1325
8800	8800	8600	15000	15000	5000	5000	5000

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3RD A.D.
TRACK CHART
No. 1
15 APRIL 1945

ROYAN AREA

No COMBATS
No A/C LOST

Legend


Briefed

- 45A
- - - 45B
- 45C
- · · 93D

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By Authority of
C.G., Eighth AF
Initials. L.H.A.
Date 2 May, 1945

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS SECTION

C O P Y

2 May, 1945

GROUND SURVEY OF THE EFFECT OF NAPALM FIRE BOMBS
AND H.E. BOMBS ON THE ROYAN AREA TACTICAL
TARGETS IN THE OPERATION "VENERABLE"

Operation "Venerable" was an air-ground coordinated attack against the German occupied Royan area. D-day was 15 ^{April} February 1945. Air operations took place from D-1 through D+1. Representatives from the Eighth Air Force were present from D to D+4 and this report is concerned with the observations and conclusion of such personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Napalm fire bombs as used in this Operation on D-day by the Eighth Air Force had little or no effect against the structures and gun emplacements of the targets, no effect against personnel in shelters, and very little effect against personnel in the open.
2. The HE bombs dropped on D-1 day against the enemy emplacements were very effective in neutralizing the targets, but in general, not effective against personnel in heavily reinforced shelters.
3. The fragmentation bombs used were effective against guns and personnel in the open, but not against those in shelters.
4. It was the bombing by the Air Force that allowed the ground troops to move in on the enemy positions.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY

The team of observers from the Eighth Air Force were in the Royan area from D to D+4 day, observing the actual bombing on D-day and advancing with the French ground troops into some of the towns and strong points which are identified by the numbers on the attached mosaics. The following strong points were inspected and were among those covered by aerial bombardment: 1, 2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 33, 37, 110 and 137. No surveys were made at Pointe de Grave on the opposite side of the Gironde estuary from Royan.

In addition to making observations at a number of strong points for the purpose of determining the actual physical damage done, German prisoners were interrogated and their reactions to, and their impressions of, the aerial bombardment obtained; also discussions relative to the bombing effectiveness, both physical and psychological, were carried on with the commanding French officers and their staffs. The survey team was unable to examine all the MPI's assigned to the Eighth Air Force for the missions of 14 and 15 April 1945, owing to enemy occupation of some areas, restrictions due to enemy mines, and time limitations.

EFFECT OF NAPALM FILLED BELLY TANKS

On D-day, 15 April 1945, between 1000 and 1207 hours, the bombing by our heavies with Napalm filled belly tanks was observed from a vantage point at a regimental command post near Chaillonnais, three miles from the target areas. The belly tanks were observed in flight from the time of their release to the time of impact. As expected, the weapons tumbled badly during their entire flight -- some 10 to 15 tanks were observed to explode in mid-air, and a number of others were seen to disintegrate during their flight without exploding. It was estimated that approximately 40 to 50 belly tanks were destroyed in this manner in the air during the bombing operation. The size of a squadron pattern on the ground was observed to be approximately 1200 to 1500 feet wide, and 1500 to 1800 feet long, and these dimensions have now been confirmed from

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strike photographs.

After an artillery barrage lasting from 1245 to 1330 hours, the tanks and infantry commenced moving in on the enemy positions that had been bombed.

The accuracy of the attacks was such that the assigned areas were covered and the fire bombs, in the main, fell well on their targets. The bombs within the patterns appeared to have hit on the average about 100 to 150 feet on centers. Although a number of the belly tanks were found that had not ignited upon striking the ground, there was no indication of a high percentage of duds. The tanks that hit in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a very definite tendency to bury to a depth which made them practically ineffective. that is, they "plopped" into just one big "blob" or puddle of Napalm no bigger than the bomb itself which either partially or wholly burned there very slowly and harmlessly. Of course, a very small portion of the filling in the form of blotches was scattered about when the casing broke up upon impact, but of an insufficient quantity to do any harm. The fire bombs that hit upon harder surfaces such as roadways and strong point areas made a bigger "splash" but still not very large in size or fierce in intensity -- still forming one large "blob" that burned with a great billowing of smoke but very ineffectively as to heat intensity or the scattering of fire. On an average the effective (far from deadly) radius of these belly tanks in this operation was approximately 10 to 15 feet. It is evident that a large "fire ball" or initial flash was not made by the bombs upon impact. This fact was also borne out by the interrogation of German prisoners who stated that these fire bombs falling as close as 30 feet to them did them no harm and if a piece of Napalm did catch onto them they readily brushed it off with no serious effects. There was no suffocating effect upon these men, who merely said that the smoke was annoying and the smell bad. In one case a single prisoner was completely demoralized by the bombing, but this was the individual rather than the general case. One instance was cited where the belly tanks hit in among some tree tops which scattered the Napalm more effectively and caused it to burn more fiercely. One of the French officers made the statement that some of the fire bombs did burn through a number of land mine trip wires, causing the mines to become non-effectual.

The pill-boxes, gun encasements, and underground shelters were not affected in the least physically, and the open trenches and dugouts only very slightly. The psychological effect upon the troops was negligible except in one or two of the cases interrogated. It is of interest to note that one set of Germans who were interrogated had been in secure underground shelters during the HE bombing on the previous day but in the open and in trenches during the Napalm attack. The Napalm attack had very little psychological effect upon them but they made the statement that had they been in the open or in trenches during the previous day's HE attack they would have been terrified.

EFFECT OF HE BOMBS

HE bombs were dropped on defense areas and strong points in the Royan area on D-1 day by fighters, and medium and heavy bombers, and preceding the Napalm attack on D-day by fighters and medium bombers. Bombs carried by the heavy bombers were 500, 1000, 2000 lb. GPs, and fragmentation bombs, and their purpose was to neutralize the areas for the D-day attack by French ground troops.

Ground inspection of a number of these fortifications showed these types of weapons to be highly effective in disrupting the communications and facilities essential to organized resistance in the strong points. Personnel in the deep shelters were not seriously affected by the bombing, either physically or from a morale point of view. The heavy reinforced concrete encasements, approximately three meters thick, and the guns they contained were not destroyed or seriously damaged physically. However, in nearly every case the guns were made at least temporarily useless by rubble thrown over them by near misses, and in every case lines of communication and electrical controls were knocked out completely. Guns in open emplacements were, of course, highly vulnerable to all HE bombs, including frags, and also to artillery fire. The Fort of Royan

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strong point, was an old construction made up in the main of stone masonry, some of which had been reinforced with concrete and timber. This particular construction, while massive, was vulnerable to our bombs and was structurally destroyed. Even here, however, in a number of cases the guns in the badly blasted emplacements were not too seriously damaged and could have been removed and, with some repair, used again.

The German officer in command of all the gun emplacements and flak batteries in this defense area was interrogated and he admitted that all of his batteries were put out of action by the complete disruption of his communication and control systems.

The field fortifications consisting of small protected gun emplacements, observation points and covered trenches were not vulnerable to the fragmentation bombs, except to keep the heads of the personnel down during the bombing - that is, the fragmentation bombs were only effective against the guns and personnel having no cover. The artillery, being more flexible and being able to be applied for longer periods of time, was much more effective against these positions.

COMMENTS

1. Due to the fact that the Napalm filled belly tank fire bombs as used on this operation by the Eighth Air Force heavy bombers were practically ineffective, both physically and psychologically, it is recommended that they not be used again on a similar attack.

It might be desirable, however, that further experimentation be done to determine what effect the very low temperatures, as encountered on an operation such as this, has on the dispersion and flashing properties of the Napalm fuel. Consideration might also be given to making the weapon more aimable, and to decrease its penetration tendency as well as improve its dispersion by a burster charge or a different type fuzing.

2. The evidence revealed by the ground survey indicates that attacks against modern heavy reinforced concrete gun emplacements with the weapons we have at present should be directed against communications, control systems, and other facilities, and for general disruption of the target area rather than an attempt to demolish the structures. The 500, 1000, and 2000 lb. HE bombs were sufficiently large, with the proper fuzing, to disrupt and bury effectively the targets, and for similar emplacements these size bombs are recommended.

3. Field fortifications consisting mainly of protected trenches, relatively small gun emplacements and observation points can be more efficiently attacked with the smaller bombs, such as the 100 and 250 lb. GPs, than with fragmentation bombs. If such field fortifications are to be attacked and cratering is no problem, then these smaller GP bombs are recommended for use.

The persons who participated in this survey were:

Lt. Col. R. L. Post, Intelligence, 2nd Air Division
Major W. E. Cooke, Ordnance/Chemical, 2nd Air Division
1st Lt. R. F. Thigpen, Ordnance/Chemical, 2nd Air Division
Lt. Col. J. H. Huckins, Intelligence, Hq. Eighth Air Force
Captain A.S. Chipley, OAS, Hq. Eighth Air Force
Mr. Alfred Hedefine, OAS, Hq. Eighth Air Force.

Operational Analysis Section

Prepared by:

Alfred Hedefine
OAS Consultant

Approved for release by:

Leslie H. Arps /s/
LESLIE H. ARPS
Lt. Col. A. C.
Director, OAS

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE

AAF STATION 101

APO 634

Auth: CG, 8th AF

Init:

Date: 18 May 1945

319.1

18 May 1945

SUBJECT: The First Eighth Air Force Fire Bomb Mission, 15 April 1945.

TO : Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633.

1. The purpose of this report is to summarize the experience of the Eighth Air Force concerning the filling, loading, fuzing and dropping of fire bombs.

2. Introduction: The fire bomb attack on Royan, France, 15 April 1945, was the first attempt by the Eighth Air Force to drop large quantities of napalm gel from heavy bombers. A total of 843 B-17 and B-24 aircraft dropped 4,615 tanks containing approximately 375,000 gallons of gel. Originally, bomb bay tanks filled with napalm gel were to be dropped on the target, but due to limited availability and the difficulty encountered in release, an alternative plan was chosen. This was the use of paper fighter-belly-tanks, modified for suspension from regular bomb stations in B-17 and B-24 airplanes. After standardizing the bomb container, methods of filling, loading, fuzing and arming were successfully devised. Special bombing tables were also prepared. The target was a defensive area consisting of strong points composed of pill boxes, machine gun and rifle pits, trenches and barbed wire; also heavy gun installations.

3. Containers:

a. Two sizes of fire bombs were used:

- (1) The British 108 gallon, paper, fighter-belly fuel tank was reduced to a capacity of 85 gallons to fit the B-17 and B-24 bomb bays, and fitted with two (2) igniter holding plates. Reference Eighth Air Force drawing No. TSG-11.

b. The 75 gallon U.S. metal fighter-belly-tank was modified by cutting off the rear conical section from each tank at a cross section 21 inches aft of the center line of the rear carrying lug. A flat circular plate was welded to the open end of tank.

c. The loading for a B-17 was six (6) paper tanks and for a B-24, six (6) paper and two (2) metal tanks.

4. Method of Filling Containers:

a. This Air Force standardized upon the type A-6 Portable Refueling Pump for transferring napalm gel from drums to fire bomb containers. This method was more satisfactory than use of air pressure, because of the simplicity and availability of necessary equipment. Reference WD Bulletin CW 21, dated 3 February 1945, for description of air pressure method.

b. The following observations were made on filling operations:

- (1) The Type A-6 Pump unit required modification which consisted of replacing suction hose with 2½ feet of 2-inch diameter pipe or hose, and replacing the discharge hose by the suction hose.

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- (2) A setting of 12 notches on the automatic pump control was found to give optimum results with thin and medium viscosity gels and 16 notches was found necessary for heavier gels. (Gel used was received on stations ready mixed from the National Oil Refineries, Ltd, in U.K. and from Zone of Interior.)
- (3) The average time to empty one 50-gallon drum of napalm gel was 3 to 4 minutes. About three (3) gallons of gel remained in each drum.
- (4) Approximately twelve (12) pumps were required per group for efficient filling. Average time of filling and loading a group of forty (40) B-17's, each with six (6) paper tanks was ten (10) hours; for a group of thirty (30) B-24's, each with six (6) paper and two (2) metal tanks was sixteen (16) hours.
- (5) Two (2) methods of "bombing up" were tried:
 - (a) Loading fire bombs after being filled with gel.
 - (b) Loading empty tanks on bomb stations and then filling. The first method was found by experience to be more satisfactory.
- (6) The few pump failures that occurred were due to air-locking. No damage was done to pump parts.
- (7) Filling and loading was accomplished without accident in considerably less time than anticipated.

5. Loading of the filled tanks into bomb bays was accomplished in conventional manner. The paper tanks were received with two (2) red bands on the circumference indicating positions of the suspension bands. Fire bombs were suspended from 1000 lb. bomb stations.

6. Fuzing: On paper tanks, two (2) M-13 igniters were attached by assembling the igniter holding plate between the igniter fuze adapter and the WP grenade. This assembly was then fitted to the empty tanks before filling took place.

a. The metal tanks had one (1) B-14 igniter inserted in the filling hole.

b. In all cases, fuzes were removed from adapters prior to installation and were replaced only after "bombing up" operations were completed.

c. Arming wires fifteen (15) feet long and .036 inches diameter were used to insure arming of bombs only after clearing the airplane completely. Wires were secured to the highest position of bomb rack and coiled in the form of a spring to prevent premature arming of the fuze through kinking and also to insure complete extension of the wire.

d. Following difficulties were experienced on fuzing operations:

- (1) Standard American bolts were not used to secure igniter holding plates which necessitated the manufacture of special wrenches.
- (2) Varying dimensions on igniter plates precluded interchangeability between paper tanks.

7. Bombing Data:

a. Bombing Table, USSTAF BT-35, was used for both paper and

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metal tanks. The intervalometer setting was 100 feet and the bombing altitude was 15,000 feet. Eleven (11) B-24 groups of 2nd Air Division and eleven (11) B-17 groups of 3rd Air Division took part in the operation.

b. Bombardiers had been previously instructed on the ballistics of fire bombs and dropping trials had been conducted to gain experience prior to the mission.

c. Since the fire bombs were not stabilized, they tumbled and approximately 40 to 50 bombs were destroyed in the air due to collision.

d. The size of a 10-aircraft squadron pattern on the ground was observed to be approximately 1200 to 1500 feet wide and 1500 to 1800 feet long, these dimensions being confirmed from strike photographs by Operational Analysis section.

e. The average effective radius of these tanks in this operation was approximately 10 to 15 feet.

8. Results:

a. The assigned target areas were hit using the bombing tables prepared in this theater. Bombs within the patterns appeared to hit about 100 to 150 feet on centers. Although some bombs failed to ignite upon impact, there was no indication of a large percentage of duds.

b. Bombs that hit in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a tendency to crater which made them ineffective. Bombs that struck harder surfaces such as roadways and strong point areas did not scatter their contents, burning only in one large "Blob" with an immense amount of black smoke.

9. Comments:

a. The Eighth Air Force Ground Survey Party observed the dropping of the fire bombs from a vantage point on the ground, three (3) miles from the target areas. Their conclusion was "that the fire bombs of this operation had little or no effect against the structures and gun emplacements of the targets, no effect against personnel in shelters, and very little effect against personnel in the open". It is recommended that fire bombs not be used again on a similar attack.

b. Leakage of gel occurred at high altitude. This difficulty can be eliminated by providing tanks with a venting hole to permit pressure equalization.

c. The following comments are made on the M-3 fuze supplied with the M-13 and M-14 igniters:

- (1) Recommend this fuze be equipped with a wing-nut to facilitate assembly and removal from adapters. Present fuze requires a special tool.
- (2) A safety pin conspicuously tagged and having a suitable diameter ring to facilitate removal should be supplied with fuze.
- (3) Recommend that fuze be delay-arming. As the M-15 and M-16 igniters have a delay arming anemometer type fuze, it is recommended that all M-13 and M-14 igniters be replaced by these new style igniters.

d. In planning large scale use of napalm gel, at least 24 hours should be allowed for filling, loading and fuzing a combat group. The above information is provided at the request of the Director of Armament, your Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. A. ARNOLD
Lt. Col., AGD
Asst Adj General

1 Incl:

Hq 8th AF Memo
dtd 4/12/44, "Fire Bombs".

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Target: Royan Area (1st Priority)

Date : 15 April 1945

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 1280

Tons of Bombs Dropped : 2780.0

1. Diagrammatic Bomb Plots.
2. Reconnaissance photographs.
3. Excerpts from Interpretation Report S.A. 3578, Interpretation Report No. B 574(R), and Interpretation Report No. B 573 (R).

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S. A. 3578
TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA
15 APR 1945

DIAGRAMMATIC BOMB PLOT NO. 1

- /// Area of H.E. Bursts
- Area of I.B. Bursts
- Target Area





Map Background: G.S.G.S. 4250 61/3
Neg. No. PT 305651

Pointe de la




S. A. 3578
TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA
15 APR 1945

DIAGRAMMATIC BOMB PLOT NO. 2

-  Area of H.E. Bursts
-  Area of I.B. Bursts
-  Area of Fire Bombs
-  Target Area

Map Background: G.S.G.S. 4250 6M/5
Neg. No. PT305652

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TARGET AREA

TARGET NO. 32
JOB 982/6



TARGET NO. 33

JOB NO 982/17A

3156

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EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3578.

TARGET: TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA.

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945.

TARGET NO. 1

Fire bombs completely blanket the entire target area and a concentration of incendiaries is seen across the West side. Scattered fire bombs are seen in open fields 1200 yards Northwest, 3000 yards South, and incendiaries are seen 1500 yards North, of the center of the target area.

TARGET NO. 7

Smoke obscures the target area and no bursts are visible but bombs are seen falling toward the general area of the objective.

TARGET NO. 8

Approximately ten scattered bursts are seen in open fields, 1000 yards East and 1700 yards North-Northwest, on smoke obscured photographs.

TARGET NO. 10

No bursts are visible on smoke obscured photographs but falling bombs may be estimated to strike in the immediate vicinity of the target and also at a point 2600 yards West-Northwest.

TARGET NO. 11

At least ten fire bombs are seen striking the Northern third of the target area with one hit visible on a 155 mm casemate. At least 15 bursts can be seen along the beach, starting in woods and a lightly built-up area 1500 yards Northwest.

TARGET NO. 12

Bombs are seen falling toward the general area of the target but no bursts are visible on smoke obscured photographs.

TARGET NO. 17

Six groups and a concentration totalling more than 225 H.E. bursts are seen extending across the target area, an unidentified group of buildings, TARGET NO. 16, the shore line, and into the water. At least three of the casemates have received very near hits and a fire is seen on another. One group of approximately 35 H.E. bursts is seen extending across the woods, railway sidings, TARGET NO. 16, and into the harbor. A group of at least 20 H.E. bursts is seen extending across TARGET NO. 14, and the two jettys, with one burst in the harbor. In woods just Southwest of the target is seen a group of approximately 20 H.E. bursts. A string of approximately 12 bursts is seen extending from the water just across the shore line.

TARGET NO. 18

Four groups totalling at least 150 bursts are seen blanketing the target and adjacent areas. On photographs taken late in the attack all three casemates are seen to be badly damaged. One section of a sea wall has been hit by at least three bursts and numerous bursts blanket a road. Six bursts are seen in open area 2000 yards West of the target.

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EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A.3578 (Continued) 15 April 1945.

TARGET NO. 19

The center of the target area was hit by successive groups of H.E. bursts totalling at least 80, with definite near hits and possible direct hits on at least three casemates. Approximately 50 H.E. bursts are visible in the water and along the shore immediately West and Northwest of the target, while a group of bursts is seen in an open area as a partially built-up area of Soulac-Les-Bains, one mile South-Southwest of the target.

TARGET NO. 24

Two compact concentrations of at least 50 H.E. bursts are seen directly on the target area, scoring probable hits and near hits on both guns. Two H.E. bursts are visible on the beach 1300 yards East-Southeast. A scattered group of 11 fire bomb bursts can be seen in a wooded area 1700 yards Northeast. A group of 50 H.E. bursts is noted in the ocean 700 yards west of the target.

TARGET NO. 26

The target is not visible on cloud and haze obscured photographs. Scattered I.B. bursts are seen in an open and wooded area four miles East-Northeast of the target, and although Napalm bombs are seen falling no resulting bursts are visible.

TARGET NO. 27

Approximately 40 H.E. bursts are seen across the central and Northern portion of the target area with possible hits, or at least near hits, visible on three of the four casemates. Other hits are seen on roads serving the installations.

TARGET NO. 28

The target and immediate area is heavily blanketed by four concentrations of H.E. bursts with probable hits on gun positions.

TARGET NO. 29

No bursts are visible on the target adjoining area on the photographs received.

TARGET NO. 32

A concentration of at least 60 H.E. bursts is seen blanketing the target area with several probable hits on the gun emplacements. Smoke prevents accurate pin-pointing of the bursts.

TARGET NO. 33

Approximately ten fire bombs are seen on the target area. Two large concentrations of bursts are seen immediately Northwest of the target area and extend approximately 1000 yards across the residential area. Another large concentration of bursts is seen on a residential area approximately 1800 yards East-Northeast of the target area. Several scattered bursts are seen in the water immediately Southwest of the target area and also along the coast and port facilities 700 yards to the East.

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EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B.574(R)

TARGET: ROYAN AREA

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945

TARGET NO. 7

The target of the attack was three emplaced heavy flak guns. The attack is concentrated on the centre of the target and extended to the highway N. Two of three emplacements have received direct hits, one being destroyed and the other heavily damaged. Several near misses in the vicinity of the remaining emplacement have partially filled it with spoil and probably damaged the gun. A shelter in the target area shattered by a hit on one corner and the two near misses. Bombs falling East and north of the target have heavily damaged two strong points in these areas.

TARGET NO. 8

The target for the attack is a strong point. There are five craters in the target area, the weight of attack falling south of the strong point in the adjacent town. Three weapons, pits and part of a connecting trench have been filled with spoil from three near misses. A hit has shattered a small shed and probably damaged the house to the rear of the target.

TARGET NO. 10

The target of the attack is a strong point. The attack is concentrated directly on the target and craters have rendered the outline of the strongpoint unrecognizable. Several craters, two direct hits and three near misses, are seen on a possible underground shelter. The only discernable elements of the target remaining are three short sections of fire trench.

TARGET NO. 11

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. Bomb craters are concentrated throughout the target area. Casemates are still intact but all have suffered near misses or probably damaged. Only three of seven open emplacements in the battery are still visible after the attack. The wooded area to the rear of the battery containing ammunition stores and personnel, housing, has been completely blanketed by craters which have obliterated all installations in the area.

TARGET NO. 12

The target of the attack is a four gun flak battery. There are craters scattered throughout the target area with the main concentration in the South. One emplacement in South area has been demolished by a direct hit, and another is severely damaged by a hit on the perimeter of the emplacement which has probably damaged the gun. There are four hits on the perimeter firing trench of a small strong point. A near miss has probably damaged a small shelter in the centre of the target.

TARGET NO. 18

The target is composed of 3 casemated coastal guns and heavy A.A. Further damage is noted and a new group of coasters extends across the target and to the rear. One edge of the No. 1 casemate appear now to have been chipped by a direct hit. The large shelter casemate referred to in No. 10 of B. 573 (R) of 16 April 1945 has received another direct hit. There are

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EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.B.574(R) Continued 15 April 1945.

TARGET NO. 18 (Continued)

now two holes approx. 10 ft in diameter in the roof. No other damage is noted.

TARGET NO. 32

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. Weight of the second attack is concentrated directly in the target area and spoil from numerous craters has been cast up around the enemy defence element in the battery. No. 3 casemate has been obliterated by several direct hits and near misses. No. 1 and No. 2 casemates are probably damaged from three near misses. No. 4 casemate has received a hit on one side but no structural damage is evident. Spoil from several craters is piled up around No. 5 casemate so as to almost extinguish its outline. No. 6 casemate has suffered probable damage from a hit on the West side but is still intact. Several direct hits have caved in the roof of an underground shelter in the rear of the area. One open emplacement to the rear of No. 4 casemate has been partially filled with spoil but the gun is still visible. A network of trenches N.W. of the battery have suffered heavy damage in the attack, only one section of trench being visible on these photographs.

ROYAN

The area within a hundred foot radius of the pinpoint designated as the target has received a heavy concentration of hits. All buildings on the actual site have been flattened. Damage extends over a wide radius, no building within four hundred feet of the pinpoint has escaped damage - being either gutted or roofless.

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EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B.573(R).

TARGET: ROYAN AREA.

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945.

TARGET NO. 28

A few more craters are seen on the Northern edge of the target area and extending to the beach. As a result of both attacks of the 14th, 15th April, 45, every installation has suffered at least one near miss. The only structural damage apparent is slight damage to one flak emplacement. Three of the flak positions are occupied.

TARGET NO. 27

The target for this attack is a four position casemated battery. The main concentration of craters is centered in the target area and extending North. A direct hit and two near misses on No. 3 casemates, reported after the first strike, are clearly seen in this cover, however, the casemate is still intact. A blast walled shelter to the rear of No. 1 casemate has suffered a direct hit on the corner, and two near misses have partially buried it with soil. There is a crater at the entrance to an underground shelter to the rear of No. 4 casemate. There are two craters within fifty feet of No. 1 casemate. A concentration of craters in the area of several small sheds to the rear of the battery is seen but no structural damage is evident.

TARGET NO. 26

The target of the attack is a four position casemated battery. The weight of the second attack is concentrated at the North side of the target area and extending into the adjacent wood. Near misses on No. 2 and No. 3 casemates from the first attack are discernable but no further structural damage to the elements of the battery is evident. One near miss has probably damaged an underground shelter to the rear of No. 2 casemate. There is a concentration of craters in the wood North of the target area in the vicinity of several small sheds which have suffered probable damage.

TARGET NO. 24

The target for the attack is a battery of three casemated positions. The main concentration of the second attack is directly on the target area. Several hits have destroyed a large building in the target area and probably damaged an adjoining shed. A near miss has heaped soil up on the rear of one casemate but no structural damage is evident. One hit has severely damaged one of four open emplacements in the battery and a near miss has probably damaged the gun in another open emplacement. Blast from several near misses has shattered a large building East of the target area.

TARGET NO. 17

The target of the attack is a four position casemated coastal battery. There are concentrations of craters South and East of the area but none on the target. Seven craters are seen in the vicinity of personnel shelters East of the target which are probably damaged.

TARGET NO. 38

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. There is a heavy concentration of craters in the Northern part of the battery

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TARGET NO. 38 (Continued)

area and extending East through the adjacent wood. There are two near misses on casemates No. 1 and No. 2 but no structural damage is evident. A near miss on an open emplacement between casemates No. 1 and No. 2 has damaged the wall and probably damaged the gun. In the rear of the battery two underground shelters are blanketed with craters, one direct hit and three near misses. A near miss has probably damaged a personnel shelter East of the battery.

TARGET NO. 19

The target is a four gun casemated coastal battery. There is a good concentration of craters over the target area. Nos. 2, 3, and 4 casemates each suffered one near miss. An occupied emplacement in front of No. 4 casemate received a direct hit which destroyed part of the emplacement wall and probably damaged the gun. The observation post between No. 2 and No. 3 casemates suffered two near misses and immediately to the rear an underground shelter suffered a direct hit and a near miss, the blast removed the sand from one side. To the rear of the battery, three wooden personnel buildings were destroyed, all lines of a rail siding were cut and two occupied flak emplacements were destroyed or severely damaged.

TARGET NO. 18

Three casemated coastal guns and heavy A.A. comprise the target. The target area is completely blanketed with craters, some of which are on the sea wall. The craters are water filled and an area to the rear of the battery is partially flooded. A great amount of spoil has been blown up by the bombs. The casemates appear to have been damaged but there is a hole approximately 10 ft. in diameter in the roof of a large shelter casemate in the center of the battery. Only one flak position remains.

TARGET NO. 1

A very heavy concentration of craters is spread over the whole of this defence area covering the entire area with a layer of sand. The only remaining elements of defence installations are a few sections of trench on the far South and on the North. Two direct hits have caved in an underground shelter and one building within the area is severely shattered. There are three guns in open emplacements near the highway at the North of the area but their condition cannot be determined. Several small fires were still burning at the time of these photographs.

TARGET NO. 33A

An area of 110 yards radius about the pinpoint is completely blanketed with craters. No land forms or structures in the area are discernable.

TARGET NO. 33

The target is smothered with a heavy concentration of craters - no area being missed. All emplacements are destroyed or heavily damaged. The roof of the shelter in the centre of the fort has been caved in. Two guns remain in open emplacements but their condition cannot be determined. The area of crater concentration extends N.E. blanketing point 036030 where all installations are destroyed or heavily damaged.



Damage assessment photographs for targets 19 and 18 were flown before the final attack ending 1327 hours and this report on these targets covers only damage prior to the last attack.

ATTACK ON ROYAN AREA

15 APRIL 1945

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SCALE: APPROXIMATE 1 INCH = 1 MILE



92 LE
92 LO
92 HI
306 LE

305 LE
305 HI

466 LE
466 LO
466 HI

446 LE
446 LO
446 HI

398 LE
398 LO
398 HI

446 LE
93 LE
392 LO
389 LE
389 HI
446 HI
445 LE
389 LO
445 LO

467 LE
467 LO
467 4TH
458 LE
458 1RD
458 2ND
458 LE
93 HI
93 LO
467 2ND
448 HHR

100 DIA
390 LE
390 DIA
490 LE
44 LO
385 HI
100 LO
487 LO
487 DIA
34 LO
487 LE
34 LE
95 HI
486 LE
486 LO
447 DIA
446 1RD

390 HI
100 HI

100 LE
388 LO
388 LE
493 HI
95 LE
493 HI
493 LO
96 LO
452 LE
96 LE
452 LO
388 HI
491 LE
452 HI
490 HI
385 LE
448 HI
95 LO
385 LO
490 C
487 HI
44 HI
94 HI

390 LO
95 DIA
491 LO
447 HI
44 LE
34 HI

384 LE
384 LO
94 LE
384 HI
94 LO

447 LE & LO, 486 LO & HI ARE PLOTTED JUST OFF THE MAP

91 LE
457 LE 1
457 LE 2
457 LO 3
457 LO 4
457 HI 1
379 LE
379 LO
379 HI

306 LO
91 LE

401 HI 5

301 LE 1
401 LE 2
401 LO 3
401 LO 4
303 LE
303 LO
303 HI

91 LO
351 LE
351 LO 2
351 LO 3
351 LO 4
351 HI 5
351 HI 6
381 LE
381 LO
381 HI

FIRST AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK	NONE
CLOUD COVER	NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	15,000'
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED	27
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED	18
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED	26
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED	16
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES PLOTTED	26
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES PLOTTED	16
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED	2,000 LB G.P. 1,000 LB G.P.

SECOND AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK	NONE
CLOUD COVER	NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	15,000'
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED	34
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED	11
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED	33
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED	3
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES PLOTTED	33
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES PLOTTED	3
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED	NAPALM FIRE BOMBS C M-47 1B'S

THIRD AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK	NONE
CLOUD COVER	NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	15,000'
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED	49
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED	48
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES PLOTTED	47
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED	NAPALM FIRE BOMBS C M-47 1B'S

○ — AIMING POINTS

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BOMBING DATA

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
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Targets in German Occupied France

Target No. 32 (Pte de Susac)

384A	293	6 min	15,580	1123	X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
384B	293	2 min	14,950	1123½	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
384C	295	4 min	15,510	1124	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

Target No. 17 & 38 (Pte de Grave)

379A	288	10 min	15,550	1126½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
379B	285	10 min	14,500	1128½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
379C	284	10 min	16,300	1130	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
306C	110	2 min	16,500	1147	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
457A ¹	272	3 min	16,500	1258	X	23x2000HE 21x1000HE	1	11
457B ¹	286	3 min	15,900	1259	X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
457C ¹	285	3 min	17,100	1301	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12

Target No. 19 (Pte de Grave)

303A	286	1 min	15,550	1129	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
303B	286	1 min	15,050	1130½	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
303C	274	1 min	16,600	1158½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
401A ¹	280	3 min	15,200	1322	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
401B ¹	285	3 min	14,400	1321	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

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5 April 1945

BOMBING DATA

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE	MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
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1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 19 (Pte de Grave) (Continued)

401C ¹	277	3 min	15,500	1327		X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
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Target No. 18 (Pte de Grave)

381A	286	8 min	15,550	1129½		X	24x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	11
381B	283	6 min	15,050	1130		X	24x2000HE 18x1000HE 4x1000 HE	1	11
381C	286	6 min	16,075	1131½		X	26x2000HE 20x1000HE 4x1000 HE	1	12
91B	140	2 min	15,050	1150		X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
351A ¹	280	3 min	15,000	1314½		X	72x1000HE	1	11
351B ¹	303	3 min	14,400	1311		X	78x1000HE	1	12
351C ¹	283	3 min	16,000	1306½		X	78x1000HE	1	12

Target No. 24 (le Fort - Royan Area)

398A	359	6 min	16,100	1147½		X	20x2000HE 20x1000HE	1	9
398B	350	17 min	15,200	1149		X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
398C	305	3 min	16,130	1136		X	20x2000HE 20x1000HE	1	9

Target No. 16 (Pte de Grave)

91A	110	3 min	15,600	1147		X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
91C	119	4 min	16,100	1210		X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

Target No. 28 (La Coubre)

306A	280	4 min	15,391	1142		X	24x2000HE 23x1000HE	1	11
92A	281	3 min	15,550	1154½		X	23x2000HE 23x1000HE	1	11
92B	287	3 min	14,560	1155		X	30x2000HE 30x1000HE	1	14
92C	287	3 min	15,700	1154		X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

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BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
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1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 14 (Pte de Grave)

306B	266	4 min	14,900	1139	X	25x2000HE 25x1000HE	1	12
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Target No. 27 (la Coubre)

305A	284	1 min	15,500	1147	X	26x2000HE 25x1000HE	1	12
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305B DID NOT BOMB

305C	288	3 min	16,050	1147	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
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2ND AIR DIVISION

Royan Area

392	300	1 min	15,000	1108	X	84x550 IB	1	10
392	300	1 min	16,000	1108 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	70x550 IB	1	8
392	295	1 min	14,500	1109		X 46x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	8
491	284	4 min	15,500	1110	X	52x550 IB	1	6
491	285	2 min	16,000	1111 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	76x550 IB	1	9
491	292	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ min	14,500	1110-3/4		X 71x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	11
44	285	3 min	15,000	1110		X 78x550 IB	1	10
44	283	3 min	15,400	1110	X	76x550 IB	1	9
44	304	3 min	14,000	1110	X	74x550 IB	1	9
466	298	2 min	15,000	1115-3/4	X	70x550 IB	1	9
466	298	2 min	14,900	1116 $\frac{1}{4}$	X	69x550 IB	1	9
466	304	2 min	14,280	1114	X	76x550 IB	1	9
466	275	3 min	14,100	1116	X	43x550 IB 130xM47IB	1	7
467	301	2 min	15,500	1117	X	76x550 IB	1	9
467	285	2 min	15,400	1116-1/3	X	76x550 IB	1	9
467	299	1 min	15,150	1117	X	5x500 HE 38x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	8
458	286	45 sec	15,900	1118	X	52x550 IB	1	6

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BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
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2ND AIR DIVISION (continued)

Royan Area (Continued)

458	286	1 min	15,500	1120	X	67x550 IB	1	8
458	303	1½ min	15,300	1122	X	62x550 IB 104xM47	2	9
93	296	3½ min	15,000	1121	X	57x550 IB	1	7
93	306	1 min	15,500	1122	X	44x550 IB 98xM47 IB	1	9
93	300	3 min	14,700	1121½	X	53x550 IB	1	7
446	304	3 min	16,500	1123		X 74x550 IB 52xM47 IB	1	10
446	310	4 min	17,000	1124	X	2x500 HE 61x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	11
446	312	4 min	15,560	1124	X	77x550 IB	1	9
448	295	2 min	15,000	1126	X	72x550 IB	1	9
448	295	2 min	16,500	1130	X	76x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9
448	286	2 min	15,500	1129	X	66x550 IB 1xM47	1	8
389	302	6 min	15,000	1118	X	67x550 IB	1	8
389	307	4 min	15,500	1118	X	61x550 IB	1	8
389	300	3 min	14,200	1118	X	68x550 IB	1	8
445	265	8 min	15,000	1127	X	68x550 IB 2xM47 IB	1	9
445	283	12 min	15,500	1129	X	79x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9
445	278	15 min	14,500	1127½	X	78x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9

3RD AIR DIVISION

Target No. 1

447A	282	6 min	15,500	1010	X	60x550 IB	1	9
447D	278	5 min	14,450	1013	X	54x550 IB	1	8
447C	271	6 min	14,990	1013	X	58x550 IB	1	9
447B	292	6 min	16,120	1030	X	57x550 IB	1	9
486A	289	6 min	15,400	1015	X	48x550 IB	1	7

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DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
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3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 1 (Continued)

486B	288	6 min	16,060	1016	X	48x550 IB	1	7
486C	274	6 min	15,032	1018	X	60x550 IB	1	9
486D	288	6 min	14,520	1017	X	54x550 IB	1	8
487A	280	6 min	15,490	1020	X	52x550 IB	1	8
487B	285	6 min	15,900	1020	X	60x550 IB	1	9
487C	299	6 min	14,950	1021	X	54x550 IB	1	8
487D	285	7 min	14,500	1020	X	48x550 IB	1	7
94A	282	6 min	14,900	1023	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94B	284	6 min	16,016	1025	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94C	283	6 min	14,700	1030	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94D	288	6 min	14,225	1034	X	60x550 IB	1	9
34A	270	6 min	15,550	1030	X	504xM47IB	1	11
34C	300	6 min	15,050	1031	X	546xM47IB	1	12
95B	281	6 min	15,600	1034	X	66x550 IB	1	10
95C	282	6 min	15,000	1035	X	48x550 IB	1	8
95D	290	6 min	14,500	1035	X	54x550 IB	1	8
390A	282	6 min	15,550	1039	X	60x550 IB	1	9
390C	286	6 min	16,100	1040	X	52x550 IB	1	8
100B	280	5 min	15,950	1044	X	48x550 IB	1	8
100C	282	6 min	15,300	1046	X	47x550 IB	1	7
100D	280	6 min	14,900	1046	X	59x550 IB	1	9
385A	285	7 min	15,570	1047	X	72x550 IB	1	11
385B	292	7 min	16,084	1048	X	78x550 IB	1	12
385C	280	7 min	15,150	1049	X	78x550 IB	1	12
490A	286	7 min	15,550	1049	X	503xM47IB	1	11
490B	273	7 min	16,200	1050	X	497xM47IB	1	11
490C	285	7 min	14,700	1050	X	502xM47IB	1	11

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BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	FACE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
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3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 33

388A	278	6 min	15,543	1055	X	72x550 IB	1	11
388B	283	6 min	16,055	1057	X	75x550 IB	1	12
388C	283	6 min	15,150	1057	X	75x550 IB	1	12
452A	282	5 min	15,400	1059	X	69x550 IB	1	11
452B	275	5 min	16,100	1101	X	78x550 IB	1	12
452C	262	5 min	14,900	1101	X	78x550 IB	1	12
96A	275	6 min	15,500	1103	X	72x550 IB	1	11
96C	285	6 min	14,950	1103	X	78x550 IB	1	12
493A	281	6 min	15,200	1103	X	501xM47IB	1	11
493B	280	6 min	14,400	1103	X	378xM47IB	1	8
493C	275	6 min	14,040	1104		X 377xM47IB	1	8
95A	273	6 min	15,500	1034	X	50x550 IB	1	8
390B	287	6 min	15,460	1040	X	49x550 IB	1	8
390D	291	6 min	15,900	1041	X	60x550 IB	1	9
100A	279	6 min	15,530	1043	X	47x550 IB	1	7

Target No. 24

34B	269	5 min	16,080	1033	X	543xM47IB	1	12
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WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Rochefort, Royan area

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
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DATE 15 April 1945

0530 - 1500 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initial _____
Date _____



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
WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Rochefort, Royan

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1st BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr. 45
0630-1530 Hrs.

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Date _____




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2nd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr. 45
0540-1449 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____




WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Royan area

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3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr. 45
0520-1430 Hrs.

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WEATHER OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 15 APRIL 1945

1. Base to Target.

Broken clouds to overcast clouds with haze, locally light fog, becoming scattered clouds north of 4830 N. with fog in patches becoming scattered clouds south of 4830 N. with fog in patches over France becoming nil by 1030 hours. 7-10/10 stratus or stratocumulus base 2-3000 feet, tops 8-10000 feet with patches base 500 feet, tops 1500 feet becoming 6-8/10 base 4-6000 feet, tops 7-9000 feet becoming nil south of 4830 N. Nil middle cloud becoming 4-6/10 altocumulus base 16-18,000 feet, tops 20,000 feet north of 50° N. and east of 03° E. becoming nil south of 50° N. 4-6/10 cirrostratus base 25-26,000 feet. Freezing level 7000 feet becoming 10,000 feet, light rime. Visibility 1-2 miles locally 1000 yards, unrestricted aloft, downward 15-25 miles.

2. Target to Base.

Scattered clouds becoming broken clouds with haze north of 4830 N. Reverse of route out except 6-9/10 stratocumulus and large cumulus base 2-3000 feet, tops 8-10,000 feet over bases. Freezing level reverse of route out. Visibility unrestricted becoming 4-6 miles over bases.

3. Winds.

	<u>Bases to 49° N.</u>		<u>49° N. to Target</u>	
Surface	250°	10 Knots	Light and Variable	
5,000 feet	260	15	Light and Variable	
10,000	270	20	Light and Variable	
15,000	280	25	300°	10 Knots
20,000	300	30	320	20
25,000	300	35	330	30
30,000	310	40	340	35

Target (Note: Velocities vary from 0-10 Knots with Directions from the Northwest)

Surface	Light and Variable		
5,000 feet	"	"	"
10,000	"	"	"
15,000	"	"	"
20,000	"	"	"
25,000	"	"	"
30,000	"	"	"

4. Temperatures.

	<u>Navigational</u>	<u>Target</u>
Surface	14 Deg. C	17 Deg. C
5,000 feet	08	10
10,000	00	00
15,000	-10	-09
20,000	-20	-19
25,000	-32	-31
30,000	-45	-44

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WEATHER OPERATIONAL FORECAST (Continued)

15 April 1945

5. Indicated and True Altitude, and Mean Temperature.

<u>Indicated Altitude</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Mean Temperature</u>
12,000 feet	12,518 feet	09° C
14,000	14,570	07.25
16,000	16,616	05
18,000	18,666	03
20,000	20,732	01.25
22,000	22,777	-01
24,000	24,837	-03
26,000	26,899	-05
28,000	28,957	-07

Pressure Altitude: Minus 266

6. Remarks.

No contrails at operational level.

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SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 15 APRIL 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0630-0740 Hours) 9-10/10 layered stratocumulus base 500-1000 feet tops 5-7000 feet. Variable 3-5/10 altocumulus, base 10-12,000 feet. Visibility 2-4 miles.

Route Out

Low cloud decreased to 4-6/10, base 3000 feet top 4000 feet over southern England, channel and Northern France and decreased to nil south of Paris. Medium cloud decreased to nil at English coast. 3-5/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet over England, decreased to 0-3/10 over France. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

Target

Royan (1145 Hours) Clear. Air to ground visibility 25-30 miles.

Return Route

Clear, becoming 5-7/10 cumulus, base 2-4000 feet top 6-7000 feet over England.

Bases on Return

(1417-1530 Hours) Variable 4-7/10 cumulus and stratocumulus, base 2-3000 feet tops 6-8000 feet. Visibility 10-15 miles.

Remarks

Nil contrails. Winds and temperatures satisfactory.

2ND AIR DIVISION

Bases at Take-Off

(0540-0620 Hours) 10/10 stratus, base 600-1000 feet, tops 15-2000 feet. 7-10/10 stratocumulus, base 3-4000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Visibility 2-3000 yards. Surface wind WSW-SW, 5-12 mph.

Route Out

10/10 stratus, base 600-1000 feet, tops 15-2000 feet becoming nil over continent. 7-10/10 stratocumulus, base 3-4000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet becoming 6-8/10, base 3-4000 feet, tops 4-6000 feet, but top to 10,000 feet in eastern portion of assembly area. Stratocumulus becoming nil south of 50° north. Nil medium cloud except for 1-3/10, base 16,000, tops 18,000 feet over eastern portion of assembly area becoming nil south of 50° north. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000.

Targets

Vaux sur Mer - Royan (1107-1155 Hours) Nil low cloud and nil medium cloud. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 15-25 miles.

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SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED (Continued)

15 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Return Route

Nil low cloud becoming 4-7/10 cumulus and stratocumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 5-7000 feet over southern England becoming 2-5/10 in Base area. Also nil to 3/10 high stratocumulus, base 5000 feet, tops 6000 feet over south England becoming 3-6/10 over bases. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet.

Bases on Return

(1350-1449 Hours) 2-5/10 cumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 5-7000 feet and 3-6/10 high stratocumulus, base 5000 feet, tops 6000 feet with cumulus increasing and stratocumulus decreasing during the period. Visibility 5-10 miles. Surface wind SW-WNW, 9-14 mph.

Remarks

Nil contrails. Winds and temperatures as forecast.

3RD AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0520-0600 Hours) 10/10 stratus and stratocumulus base 800-1000 tops 15-2000 feet. Visibility 25-3500 yards becoming unrestricted aloft.

Route Out

8-10/10 stratus and stratocumulus over England breaking to 4-6/10 over channel and to nil in assembly area. 2-3/10 cirrus above 20,000 feet. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

Target

Royan (1015-1110 Hours) Clear. Downward visibility 25 miles.

Return Route

Clear becoming 8/10 cumulus base 1500-2000 feet, tops 3-5000 feet and 4-6/10 altocumulus and altostratus base 6000 feet, tops 10,000 feet at 51° N. Horizontal visibility 8-10 miles in haze.

Bases on Return

1-2/10 cumulus base 2000 feet tops 5-6000 feet increasing to 5-6/10 by 1400 hours. 1-2/10 altocumulus base 8-10,000 feet. Visibility 5-6 miles in haze.

Remarks

None

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BOMBER SUMMARY

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

	<u>PTE de SUSAC ROYAN NO. 32</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 17</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 19</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 18</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 24</u>
A/C Sorties	38	42	42	37	31
A/C Credited Sorties	37	42	42	37	31
A/C Effective Sorties	36	42	42 a	37	31
A/C Bombing	36	42	41	37	31
1st Priority	36	42	40	37	31
2nd Priority	0	0	1 b	0	0
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	108.0	126.0	120.0	108.0	93.0
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	2.5	0	0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

a One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

b One aircraft - Target No. 24 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre).

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BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 29</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 26</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 27</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 28</u>	<u>TOTAL FORCE III</u>
A/C Sorties	37	39	39	39	344
A/C Credited Sorties	37	39	39	39	343
A/C Effective Sorties	37 c	38 c	26	39	328
A/C Bombing	36	37	26	39	325
1st Priority	0	0	26	39	251
2nd Priority	24 d	24 e	0	0	49
3rd Priority	12 f	13 g	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	77.5	115.5	748.0
2nd Priority (HE)	72.0	71.5	0	0	146.0
3rd Priority (HE)	36.0	37.5	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

c One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

d Twelve aircraft on Target No. 17 ; 12 aircraft on Target No. 18.

e Twelve aircraft on Target No. 28 ; 12 aircraft on Target No. 38.

f T.O. - Target No. 16 (Pointe de Grave).

g T.O. - Target No. 14 (Pointe de Grave).

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BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 18</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 19</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 17</u>	<u>TOTAL FORCE IV</u>	<u>TOTAL 1ST A.D.</u>
A/C Sorties	39	38	37	114	458
A/C Credited Sorties	39	38	37	114	457
A/C Effective Sorties	39 h	38	37 i	114	442
A/C Bombing	38	38	36	112	437
1st Priority	38	38	36	112	363
2nd Priority	0	0	0	0	49
3rd Priority	0	0	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	114.0	114.0	105.5	333.5	1081.5
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	146.0
3rd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

h One scouting aircraft.

i One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

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BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION

	<u>NO. 11</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 12</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 7</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 10</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 8</u>	<u>TOTAL 2ND A.D.</u>
A/C Sorties	67	97	97	28	70	359
A/C Credited Sorties	63	91	93	27	68	342
A/C Effective Sorties	63	89	92	27	68	339
A/C Bombing	63	89	92	27	68	339
1st Priority	43	89	91	26	67	316
2nd Priority	20 j	0	1 k	1 m	1 n	23
Total Bombs (Tons)						
1st Priority (HE)	0	.5	0	0	1.2	1.7
1st Priority (IB)	83.6	171.3	185.7	53.4	133.2	627.2
2nd Priority (IB)	43.2	0	2.2	1.8	2.2	49.4
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	4	4	2	0	10
Cat. "A"	0	3	3	2	0	8
Cat. "E"	0	1	1	0	0	2
Cause of Damage	0	4	4	2	0	10
AA	0	2	3	2	0	7
Other	0	2	1	0	0	3
Casualties						
Killed	0	0	0	0	2	2
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0	0

j Ten aircraft on Target No. 8 (Royan/Vaux-sur-mer).
Ten aircraft on Target No. 24 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre -- Le Fort).

k One aircraft on Target No. 8 (Royan/Vaux-sur-mer).

m One aircraft on Target No. 12 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre).

n One aircraft on Royan Area No. 7.

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BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION

	ROYAN AREA NO. 1 019052 <u>ILL. 734</u>	ROYAN AREA NO. 33A 100018 <u>ILL. 728/4</u>	ROYAN AREA NO. 33 043039 <u>ILL. 730</u>	TOTAL <u>3RD A.D.</u>	OPERATION <u>TOTAL</u>
A/C Sorties	189	189	145	523	1340
A/C Credited Sorties	189	189	145	523	1322
A/C Effective Sorties	188	185	131	504	1285
A/C Bombing	188	185	131	504	1280
1st Priority	175	149	131	455	1134
2nd Priority	13 o	36 p	0	49	121
3rd Priority	0	0	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	1083.2
1st Priority (IB)	282.3	234.6	208.2	725.1	1352.2
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	146.0
2nd Priority (IB)	19.0	56.7	0	75.7	125.1
3rd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	2	1	1	4	14
Cat. "A"	2	1	1	4	12
Cat. "E"	0	0	0	0	2
Cause of Damage	2	1	1	4	14
AA	1	1	1	3	10
Other	1	0	0	1	4
Casualties					
Killed	0	0	0	0	2
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

o Thirteen aircraft on Royan Area No. 24.

p Thirty-six aircraft on Royan Area No. 33 - 043039 Illus. 730.

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